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Summary
When South Africa's President, Thabo Mbeki, began doubting that HfV was the cause of
AIDS in the late nineties, the debate he introduced in his country was not new; it had
raged in the United States as far back as a decade ago. But, even prior to that, there had
been numerous controversies pertaining to the discovery of the Ill-virus. This thesis
argues that those contentions created such a heated atmosphere that the causal debates
that were to follow, however incredible they were, were largely unavoidable.
In its coverage of the epidemic, the media were immersed in its own politics. During the
early eighties, the gay newspapers in the US felt a personal responsibility to find the
cause of a disease that was rapidly killing many of its readers. But, in the process, the
often promoted unscientific and dangerous approaches. By the time the AIDS dissident
debate had unraveled in the US, the gay media was so suspicious of the anti-gay Reagan
government that they frequently advanced dissident arguments. The mainstream and
scientific media, on the other hand, were perceived as rigidly supporting government
institutions, excluding critical voices.
When the dissident debate reached South Africa ten years later, the South African media
was completely unprepared. Most journalists had never heard of AIDS dissidents; some
had not even heard of HfV or the anti-AIDS drug AZT, that the President had labeled
toxic. Begin a new democracy, with a history of white oppression, the black and white
media differed immensely on how to cover 'the President's debate'. Criticism of the newly
elected ANC government's arguments were often branded racist and unpatriotic, with
journalists suffering regular intimidation at the hands of state officials and government-
aligned editors.
This thesis examines the development of the politics surrounding the science of AIDS,
from the discovery of'HfV up until Thabo Mbeki's controversial contentions. To an equal
extent, it looks at the news media's coverage of the process, focusing on the approaches
to the debate of various media outlets and individual journalists. It also raises ethical
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issues, particularly in South Africa, that emerged during one of the most widely reported
debates in the country's history. It in no way attempts to provide a quantitative analysis of
media coverage and, in the case of the US media, draws heavily on analytical studies
conducted at the time.
NOTE: In the analysis of the South African media's coverage of the AIDS dissident
debate in Part Three: B, issues pertaining to the country's public broadcaster, the South
African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), were not discussed The reason was that the
author was the Corporation's Health Correspondent at the time, and therefore too closely
involved in the institution in order to provide an objective perspective.
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OPSOMMING
Toe Suid-Afrika se president, Thabo Mbeki, in die laat jare negentig begin het om die
oorsaak van VIGS in twyfel te trek, was die debat wat hy in sy land ingelei het, nie nuut
nie; dit reeds 'n dekade tevore in die VSA gewoed. Maar, selfs voor daardie debat, was
daar 'n hewige omstredenheid wat met die ontdekking van die MI-virus verband gehou
het. Hierdie tesis argumenteer dat daardie omstredenheid so 'n driftige atmosfeer geskep
het, dat die debat oor die oorsaak van VIGS wat sou volg, hoe ongeloofwaardig ook al,
grootliks onvermydelik was.
Met die dekking van die epidemie was die media in hul eie politiek gedompel. Tydens die
vroeë jare tagtig het gay-koerante in die VSA 'n persoonlike verantwoordelikheid gevoel
om die oorsaak te vind van 'n siekte wat baie van hulle lesers vinnig laat sterfhet. Maar,
in die proses het hulle dikwels onwetenskaplike en gevaarlike benaderings bevorder.
Teen die tyd dat die 'oorsaak-debat' in die VSA begin posvat het, was gay-koerante so
agterdogtig oor die anti-gay Reagan-regering dat hulle dikwels 'afvallige' argumente
aangemoedig het. Die hoofstroommedia en wetenskaplike joernale is aan die ander kant
weer gesien as rigiede ondersteuners van regeringsorganisasies, wat kritiese stemme wou
stilmaak.
Toe die 'oorsaak-debat' Suid-Afrika tien jaar later bereik het, het dit die plaaslike media
geheel en alonkant betrap. Die meeste joernaliste het toe nog nooit van 'VIGS-afvalliges'
gehoor nie; party nie eens van MIV of die teenvigsmiddel AZT, wat die president as
giftig geëtiketteer het nie. Daarby was die land 'n jong demokrasie met 'n geskiedenis van
wit onderdrukking, wat meegebring het dat wit en swart media-instansies grotendeels
verskil het oor hoe die 'president se debat' gedek moes word. Kritiek teen die nuut
verkose ANC-regering se argumente is dikwels as rassisties of onpatrioties afgemaak, en
regeringsamptenare of regeringsgesinde redakteurs het gereeld probeer om joernaliste te
intimideer.
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Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek die ontwikkeling van die politiek rondom die wetenskap
van VIGS, van die ontdekking van MIV tot en met Thabo Mbeki se omstrede argumente.
Dit kyk ook na die nuusdekking van die proses, deur op die benaderings van verskeie
media-instansies asook individuele joernalistse te fokus. Dit bespreek ook etiese kwessies
wat tydens nuusdekking na vore gekom het, veral in Suid-Afrika, waar hierdie debat van
die wydste nuusdekking óóit in die geskiedenis van die land geniet het. Dit poog geensins
om 'n kwantitatiewe analise van mediadekking te verskaf nie, en waar die Amerikaanse
media beskou word, word daar sterk gesteun op analitiese studies wat tydens die duur van
die debat uitgevoer is.
NOTA: In die analise van die Suid-Afrikaanse media se dekking van die 'oorsaak-debat' in Deel 3:B word
kwessies wat met die nuusdekking van die land se openbare uitsaaier, die Suid-Afrikaanse
Uitsaaikorporasie (SAUK), verband hou, nie bespreek nie. Die rede is dat die outeur die korporasie se
gesondheidskorrespondent was, en was daarom te nou verbind aan die korporasie om 'n objektiewe
perspektiefte verseker.
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The Scientific Politics of HIV/AIDS: A Media Perspective
CHAPTER ONE
IN SCIENCE, NAMES ARE NEVER INNOCENT: THE DISCOVERY OF THE
AIDS VIRUS
In science the credit goes to the man who convinces the world, not to the man to whom
the idea first occurs.
Francis Darwin 1848-1945: in Eugenics Review, April19l4.
(Cited in: The Little Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 2nd edition, 2001 :355)
Introduction
HIV/AIDS is not simply another medical condition like malaria, meningitis or mumps. It
has taken on a life of its own which rides on a multitude of vested interests having to do
with power, prestige, religion and money (Ncayiyana, 1997: I). No other disease in the
20thcentury has been associated with so much overt conflict and contestation - whether
in attributing origins and causes, or in proposing solutions and allocation of resources.
Schneider (1998: 1) contends that the fact that we have "AIDS activists" and not "TB" or
"measles activists" bears witness to the distinctive and unique political standing of this
pandemic.
Many, however, argue that it is not the disease itself that is political; AIDS merely
acts as a mirror reflecting the current state of modem world society (Benatar, 2001:374).
Nwokedi (personal communication, August 24,1999) depicts the epidemic as
metaphorical of "everything dysfunctional in society - from prejudice towards minorities
to political quagmires driven by a hunger for prestige, control and money".
On a scientific level, few incidents have illustrated these arguments as weU as the
discovery of the cause of AIDS in the early eighties: the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
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2(HIV). Francis (1984) argued that it revealed a scientific community far from noble or
cooperative, but "wretched and rank with politics" (cited in Shilts, 1987:462). In fact,
HIV uncovered scientific rivalry so relentless that it required the intervention of heads of
states (Shilts, 1987:593).
These were events that would eventually set the agenda - at least partially - for a
quandary of distrust, factional partisanship and envy that would pave the road towards
infinite and trivial disputes over the cause of one of the worst scourges in recent history.
On the trail of a disturbing epidemic
Between October 1980 and May 1981 (Schoub, 1999:2) an attentive Los Angeles doctor,
Michael Gottlieb, became intrigued by a group of young, gay men with similar
symptoms. All of them - who had previously been healthy - were dying of an
uncommon, but severe, form of pneumonia known as pneumocystosis or PCP
(Montagnier, 2000:43). Up until this point, pneumocystosis had only been seen in babies
born without immune systems, or in patients whose defenses were deliberately
suppressed to avoid rejection of transplanted organs (Montagnier, 2000:43). They were
also infected with thrush, and showed a decrease in their number ofT4 lymphocytes - a
group of white blood cells that protect the human body against disease (Montagnier,
2000:241-242). All these symptoms are characteristic of people with suppressed immune
systems (Schoub, 1999:2).
On June 5, 1981, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States published a
report on these observations in its widely distributed weekly bulletin, Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR). The article Pneumocystis pneumonia in homosexual
men - Los Angeles (Gottlieb et al., 1981, cited in Shilts, 2000:67) was expected to
generate strong interest among the medical and scientific community ... but it initially
seemed of" little more interest than the usual litany of food poisonings and fevers
recorded from the four corners of the world" (Montagnier 2000:44).
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3It was only when a new alert was sounded a month later, in the July 4, issue that the
broader medical fraternity started paying attention to it. Kaposi's Sarcoma and
Pneumocystis Pneumonia Among Homosexual Men - New York and California (MWWR,
1981, cited in Shilts, 2000:76) informed doctors and public health officials that 20 New
Yorkers and 6 Californians had been diagnosed with Kaposi's Sarcoma (KS) - a rare form
of skin cancer that "usually attacks only elderly men of Mediterranean origin"
(Montagnier, 2000:44) or "Jewish extraction" (Schoub, 1999:2). This time, the medical
community became concerned: most of the KS patients also showed signs of
pneumocystosis pneumonia (PCP), thrush (Schoub, 1999:3) and reduced numbers ofT4
lymphocytes (Montagnier, 2000:45). Doctors realized that there could be a possible
causal link between the PCP and KS patients, as they shared symptoms that seemed to
relate to "infections arising from the destruction of the immune system in gay men"
(Montagnier,2000:44).
But it soon became clear that the disease did not only affect gay men. Montagnier
(2000:45) cited that, by the end of 1982, it had already affected 750 people in the United
States and had also spread to Western Europe and Africa. By this time, a quarter of its
victims were intravenous drug users, hemophiliacs and heterosexual men and women.
In late 1982, the CDC decided to give a name to this unidentified illness, which for a
while had been known as GRID: gay-related immune deficiency. Because of its striking
effect on the immune system of patients who later included heterosexual men and
women, GRID's name was changed to AIDS: acquired immune deficiency syndrome.
AIDS was defined as a condition "affecting persons under sixty years of age who had no
other illness and were not undergoing any treatment that might depress their immune
systems" (Montagnier, 2000:45). Itmanifested itself by "the presence of one or more so-
called opportunistic infections [infections occurring only when the immune system is
very weak], or by the onset of Kaposi's Sarcoma" (Montagnier, 2000:45).
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4Identifying the causal agent
Finding the cause of AIDS became a matter of urgency: its rapid spread pointed towards
the disease escalating into one of the worst outbreaks in history. Kinsella (1989:82-83)
reported that a flurry of scientific and epidemiological research followed and that
discovering the "culprit" became the objective of scientists throughout the world.
By that time, researchers knew what type of agent they had to look for. From the vast
number of reported cases, it was clear that they were dealing with a communicable
disease. There were also substantial indications pointing to the involvement of blood
products: both intravenous drug users and hemophiliacs seemed to become infected via
contaminated blood (Montagnier, 2000:42). Moreover, it was apparent that "AIDS could
not be caused by a conventional bacterium, a fungus or protozoan, since these kinds of
germs are blocked by the filters through which the blood products necessary to the
survival of hemophiliacs are passed" (Montagnier, 2000:42). That left only a smaller
organism: the agent responsible for AIDS could only be a virus (Schoub, 1999:5;
Montagnier, 2000:42).
But, as it would later emerge, alleviating mankind's suffering is not the only striving of
medical researchers. Rewards for scientific discoveries are remarkably gratifying:
international recognition, prestige and - in the case of diseases - lucrative patents for
subsequent diagnostic tests. For an epidemic with the potential magnitude of AIDS, the
incentive could be as fine as the Nobel Prize for Medicine (Kinsella, 1989:85; Grmek,
1990:73); the larger the problem, the bigger the payoff for solving it (R. Anderson,
personal communication, June 13th,2001). These considerations would prove to playa
sinister role in the events leading to the discovery of the AIDS virus, becoming so
ominous that they would lead to "some of the most scandalous glory grabs in the history
of modern science" (Kinsella, 1989:235).
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5The people behind the scenes
The search for the AIDS virus started in the laboratories of two researchers, on two
different continents - the United States and Europe.
Luc Montagnier was the director of the Cancer Virus Unit of the Pasteur Institute, a
private foundation in Paris. Montagnier specialized in cancer viruses classified as human
retroviruses (HTLV): a virus family capable of inserting itself into the DNA of certain
types of white blood cells and, in the process, programming them to produce viruses
(Whiteside & Sunter, 2000:2). His unit was relatively new, but had nonetheless made
remarkable progress in developing techniques to grow human retroviruses (Montagnier,
2000:36).
Robert Gallo worked for a considerably more influential institution. The National Cancer
Institute (NCI) in Bethesda, Maryland was regarded as "one of the most important
biomedical research centres in the world" (Kinsella, 1989:12). It formed part of the US
Department of Health and Human Services' National Institutes of Health (NIH) that
conducted most of the US government's laboratory research into health matters.
The Parisian and American did not only work for two very diverse institutions; they were
also as dissimilar as two human beings could be: "each made the other vaguely
uncomfortable: Gallo was chummy, aggressive and charismatic. Montagnier held himself
aloof and was doughty and patrician" (Shilts, 1987:264).
In the United States, many in the AIDS field placed their bets on Gallo's labs. He was an
aggressive doctor who in 1976 mistakenly claimed that he had discovered the first viral
form of cancer. Gallo's colleagues "believed he wanted to redeem himself by discovering
the cause of AIDS" (Kinsella, 1989:83). If this was indeed the case, he was by now well
on his way to recovery: two years after the 1976 imbroglio, he discovered a new
retrovirus: HTLV-1 (Human T-cell Leukemia Virus), a virus that causes leukemia. For
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6this, he received the prestigious Albert Lasker Award and became recognized as a
"patriarch in the field ofretrovirology" (Shilts, 1987:270).
More importantly, Robert Gallo possessed personality traits considered formidable in the
fight against epidemics: he was arrogant and temperamental (Shilts, 1987:270). In
scientific politics, he could be ruthless. The NCI was often criticized for Gallo's pompous
ways, but passed it off as merely "reflecting the shadow side of his character" (Shilts,
1987 :270). Gallo himself justified his actions by claiming his behaviour was "what was
required from the few brave scientists who challenge nature to yield its secrets to them"
(Shilts, 1987:270). Furthermore, the NCI scientist carried enough weight in scientific
circles to thwart any attempts by the French to have their discoveries recognized in the
US - "the only arena that really mattered" (Shilts, 1987:264).
Luc Montagnier had noticeably fewer accomplishments ... but he was no less ambitious.
He knew exactly what he wanted to achieve and was well aware that these targets could
be time-consuming - as he later admitted in his account of the discovery ofHIV, Virus
(2000): "One [a scientist] must have the ability of a gambler fisherman. As for me, I am
only interested in big fish. But they are rather rare" (Montagnier 2000:41). The Parisian
was exceptionally hardworking, and at a rather speedy pace: by the end of 1977 - five
years after its opening - Montagnier's unit was believed to already be equipped with "all
the concepts and methods that would be needed for the isolation of the AIDS virus"
(Montagnier, 1986 cited in Grmek, 1990:61). He was well aware of Gallo's "list of
triumphs" (Grmek, 1990:71), as the two had already collaborated on one occasion
(Montagnier, 2000:40). But ironically, Montagnier's own institute offered him something
the mighty NCI could not compete with: greater intellectual freedom (Grmek, 1990:71).
The Pasteur Institute's objective was to be a "sort of scientific cooperative, where
individuals could contribute to a common goal without risking their intellectual freedom"
(Roux cited in Grmek, 1990:60).
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7The race starts
Gallo and Montagnier had the same "culprit" in mind - a human retrovirus (Grmek,
1990:63; Shilts, 1987:289). At the time, the only known human retrovirus family was
HTLV, the Human T-cell Leukemia Virus group (Grmek, 1990:65). This was the same
class of viruses to which HTLV-1 - the leukemia virus that Gallo discovered in 1978 -
belonged. Their suspicions were substantial: the AIDS virus seemed to destroy T4-
lymphocytes [almost all AIDS patients had reduced numbers ofT4-cells], a form of
contamination that human retroviruses were strongly associated with (Grmek, 1990:62;
Shilts, 1987:163). The virus family had also been linked to "conditions characterized by
an impaired immune system" (Martin, 2000).
In order to survive, a retrovirus produces a unique enzyme known as reverse transcriptase
(Whiteside & Sunter, 1999:2). This compound enables the virus to programme its host
cells [in this case T4 lymphocytes] to assist in producing more viruses (Schoub,
1999:57). When searching for a retrovirus, its reverse transcriptase signals its presence.
In January 1983, Luc Montagnier's team found traces of this reverse transcriptase in the
tissue sample of an enlarged lymph node [swollen gland] in a patient with pre-AIDS
symptoms (Grmek, 1990:63). Swollen glands - or lymphadenopathy syndrome - are "one
of the disease manifestations which precedes AIDS" (Schoub, 1999:9). Montagnier's
team now knew they were dealing with a retrovirus (Grmek, 1990:63) ... but they still
had to determine what type of retrovirus it was: was it a new type, or another variant of
HTLV?
In order to make this determination, the Pasteur scientists infected "healthy" T4-
lymphocyte cells they obtained from non-infected blood donors, with cultures of the
newly found virus, and closely monitored its actions (Grmek, 1990:63). To their surprise,
it operated notably different from retroviruses belonging to the HTLV family: "HTLV
caused lymphocytes to divide, and this multiplication increased the amount of reverse
transcriptase. This new virus seemed to act differently: it killed the cells" (Grmek, 1990:
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864). They therefore called their discovery the Lymphadenopathy/Lymphotropic
Associated Virus (LAV), signaling that it was isolated from a lymphadenopathy patient
(Montagnier, 2000:57) and had an affinity for T4-lymphocytes (Grmek, 1990:68). The
name LAV bore no relation to RTLV. Rather, it indicated that, although both LAV and
RTL V variants were human retroviruses, LAV seemed to belong to a separate category
of retroviruses.
Later, this finding proved to be a turning point in the scientific understanding of the
epidemic. But in the lives of the French discoverers, it was noted as the beginning of
great frustration: "they had taken the mystery out of the mystery disease but nobody was
going to believe them" (Shilts, 1987:320).
Gallo's labs
At the NCI, Gallo's team was conducting research aimed at demonstrating exactly the
opposite: that the AIDS virus originated from the RTL V-family. Gallo believed the virus
to be very close - or even identical - to his own discovery, RTL V-1 (Shilts, 1987: 289).
The NCI had not found a virus yet, but it did locate "preliminary evidence of retroviruses
... in tissues from people with AIDS or pre-AIDS conditions" (Gallo 1987 cited in
Grmek, 1990:67) and was busy studying it for similarities to HTLV-l (Grmek, 1990:65).
The NCI scientist was so convinced that Montagnier was wrong that he sent the Parisian
RTL V-1 antibodies to compare with LAV (Montagnier, 2000: 51). But when Montagnier
informed him that the results had yielded nothing (Montagnier 2000: 51), Gallo refused to
believe him (Grmek 1990:67).
Going public
The Pasteur team was not deterred by Gallo's response; it was ready to publish its
findings. The French research did not only defy the Americans', it was also more
advanced: the Pasteur Institute had a virus - something the NCI could not yet claim.
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9But, the US team was not going to allow this situation to intimidate it: Gallo was ready to
use his influence to boost his own arguments, and ensure that his competitor's
conclusions would be taken as lightly as possible.
Montagnier recorded his recollection of these events in Virus (2000:55): "This was April
1983, and I was preparing a text for publication in the British journal Nature. On Easter
Monday, Robert Gallo called my home to tell me he was about to submit for publication
in the American journal Science his initial findings on the role ofHTLV in AIDS ...
Might it be possible, he wondered, for us to present our findings in the same issue? He
was convinced we had, like him, found an HTLV virus and that our ... articles, if
published in the same issue, would lend each other to support."
The tight deadline left the Parisian with only two days in which to finish his article. To
save time, he sent it directly to Gallo and thereby bypassed the Science editor. To the
editor, this was an acceptable move, as Gallo was the journal's peer reviewer to whom the
editor would automatically first send Montagnier's article for critique (Montagnier,
2000:55). But in his haste, Montagnier had forgotten to write an abstract, which was to be
published at the head of the article. Gallo offered to write it for him, and by accepting the
offer, Montagnier made one of the most regrettable mistakes of his career: he allowed
Gallo to unilaterally change his work, promoting Gallo's own arguments: "His [Gallo's]
summary ... implied that our virus should be included in the family ofHTVL, whereas
the rest of the article, as well as its title indicated the contrary" (Montagnier, 2000:56).
The abstract did not only support Gallo's own findings, it also diminished the impact of
Montagnier's research significantly: his [apparent] contradictory and confusing
statements had to be weighed up against those of the authoritative and conclusive Gallo.
To the readers of Science there was little choice - they'd believe the person with the
clearest article and most credentials. The May 20 1983 issue of Science consequently left
the Pasteur Institute with "a bitter aftertaste" (Grmek, 1990:66). Montagnier later bitterly
recalled that he started to realize that his team, without being aware of it, was already
engaged in a scientific quarrel that would not be settled for a number of years
U:-lIVERSITE, r "1.;"1
81SLO ,
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
10
(Montagnier, 2000:56). Even after the French team isolated LAV in several AIDS
patients of different social, ethnic and biological backgrounds and obtained even more
evidence that LAV was not a member of the HTLV family (Grmek, 1990:66), the Pasteur
virus would for many years continue to be the "poor cousin ofrich Uncle Sam" [Gallo's
virus] (Grmek, 1990:67).
Battle lines
In September 1983, Gallo invited Montagnier to a colloquium on retroviruses that he had
been asked to organize at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory on Long Island, New York.
The colloquium focused on HTL Vand leukemia, and also included a session on AIDS.
Montagnier was to present his latest findings on his work with LAV: he had found new,
morphological differences between LAVand HTLV-1 (Grmek, 1990:68) as well as proof
of similarities between LAVand the lentivirus [slow virus] responsible for equine
infectious anemia (EIAV) in horses.
A senior CDC researcher had studied his results and was visibly impressed. Montagnier
hoped the other Americans could be convinced as well. But, he was met with "a wall of
indifference and bad faith" (Montagnier 2000:63), with the scientists talking continuously
about the possibility that Gallo's leukemia virus might be the cause of AIDS (Shilts,
1987:371). When Montagnier finally presented his findings at the end of the proceedings,
some researchers were so convinced by Gallo's findings that they "chuckled aloud"
(Shilts, 1987: 372) at Montagnier's.
Leading a grueling interrogation ofMontagnier, Gallo mocked the supposed link to the
equine virus, expressed doubt that LAV was a retrovirus and rejected its etiological
relationship with AIDS (Grmek, 1990:68).When Montagnier later asked his counterpart
why he had acted in this way when he had all the details of the French team's work at
hand [Montagnier's manuscript had been given to Gallo three months prior to the
conference], Gallo replied: "You punched me out" (Montagnier, 2000: 63), meaning that
Montagnier had "demolished all his work on HTLV and AIDS" (Shilts, 1987:372).
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But behind the scenes it became glaringly obvious that Gallo was well aware of the
credibility of the Pasteur team's virus, and was leaning heavily upon it. In June 1984, the
Cold Spring Harbor meeting published its proceedings: it contained an introduction by
Gallo, in which he described a new HTLV-variant, HTLV-III - a fact not mentioned
during the meeting of September 1983. Itwas a subtle, but clever change in the meaning
of the acronym, HTLV, that gave him away: where "L" had meant "Leukemia," it now
stood for "Lymphotropic" ... as in Montagnier's LAV (Grmek, 1990:68).
Exchanging viruses
Despite the growing distrust emerging between the Pasteur Institute and the NCI,
Montagnier sent Gallo, at the latter's request, two specimens of the LAV virus
(Montagnier, 2000:67). The NCI signed an agreement that recognized the French
priority: that the virus would be used for "biological, immunological or molecular
research only" (Grmek, 1990:69) and not for commercial purposes. But, despite the legal
protection, "lending" Gallo his virus turned out to be another unfortunate "Montagnier
blunder" - even though the "practice of exchange is very common in the scientific
community" (Montagnier, 2000:51). In March 1984, shortly after the swap, Gallo phoned
Montagnier to inform him he had isolated a new virus that was growing very well: an
HTLV a bit different from the others that he called HTL V-III. In his opinion, it was the
AIDS agent. The Americans wanted to be the discoverers of the cause of AIDS, and they
were going to make it happen - with or without their own virus.
Heckler's announcement
A month later, on April28 1984, US Health Secretary Margaret Heckler "proclaimed a
great victory for American science" (Montagnier, 2000:69) when she announced that
Robert Gallo and his team had - at last - found the cause of AIDS: HTLV-III. "Today we
add another miracle to the long honor roll of American medicine and science ... ", she
declared. "Today's discovery represents the triumph of science over a dreaded disease".
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(Heckler, 1984; cited in Shilts 1987:450-451). The French breakthroughs were glanced
over; in her press release, Heckler made no mention of the Pasteur Institute's work
(Kinsella, 1989:84). She was clearly more interested in gaining the support of Americans
accusing the US government of not doing enough to curb the epidemic, than
acknowledging the accomplishments of others: "Those who have disparaged this
scientific search - those who have said we weren't doing enough - have not understood
how sound, solid, significant medical research proceeds" (Heckler, 1984; cited in Shilts,
1987 :450-451).
Most people had indeed not understood how the "sound" and "solid" research
surrounding the discovery ofHTLV-III "proceeded". But in Paris, a disillusioned
Montagnier started realizing that something was wrong: his competitor's 'discovery'
followed unusually quickly on his borrowing of LAV from Montagnier.
The big question
Gallo published his findings in Science (May 4 1984; cited in Grmek, 1990:69);
Montagnier, on the other hand, could not get his research published anywhere
(Montagnier,2000:76). The world now knew that the cause of AIDS had been found ...
but what hadn't been established was the resemblance between LAV and HTLV-III: were
they two different viruses, or in fact one virus with two different names? For the French,
the time had arrived to find out. As Kinsella (1989:235) framed it, the answer would
prove to be of pronounced significance: "That question would reveal one of the most
scandalous glory-grabs in modern science. "
Reckoning
The Pasteur Institute announced their findings at a press conference at the Harley Hotel in
New York City on February 8 1985: the HTLV-III prototype isolate varied from LAV by
less than one percent (Shilts, 1987: 528). In the world of virology it was inconceivable
that there could be a genetic variation of less than one percent between two different viral
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isolates. Shilts (1987: 529) pointed out that it would be like "finding two identical
snowflakes. It simply didn't happen" (Shilts, 1987:529).
These results opened up a very serious accusation: either Gallo had stolen his virus from
Montagnier, or the Parisian had stolen LAV from the American. The chronology of
events pointed to the American in no uncertain terms: "To both the French researchers
and many of the AIDS doctors at the conference that day, Montagnier's comparisons
indicated that the NCI prototype ofHTLV-III, announced in April 1984, could have been
grown from the same virus the French had cultured in January 1983" (Shilts, 1987:529).
Just over a year later, in April 1986, Robert Gallo admitted that he had used the LAV
isolate he received from the Pasteur Institute in September 1983 for research purposes
prior to the discovery of HTLV-III. Grmek (1990: 75) reported that he even
acknowledged that the electron microscope image that appeared in the May 4 1984 issue
of Science was "actually a picture ofLAV and not, as the legend said, the new virus
isolated by the American team".
Both Gallo and Margaret Heckler were invited to the New York press conference ... but
cancelled at the last minute. Yet even without their presence or confessions, there was
enough reason to still be astounded by Robert Gallo's behaviour: "Before claiming he had
isolated a new virus, he [Gallo] could have compared it with the LAV specimens he
possessed, published the result of the comparison, and if unable to prove a difference,
respected the priority of the discoverers in the attribution of the name" (Grmek, 1990:69).
This shows that, even if the Americans did discover HTLV-III, they had no right to name
it ... because LAV had been discovered first. But when the terms HTLV-III and LAV
became synonymous, the Americans made an all-out effort to keep their name (Grmek,
1990:69) - because, "in the world of science, as among primitive societies, to be the
namer of an object is to own it" (New York Times, April 1984; cited in Kinsella,
1989:85).
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Patent rights
In actual fact, the American shares in the AIDS virus were already much higher than their
insistence to name it: by that time, they had been awarded patent rights for a diagnostic
blood test, and thereby "obtained the rights to an income deriving from the sale of it, then
an estimated five million dollars annually" (Grmek, 1990:72). The haste with which the
American Food and Drug Administration granted this patent in April 1985 was
reprehensible in itself. The Americans' requisition had been processed within a year,
while the French - who had applied for a patent in December 1983 - were still kept
waiting in suspense. Grmek (1990:72) encapsulated it: "The delay over the French
application was not unusual; the relatively rapid processing of the Nll-I request was. "
There was, of course, more at stake than the mere injustice of this process: if Gallo's
HTLV-III and the French's LAV were one and the same, the NCI had violated the
contract they had signed in September 1983, which forbade them use of it for commercial
purposes (Montagnier, 2000:242; Grmek, 1990:69). By now, "the butcher's bill was so
high that long-tolerated transgressions could no longer be ignored" (Shilts, 1987:529):
Undoubtedly, reckoning was at hand.
Enemy time
That same year, the Pasteur Institute launched a lawsuit against the American
government (Shilts, 1987:592), accusing the NCI of breaching its contract (Grmek,
1990:73) and the FDA of handling their patent rights application unfavourably.
The Americans claimed that, at the time of the French application, the Pasteur test was
still only of doubtful value and that there was no proof that Gallo had used their isolate
instead of his own (Grmek, 1990:73). But when a later inquest established that Robert
Gallo had cultured the French virus in white cells in his own lab (Montagnier, Gruest,
Chamaret et al, 1984, cited in Grmek, 1990:74) and even used the name LAV instead of
HTLV-III in his laboratory notebooks (Grmek, 1990:74), the Americans realized that
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they had major trouble on their hands. The NCI may have succeeded in developing more
accurate diagnostic tests ... but they had done so with their competitor's virus. A telling
memorandum from senior CDC researcher Don Francis on the potentials of such a suit
warned the administration: "If this litigation gets into open court, all of the less-than-
admirable aspects will become public and, I think, hurt science and the Public Health
Service. The French clearly found the cause of AIDS first and Dr. Gallo clearly tried to
upstage them one year later" (Shilts, 1987:593).
Facing the possibility of public court hearings, the US government reconsidered fighting
the French (Shilts, 1987:593) - an out of court settlement began to be a better option.
These negotiations, however, became so heated that - for one of the first times in the
history of science - heads of states were called in to resolve a dispute over a viral
discovery (Shilts, 1987:593).
Reunion
The dispute was settled in March 1987 with an amiable agreement between the US
Department of Health and Human Services, and the Pasteur Institute. The settlement was
announced in Washington as a common declaration by US president Ronald Reagan and
French prime minister Jacques Chirac (Grmek, 1990:76): "The French would abandon
the judicial process and renounce rights to damages for income already acquired by the
opposition party; the Americans would add the name of Montagnier to that of Gallo to
their patent for the diagnostic kit, henceforth to be recognized as a common invention to
which both parties held equal rights" (Palca, 1987 and Conner & Kingman, 1988 cited in
Grmek, 1990:76). An international nomenclature commission put an end to the use of the
bizarre "double acronym", LAVIHTLV-1, when it baptized the AIDS virus with an
entirely new name: HIV - Human Immunodeficiency Virus. In order to strike a
compromise, the commission "revoked the French team's right to name their discovery,
but found fault with the American team, refusing terminological affiliation with the
HTLV family" (Coffin, Haase, Levy, et aI., 1986 and Marx (1986) cited in Grmek,
1990:69).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
16
As an integral part of the agreement, Gallo and Montagnier published a chronological
history of AIDS research, promising not to "make or publish any [additional] statement
which would or could be construed as contradictory or compromising the integrity of said
scientific history" (Grmek, 1990:76). Itwas through this settlement, that Robert Gallo
and Luc Montagnier became the co-discoverers of the AIDS virus, HIV. Neither of them
had won the Nobel Prize they were so desperately looking for, and both had to settle for
smaller American government awards (Shilts, 1987:593).
In 1989, an investigative article on Gallo's work by the Chicago Tribune, quoting several
of his co-workers doubting his honesty, led to a reopening of the Montagnier-Gallo
debacle ... in the form of several federal investigations of scientific misconduct by the
US health department's Office of Scientific Integrity (OSI). In late 1992, the OSI found
Gallo guilty of scientific misconduct "by concealing the fact that his lab put the French
virus into a permanent cell line ... [intending] to mislead the scientific community"
(Cohen, 1993: 168). But Gallo's influence never seemed to end: following an appeal, he
was acquitted of all charges (Pelton, 2002). The status quo remained the same.
What did however change, was the royalties agreement in the 1987 settlement: in 1994,
the new Pasteur director, Maxime Schwartz, announced that a decision had been taken to
distribute "royalties in a way that is much more fair than it was before" (Schwartz, 1994
cited in Crewdson, 2002:523). The truth was that "for the past seven years or so, the
distribution was such that the NIH or HHS were receiving more royalties" than the
Pasteur Institute did. "So now, for the second half-life of the patents, the Pasteur Institute
will receive more royalties than the department of Health and Human Services here"
(Schwartz, 1994 cited in Crewdson:523).
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Conclusion
Twenty years after the discovery ofHIV, it is generally accepted that the
credit should be shared between the two continents (Shoub, 1999:10): the
French are recognized for finding the virus, and the Americans for doing the
substantial additional work to develop diagnostic tests (Altman, 1984 cited in
Kinsella, 1989:85).
There were, however, limits to what such an agreement could achieve: it may have
settled some squabbles and doused a few fires, but it couldn't change the already-
fragmented AIDS world: a powerful 'AIDS establishment' [at this stage American
governmental institutions] that entitled itself the right to speak on behalf of others and the
rest of the scientific world, doing highly significant AIDS research ... but without much
control over eventually owning it or knowing in which journal it would end up in ... if
published at all.
If these disputes were any indication of the level of politicking present in the scientific
community, they were certainly also suggestive of the endless quarrels that were to come
over the cause and appropriate treatment ofHIV/AIDS.
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COVERING THE PLAGUE: THE DISCOVERY OF THE AIDS VIRUS
Introduction
Kinsella (1989:2) has remarked that science and medicine are the stepchildren of news
organizations, the subjects often covered by poorly trained, poorly educated reporters.
Given its political undertones, AIDS requires a fundamental understanding of its basic
science from journalists. But during the early stages (1980s) of the epidemic, this was
rarely the case: "the rise and fall of media interest in AIDS had little to do with the degree
of crisis or with scientific advances" (Kinsella, 1989:2). When the May 1983 issue of
Science came out, no news publications were aware of Gallo's changing ofMontagnier's
abstract ... let alone running stories on the politicking behind it. Itwas only a year later,
with US health secretary Margaret Heckler's notorious announcement that the Americans
had found the cause of AIDS, that leading newspapers such as the New York Times
became aware of the American's devious ways of operating.
A lack of scientific expertise was, however, not the only factor preventing the epidemic's
science from being covered. In the beginning, AIDS struck social outcasts - mainly gays
and drug addicts. Editors often reasoned that "news about homosexuals would not interest
the great majority of 'family newspaper' readers" (Kinsella, 1989:2) ... resulting in the
gay press taking it upon itself to report on the disease. Although gay publications were
pivotal in increasing awareness of AIDS, this situation often had disastrous
consequences: newspapers such as the New York Native followed dangerous, unproven
AIDS theories, mainly out of frustration with the US government's perceived reluctance
to produce research to produce a cause and/or cure.
The technical side of covering AIDS research also raised unique obstacles. When the few
concerned and science-conscious journalists attempted to cover scientific developments,
they would come up against particular difficulties. The protocol of medical and scientific
journals required that researchers' findings not be announced in the press prior to them
being published in the medical journal that originally accepted the study. Consequently,
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AIDS researchers often declined to talk to the media about their latest results for fear that
professional journalists would blackball their work. "For reporters and their editors, that
lack of fresh, accurate information from the experts on the epidemic meant that they had
no story to report - and so the public remained in the dark" (Kinsella, 1989:2).
Reporting on Gottlieb's findings (MWWR) - first cases
The mass media's first AIDS report was printed on May 18, 1981, two weeks prior to the
lvfMWR's June 5 issue. Dr Larry Mass, a freelance journalist for the Manhattan gay
newspaper, the New York Native, responded to a tip-off on gay men in the city being
treated for "a strange pneumonia" (Kinsella, 1989:25). Mass's careful report, Disease
Rumours Largely Unfounded (Mass, 1981 cited in Kinsella, 1989:28), quoted a New
York City public health official denying the rumours (Shilts, 2000:67) and claiming that
"Pneumocystis was not unusual" (Kinsella, 1989:28).
The New York Native was the "most widely read gay newspaper in New York City"
(Epstein, 1996:46), but no other reporters followed its lead. Firstly, the 15 centimetre
story was easily overlooked on page seven of the Native - hidden away in a lower left-
hand corner. Secondly, in the early eighties, gay publications were not nearly influential
enough to set agendas for leading publications: "even if the scoop had been prominently
played, as stories would soon be in the Native, Mass's piece would hardly have attracted
much attention from the mainstream media" (Kinsella, 1989:28).
A fortnight later, the lvfMWR proved the health department wrong with Dr Michael
Gottlieb's observations Pneumocystis pneumonia in homosexual men - Los Angeles
(Gottlieb, 1981 cited in Shilts, 2000:67) in its June 5 edition. The report stated pertinently
the presence of this unusual form of pneumonia in gay men. Every Friday, the CDC
distributes 40 000 copies of the lvfMWR to doctors and local public health officials, with
an additional "835 copies of the pamphlet-sized journal going to reporters" (Kinsella,
1989:9). The.MMWR is recognized as the medical profession's version of the Top 40 of
disease updates, and journalists immediately study those statistics upon receipt of their
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copies. But, much like the scientific community, the mainstream media didn't bite. A
week went by and" ... [the CDC's Dr James] Curren had yet to hear from more than a
couple of curious journalists" (Kinsella, 1989:8). Besides minor stories in The Associated
Press, Los Angeles Times and San Francisco Chronicle (Kinsella, 1989:10), the new
disease remained entirely absent from the mass media.
The MMWR'S second report on July 3, Kasposi's Sarcoma and Pneumocystic Pneumonia
Among Homosexual Men - New York and California, documenting 26 gay men struck by
this rare form of cancer, drew a little more interest - yet for only one day (Shilts,
2000:78). A telling article was a "a column-length story buried in the back of ... [the New
York Times'] ... national section" (Kinsella, 1989: 10), significant for its tone being typical
of what would become one of the most common themes in the mainstream media's
coverage of the epidemic - AIDS was exclusive to promiscuous, gay men: "The reporting
doctors said that most cases had involved homosexual men who have had multiple and
frequent sexual encounters with different partners, as many as ten sexual encounters each
night up to four times a week" (Altman, 1981 cited in Epstein, 1996:46). Stories were
also carried in the Associated Press (AP) and two broadcast outlets, National Public
Radio (NPR) and the Cable News Network (CNN).
This "day in the limelight, however, was the most attention the new epidemic would
receive for the next year" (Shilts, 2000:78). Besides minor stories in Time magazine and
Newsweek, and a 2 minute spot on the American Broadcasting Corporation's morning
show, Good Morning America, in mid-December 1981 (Shilts, 2000: 110), the outbreak
faded from the mainstream media and "became an item of interest largely to gay men"
(Shilts 2000:78). Editors killed articles on Aids "because they didn't want stories about
gays and all those distasteful sexual habits littering their newspapers" (Shilts, 2000: 110).
The gay media's coverage
Contrary to the mainstream media, gay publications such as the New York Native were
filled with AIDS stories. The Native's editor, Chuck Ortleb, had good reason to follow the
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epidemic: his newspaper's pages "were crowded with the obituaries of dancers and
architects, priests and poets, university professors and civil engineers who had all died
young from AIDS" (Shilts, 2000:418). As the death toll among his staff and readership
rose without any quick solution in sight, Ortleb grew frantic. Soon, he did more than
merely publishing stories in his paper: "He reached out, cajoled, and sometimes verbally
assaulted mainstream journalists in attempts to get them to cover the issue more closely"
(Kinsella, 1989:25). Initially, Ortleb's tactics had little effect.
With the Reagan administration's openly anti-gay stance, Ortleb "began to think that the
lack of progress [with AIDS] was due mostly to a lack of interest" (Kinsella, 1989:32). It
was more than a year since the first cases of AIDS had been recorded, yet the "U.S.
medical miracle machine [the CDC] was not coming up with an answer, much less a
cure" (Kinsella, 1989:32). Compared to the haste in which the state had acted during past
epidemics such as the 1976 Legionnaire's disease outbreak and the 1982 Tylenol tragedy,
Ortleb's concerns weren't groundless: in both cases the CDC had produced solutions
within a matter of a few months (Kinsella, 1989:2; 13). On August 16 1982, the Native
editor voiced his opinions in the first of many editorials: "The gay community has all too
quickly adopted a wait and see attitude toward the CDC ... It has now been a year since
the epidemic surfaced as a serious health crisis, and we are no closer to a cure or an
explanation than we were a year ago ... If the CDC exists for the purposes of monitoring
this - or any - epidemic, who exists for the purposes of monitoring the CDC?" (Ortleb,
1981 cited in Kinsella, 1989: 32).
By mid-1983, Ortleb was so fiustrated that he had only one thing on his mind: finding a
cure for AIDS. At about the same time, Gallo and Montagnier's Science articles on the
cause of AIDS appeared. But Ortleb was far more intrigued by a letter that was published
in the April23 issue of the Lancet, entitled "Could AIDS Agent Be a New Variant of
ASFV[African Swine Fever Virus]?" (Teas, 1983 cited in Kinsella, 1989:37). The writer,
Dr Jane Teas, supposed that AIDS could be linked to a disease found in pigs - swine
fever. The African Swine Fever Virus (ASFV), a virus that "had never been known to
infect humans", caused this disease (Epstein, 1996: 100). Teas, a postdoctoral fellow at
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Harvard's School of Public Health, had never done research on either of the epidemics.
During casual reading, she was, however, struck by the apparent similarity in symptoms:
both diseases compromised the immune system (Kinsella, 1989:37). There was another
coincidence she thought important, known as "the Haitian connection" (Epstein,
1996: 100): both the diseases surfaced in the late 1970s, within a year of each other
(Epstein, 1996: 100). Teas proposed: "Perhaps an infected pig was killed and eaten as
either uncooked or undercooked meat. One of the people eating the meat who was both
immuno-compromised and homosexual would be the pivotal point, allowing for the
disease to spread to the vacationing 'gay' tourists in Haiti" (Teas, 1983 cited in Epstein,
1996:100).
To her fellow scientists, Teas' speculations had hardly any credibility; Ortleb, though,
was fascinated. Teas' lack of credentials for hypothesizing in this way was, in part, why
Ortleb wished to pursue her: "she was not part of the AIDS establishment, as he began
labeling the CDC, NllI, and the doctors and scientists who worked with those agencies"
(Kinsella, 1989:38). Teas publicly admitted to teaching herself about swine fever in an
afternoon's reading, and "this kind of self-education by non-experts epitomized the
critical attitude toward scientific authority he [Ortleb ] had been promoting on the pages
of his newspaper" (Epstein, 1996:101). For Ortleb's colleagues it therefore came as no
surprise when the front page of the May 23 1983 edition of the Native read: Is African
Swine Fever Virus the Cause [of AIDS)? (D'Eramo, 1983, cited in Kinsella, 1989:38). "A
most uncommon, exciting and plausible theory has surfaced on the chaotic horizon of the
AIDS mystery" (D'Eramo, 1983 in Kinsella, 1989:38), the article began, and ended by
questioning why state researchers were so slow to follow it up: "Dr Teas' theory that
ASFV is linked to AIDS may hold answers to many of the questions that pertain to 'how
the disease is spread'. But as yet, her theory has received only a very cool reception from
official agencies and institutions" . Yet again, the Native's queries didn't come out of thin
air: the government had also denied rumours about the spread of Pneumocystis when the
Native first pursued that story, and Pneumocystis turned out to indeed exist.
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Itwas against this background that the New York Native diverged "from the path of
reporting the medical facts exclusively as they were seen by the medical establishment"
(Kinsella, 1989:39). The publication even took its coverage a step further: "ASFV
became the Native's cause" (Kinsella, 1989:39).
Furthering the swine fever cause
Convinced that he was one of the few people with enough insight and distance from the
establishment to understand the epidemic, Ortleb began pushing other media outlets to
pursue the swine fever angle. This time, he received reaction from major newspapers
including the Boston Globe and New York Times (Kinsella, 1989:41), with even the CDC
responding: in a striking "demonstration of the perceived importance of the gay press in
the eyes of the public health officialdom" (Epstein, 1996:101), the newly appointed CDC
director, Dr James Mason, flew to New York in early 1984 in an effort to persuade the
Native's publisher that "studying ASFV would not bring scientists any closer to
discovering the cause of AIDS" (Kinsella, 1989:41).
In exchange, Mason had a major scoop to offer Ortleb - that Luc Montagnier's Pasteur
Institute in Paris had found the cause of AIDS, the Lymphadenopathy Associated Virus,
LAV (Kinsella, 1989:41). This was two weeks prior to granting the New York Times an
interview, and was considered a remarkable gesture on the part of the CDC director. But,
Ortleb's wariness of the US government was too far advanced: he was convinced that
Mason was trying to divert his attention and attempting to "co-opt" him ... so he buried
the story in the back of the Native on April 9 1984. "I knew we were on the trail," Ortleb
wrote in a later article, "why else would the government be sending its top guns to a gay
journalist? He was trying to co-opt us" (Ortleb, 1984 cited in Kinsella, 1989:42).
The New York Native was nonetheless the first lay publication in America to write about
Montagnier's findings (Kinsella, 1989:42). But it was still almost an entire year after the
Frenchman's findings had been published in the May 23 1983 edition of Science.
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Gallo and the Science articles
In 1983, Montagnier's discovery was almost entirely ignored by the mainstream media. It
was Gallo's work that was featured - partly through his unethical promotion of it among
journalists before its publishing date, and partly due to the way scientific journals were
run, allowing Gallo to unilaterally change Montagnier's research. In order to have
research published in a prestigious journal such as Science, a study "must weave its way
through a kind of old-boy network of doctors and scientists" (Kinsella, 1989: 111). The
process, called peer-reviewing, is designed to determine a study's value. Doctors serving
as peer-reviewers "are chosen primarily because of their connections to the journal
editors, whether personal or professional" (Kinsella, 1989: 111), and usually work in the
same fields as "those on whose research they are passing judgment" (Crewdson, 2002:7).
Gallo was on the reviewing committee of several journals, including Science ... putting
him in a position to edit his counterpart's study in the May 20 1983 edition, and to
withhold Montagnier's later research from publication in reputable magazines. In May
1984, Gallo managed to publish four papers the same Science edition. When the Science
biology editor, Ruth Kulstad "had dared to suggest that four articles from the same
laboratory might be too many" (Crewdson, 2002: 123), Gallo was influential enough to
force her to publish all four by threatening that he had good links with many other
"journals that would like the papers" (Gallo, 1983 cited in Crewdson, 2002: 123).
Weeks before their due date for being published, Gallo unscrupulously promoted his
articles by providing a British reporter, Martin Redfern, with all four of his Science
papers. He informed Redfern "that he thought a number of papers in the States
... [including] the New York Times and the Washington Post, were onto the story and
might well put it out in the next few days, possibly over the weekend" (Redfern, 2002
cited in Crewdson, 2002: 122). The American agreed for Redfern to only hold the story
back if another newspaper did not break it prior to his articles being printed in Science.
On April 16 1983, the London based scientific journal New Scientist published a
freelance article by Redfern, after the Wall Street Journal printed a piece reporting "that
researchers soon will announce discovery of a new variation of human cancer virus that
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
25
may cause acquired immune deficiency syndrome" (Wall Street Journal, 1983 cited in
Crewdson, 2002: 125). Many US newspapers picked up on the story, with the Washington
Post reporting that Gallo had found "very strong signs that a newly discovered form of
the Human T-Cell Leukemia (HTLV) virus infects victims of AIDS" (19, 1983 cited in
Crewdson, 2002: 125).
When Gallo's seniors confronted him about his studies appearing in national newspapers
prior to the discussed Science embargo, he denied having anything to do with it ...
accusing Martin Redfern of "having stolen the four Science manuscripts from his office
while his back was turned" (Gallo, 1983 cited in Crewdson, 2002:126).
Reaching the mainstream media
The French side of the story that would highlight Montagnier's work, would only appear
in the mainstream media a year later. Two weeks after the New York Native had run its
Montagnier story on April 9 1984, CDC director James Mason granted the New York
Times medical reporter, Dr Lawrence Altman, an interview. It happened at a crucial time:
six days before the notorious Heckler announcement (Kinsella, 1989:42). Contrary to the
Native, the New York Times considered Mason's information about the French
discovering the cause of AIDS a scoop, publishing a front page story on April 22. The
article quoted a puzzled Mason asking "why it had taken so long for the importance of
the Pasteur Institute's work to be recognized" (Epstein, 1996:72). Native editor Chuck
Ortleb responded with a cynical article, New York Times took the LAV bait (Ortleb, 1984
cited in Kinsella, 1989:42), accusing the Times of falling for the 'aids establishment'.
Still holding on to his swine fever theory, it was with equal cynicism that Ortleb greeted
health secretary Margaret Heckler's announcement on April 28 1984 that Robert Gallo
had discovered the AIDS virus, called Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III (HTLV-
III). On June 17, 1985, he titled one of his many critical editorials on the subject,
AIDSGATE, declaring "that Dr. Gallo was misleading America into the forest of AIDS
research", and that his "discovery" ofHTLV-III was in fact nothing more than the
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rediscovery of the French team's identical virus" (Ortleb, 1985 cited in Kinsella,
1989:42). Included in the editorial was a verbatim transcription of a telephone
conversation with Gallo, during which the NCI scientist complained about bad press:
"Gallo told me ... I had made a tremendous mistake, the mistake of my lifetime [in
accusing him of fraud] ... [that] I should 'try and be a friend'. I told Gallo a few of the
basics about the African Swine Fever Virus, and he thanked me. He seemed to know
nothing about he virus. Gallo continually told me: 'If you'd only read the science, if you
only understood the science'. I told him I wouldn't be browbeaten by him or his so-called
science, even if most of the AIDS researchers in America are afraid of him. To borrow
some of Gallo's own "scientific language," I think we have discovered two isolates:
Gallo-l and Gallo-Il ... Gallo-I a reasonable scientist, who knows a great deal (but not
about African Swine Fever Virus) ... Gallo-Il is a fraudulent, vindictive, arrogant, anti-
gay bully" (Ortleb, 1985 cited in Kinsella, 1989:43)
The New York Times was "not slow to draw implications from the episode" (Epstein,
1996:72) either, having reported on the French discovery six days before. Lawrence
Altman focused "squarely on what was erupting as an international battle for scientific
credit" (Kinsella, 1989:84), being the first reporter to recognize the politics behind the
virus. In an editorial three days after Heckler's press conference, Altman remarked:
"What you are hearing is not yet a public benefit but a private competition - for fame,
prizes, new research funds ... The commotion indicated a fierce - and premature - fight
for credit between scientists and bureaucratic sponsors of research. Certainly no one
deserves the Nobel Peace Prize" (Altman, 1984 cited in Shilts, 2000: 451). Moreover,
Altman recognized Gallo's dominance over Montagnier, quoting the American as saying
that if the two viruses turned out to be the same, he would be the one to "say so" (Altman,
1984 cited in Epstein, 1996:72). Most other American newspapers and major television
networks, however, reprinted and rebroadcast her claims without "rebuttal from more
sober authorities" (Kinsella, 1989:84).
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Ortleb loses his credibility
With his continuous, and almost exclusive reporting on ASFV, Chuck Ortleb began
losing what little credibility he had left (Kinsella, 1989:45). When further evidence on the
causal role of ASFV was not forthcoming, Ortleb was "onto the next rival theory, and the
next - Lo's mycoplasma ... and ... the claim that AIDS and chronic fatigue syndrome are
different forms of the same disease" (Epstein, 1996: 101). Over time, the Native's "star
began to fall, and Ortleb became an increasingly controversial figure within the AIDS
movement" (Epstein, 1996: 101). Cultural critic and AIDS activist Douglas Crimp
complained in 1987: " 'Rather than performing a political analysis of the ideology of
science, Ortleb merely touts the crackpot theory of the week, championing whoever is the
latest outcast from the world of academic and government research' " (Crimp, 1987 cited
in Epstein, 1996:101).
San Francisco Chronicle
Strengthening Ortleb's suspicions about the US government's reluctance to fight AIDS
were the reports of Randy Shilts of the San Francisco Chronicle. Being Hl'V-positive and
gay himself, Shilts felt it a personal mission to follow-up on the state's commitment to
AIDS. During Shilts' employment, the Chronicle ran more investigative AIDS stories
than any other newspaper in the United States (Shilts, 2000:255). Many of his articles
exposed government officials like Margaret Heckler's reluctance to fund AIDS research
(Shilts, 2000:332).
In 1987, Shilts released a book described as a "heroic work of journalism" (New York
Times, 1987 cited in Crewdson, 2002:311) by the New York Times. And the Band Played
On "wove a chronological account of the early years of the epidemic, the response of
government and the blood banks, and the decimation of the gay community" (Crewdson,
2002:311), with Gallo being the target ofless kind words. A furious Gallo responded by
accusing Shilts of getting his information from untrustworthy sources: "It never ceases to
me to be a source of great wonder ... how people such as a gay young man on the West
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Coast can think they know more when they're stimulated by the same two people over
and over and over again. Namely Don Francis and what I would regard as a psychotic
who lives in Cambridge" (Gallo in Crewdson, 2002:312).
This would not be the last time that Gallo's perceived deviousness would be exposed by a
journalist. Two years later, on November 19 1989, Chicago Tribune reporter and 1981
Pulitzer Prize winner John Crewdson, published a 16 page, 55000 word account of
Gallo's work ... leading to an official investigation against the American scientist
(Horgan,2002).
Reopening of the Gallo investigation
Crewdson asserted that there was compelling evidence that Gallo's 'discovery' was "either
an accident or a theft" (Horgan, 2002). What followed was "six years of history: the
mixed-up micrographs; the CDC's bakeoff of the Gallo and Pasteur blood tests; ...
Gallo's authorship of the Pasteur Science abstract; ... and, finally, the fact that no AIDS
virus in Gallo's lab except HTLV-3 ... had been capable of growing in the quantities
necessary to perform the key experiments that led to the AIDS blood test" (Crewdson,
2002:343).
This time around, mass media coverage wasn't limited to the US. The French, who
thought the Gallo affair had ended three years before, were suddenly reading and hearing
about "SIDAGATE" - SIDA being the French acronym for AIDS (Crewdson, 2002:357).
Montagnier, who had remained quiet since the settlement, admitted to Le Monde that the
possibility that Gallo had stolen LAV "did cross our minds" (Montagnier, 1989 cited in
Crewdson, 2002:357). But he was careful to note "the possibility of accidental
contamination must first be considered before accusing someone. I think that if this turns
out to be the case there is no reason to accuse Dr Gallo of theft" (Montagnier, 1989, cited
in Crewdson, 2002:357).
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When Francois Sergent, the Washington correspondent for the Paris newspaper
Liberation called Gallo for comment, he angrily denied having written the abstract for
Pasteur's first Science article, and accused Crewdson of having ulterior motives for
writing the article: "That's nonsense ... You think if I write their abstract, you think any
journal is going to accept that? If I wrote their abstract - what does that mean? That they
come to me to write their papers? Or that I own Science? ... The person who allows
somebody else to write their abstract - don't you think they look a little odd? ... I believe
the man who wrote the article has no knowledge of the scientific process and had a
motive in his article ... " (Sergent, 1989 cited in Crewdson, 2002:344). Montagnier, on
the other hand, declined to comment.
There was ample response in the scientific media; Science carried several analytical
articles (Culliton, 1990:202-203 and 1494-1498; Cohen, 1993:168-170) and Nature
editor John Maddox offered to publish Gallo and Montagnier's replies with an
accompanying editorial. Gallo never replied, but Montagnier voiced the opinion that it
would be in Gallo's interest "to acknowledge the likely possibility that ... [HTLV-3] ...
was contaminated by LAV" (Montagnier, 1989 cited in Crewdson, 345).
When Gallo learned that Montagnier had called on him to publicly acknowledge that
HTLV-3 was LAV, he became livid. Itwas "completely shameful to hear such things",
he told Liberation (Gallo, 1989 cited in Crewdson, 2002:357) and instantly provided
senior editors at Newsweek and the Washington Post with his version of history. But so
thorough and credible were Crewdson's investigations that Gallo couldn't halt upcoming
probes into alleged scientific misconduct against Gallo (Horgan, 2002).
Suddenly, Gallo became the subject of many a critical report in the media.
The Office for Scientific Integrity's 1992 report found Gallo guilty of scientific
misconduct and was leaked to the media prior to its publishing date; Le Monde reported
that Gallo had stolen the virus from the French, blocking his colleagues from discussing
it (Crewdson, 2002:430). Gallo accused Le Monde of orchestrating a mass media
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campaign against him, and desperately asked for help from the NnI ...but he did not
receive any.
For the French, Gallo's successful appeal acquitting him of all charges was a huge
disappointment ... but his tarnished name and the new royalties settlement between the
two countries seemed to make up for it. French newspapers quoted Maxime Schwartz's
pronouncement as a "turning point" that had been reached in the Pasteur's nine year
struggle with the Americans (23 in 2002:57).
Eight years later, in 2002, John Crewdson published a detailed account on the order of
events in the form of a 600 page book: Science Fictions - A Scientific Mystery, A Massive
Cover-up and the Dark Legacy of Robert Gallo (Crewdson, 2002). At various points he
quoted sources suggesting that Gallo was "mentally disturbed" (Horgan, 2002).
Crewdson ended his book with a quote from a ninth century Arab philosopher that Gallo
announced he was planning to inscribe over the door of his laboratory: "We ought not to
be ashamed ... of appreciating the truth and of acquiring it wherever it comes from, even
if it comes from races distant and nations different from us. For the seeker of truth
nothing takes precedence over the truth, and there is no disparagement of the truth, not
belittling either of him who speaks or him who conveys it. No one is diminished by the
truth; rather does the truth ennoble us all" (Gallo's philosopher's quote cited in Crewdson,
2002:540).
Conclusion
With journalists such as the San Francisco Chronicle's Randy Shilts, John Crewdson of
the Chicago Tribune and Dr Lawrence Altman from the New York Times leading the
charge, the American news media played a crucial role in exposing the brutality of the
scientific world in the long lasting feud between the French and Americans. Derived from
what could be found in literature, France was far less conscious of the debacle, with Le
Monde and Liberation only starting to report on the issue during the late eighties. Most of
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the influential scientific journals acting as guidelines for journalists were of course far
less accessible in France, with the majority being published in English in the US.
While the New York Native's continued reporting on AIDS forced "gay journalism to
grow up" (Kinsella, 1989:45) and get noticed (Kinsella, 1989:25), it simultaneously
resulted in reduced credibility as far as reporting on the science of the epidemic was
concerned. Ortleb's almost exclusive tracking of the African Swine Fever Virus, and
other rival theories, was considered reasonable only up to a point. I fact, "reading the
Native could be confusing ... with reportage of AIDS researchers' latest findings sharing
space with the publisher's aggressive accusations against those scientists, which
sometimes spilled over from his editorial column into Ortleb-bylined articles in the news
pages" (Kinsella, 1989:44). This situation led to dangerous gaps in reporting on what was
to come: Peter Duesberg's dissident theories. lts endless frustration with the government's
lack of action would drive the Native into boosting AIDS theories that would ultimately
result in people stopping treatments designed to save their lives.
Most of the mainstream media, on the other hand, would counter these hypotheses, and
so would scientific publications. But most of them were already perceived as part of the
'AIDS establishment', with its refusal to follow dissident theories being perceived as
merely acting in the interest of the 'establishment'.
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CHAPTER TWO
DEADLY DECEPTIONS: THE AIDS ESTABLISHMENTS'
DISSIDENTS
Felix qui potuit rerum eognoseere eausas.
Lucky is he who has been able to understand the causes of things.
Virgil 70-19 BC: Georgies.
(Cited in: Ratcliff and Rappaport, 2001 :358)
Introduction
In the AIDS world, March 1987 - the month in which the acrimonious discovery battle
between the French and Americans was settled - turned out to be a mammoth
contradiction. In the same month, a respected Californian retrovirologist, Professor Peter
Duesberg, voiced his strongly opposing views in a mainstream medical journal: that HIV
could not possibly cause AIDS. The settlement of one dispute ironically made room for
another. Only this time, it was a feud with far more than legal perils; it was one of deadly
deceptions. Branding HIV harmless contradicted most prevention methods that enabled
people to protect themselves against the virus. By now, it had been proven that HIV was
transmitted via contaminated blood, hetero- or homosexual sex, and that HIV -positive
pregnant women were capable of transmitting the virus to their unborn babies (Martin,
2000:14-15; Whiteside & Sunter, 2000:10). Challenging these theories could deter people
from practicing safe sex or using clean needles in cases of intravenous drug use.
The danger was not the query but its potential 'audience'. This contention had a far bigger
appeal than its predecessor; it played right into the hands of those fed-up with the US
government's perceived arrogance ... like the 'anti-establishment lobby' that viewed
AIDS researchers like Gallo as "greedy self-interested mythmakers" (Cohen 1994:1643).
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Unlike their predecessors, dissident arguments were set to make their way into the public
domain instantaneously. With the distrustful milieu that the discovery ofHIV left behind
and the way in which the AIDS establishment was to treat AIDS dissidents, this was
hardly surprising. As with Montagnier, there would be stringent control over who was
allowed to question what.
The Duesberg phenomenon
Anderson (personal communication, June 13,2001) has pointed out that scientists
question conventional wisdom for diverse reasons, one being "that they truly believe that
the decided scientific evidence is unfounded" and that by challenging it, "new facts will
emerge that move the scientific understanding of that subject forward". In the history of
science, such queries have often resulted in this. By confronting the scourge of soaring
maternal deaths, the 19thcentury physician, Ignaz Semmelweiss - pioneer of antisepsis in
medical practice - demonstrated that a simple chlorine hand wash between autopsies and
the examination of women in labour drastically reduced the maternal death rate.
Semmelweiss was ostracized by his colleagues because he "dared to conduct research in a
manner that defied prevailing medical orthodoxy" (Ncayiyana, 1997:2). Another case in
point is that of 1970's UK gynaecologist Dr Patrick Steptoe. Steptoe sidestepped
conventional research protocols to spearhead the world's first in vitro fertilization (IFV)
eventuating in the birth of 'test tube' baby Louisa Joy Brown (Nicayiyana, 1997:2).
A less charitable view on such objections is that some researchers use it to get noticed:
"If your research is not going well, and you're not an internationally recognized authority
in a particular area - what is the simplest way of gaining attention? To be extremely
noisy about the understanding of a major problem and end up on the front pages of
newspapers" (Anderson, 2001, personal communication, June 13).
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Credentials
There would be little justification for arguing that Peter Duesberg was seeking attention;
his career spoke for itself. In 1987, the year in which he first questioned HIV as the
cause of AIDS, Duesberg was assuredly someone to be reckoned with: he was 58, a full
professor of Molecular and Cell Biology at Berkeley's University of California and
already a member of the National Academy of Sciences. This emanated from his work
with cancer genes: in the 1970s he was among the first to "demonstrate the existence of
cancer-causing oncogenes by showing that animal [retro]viruses ... carry genes that can
transform normal cells in culture into cancerous ones" (Cohen, 1994:1643). He
subsequently mapped the genetic structures of several retroviruses (Gallo, 1985: 1) and
had his work published in almost all the reputable journals. Many, such as Nature editor
John Maddox, considered his contributions as "a classic of its kind" (Maddox, 1993:109).
Duesberg was also the recipient of a seven-year Outstanding Investigator Award Grant
from Robert Gallo's National Cancer Institute (NCI) that provided him with hundreds of
thousands of dollars to conduct research on the molecular biology of viruses (Strohman,
cited in Duesberg, 1995). Itwas an award very few scientists qualified for - these
bursaries were intended to "fund star researchers" (Goodman, 1995) with exceptional
potential, and to enable them - incidentally - to "venture into new territory and ask
creative questions" (Mann, 1993).
The Californian's accomplishments brought him all the desirable connections, making
him a well-positioned man. He had the blessing of the AIDS establishment - approval
Luc Montagnier could only dream of during his LAV days. Moreover, he had the
establishment's "maestro", Robert Gallo, as a friend. So mutual was the respect between
the two that Gallo offered to introduce Duesberg to a retrovirus conference in 1984:
"Peter Duesberg is a man of extraordinary energy, unusual honesty, enormous sense of
humour, and a rare critical sense ... a man who makes life more interesting and
pleasurable to many of us" (Gallo, 1985:1). But despite his praises, Gallo must have been
well aware of the nature of his friend's "rare critical sense" when he ended the
introduction rather cynically: "This critical sense often makes us look twice, then a third
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time, at a conclusion many of us believed to be foregone ... [They are however] a major
problem for the casual observer. When is he truly debating? When is he only being the
devil's advocate? When is he being the devil himself? ... Peter, it's hard for us to tell
when you are using your machine gun or your slingshot, or simply exercising your vocal
cords" (Gallo, 1985: 1).
But for the time being, the Berkeley scientist's appraisals offered more benefits than
drawbacks.
Duesberg's queries
Duesberg's critiques did not discriminate; he even re-examined his own theories. By 1983
he had turned against the field he helped to found, publishing an eight-page paper in
Nature that attacked his own hypothesis: that the related oncogenes in normal human
cells, once activated, behaved like retroviral oncogenes and caused cancer. Two years
later, in 1985, Science ran a similar nine-page Duesberg critique (Cohen:94:1643).
In 1986 and 1987, Duesberg was on leave from Berkeley at the NIH in Bethesda where
he was a Fogarty Scholar-in-Residence (Strohman cited in Duesberg, 1995). His
sabbatical there provided him with the opportunity to formulate his contentions in more
detail and publish them in a 22-page 'Perspective' Cancer Research article (March 1987)
under the title Retroviruses as Carcinogens and Pathogens: Expectations and Reality
(Duesberg, 1987: 1199). He argued that the mainstream cancer research community was
"wrong about retroviruses" (the group to which HIV belongs). Some of those viruses, he
wrote, which were being thought of as 'evil', were, in fact "harmless creatures that were
incapable of causing cancer" (Cohen, 1994: 1643). The last four pages of his review were
devoted to HIVand its role in AIDS. The Californian maintained that many
contradictions appearing in the retrovirus/cancer hypothesis were also applicable to the
HIV/AIDS theory (Strohman cited in Duesberg, 1995). He argued that HIV was too
inactive, infected too few cells and was too difficult to even find in AIDS patients to be
responsible for AIDS (Guccione, 1993:8). In a follow-up article in the June 29 1988
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edition of Science, Duesberg conceded that mv was nothing more than a harmless
"hitchhiker" virus that somehow managed to find its way into the bodies of people with
immuno-compromised systems (Fumento, 1992).
Most AIDS researchers thought Duesberg was exploiting uncertainties about the precise
mechanism of disease causation to discount a mountain of compelling epidemiological,
laboratory, and animal data supporting the conclusion that mv caused AIDS (Cohen,
1994: 1643). But the Berkeley scientist was not deterred by their opinions; he was so
convinced of his arguments that he started theorizing about alternative causes.
Causal politics
Duesberg's disputes had become dangerous, as they had the potential to discredit safe sex
campaigns and falsely persuade people to reject medical care. He believed AIDS was the
direct result of the use of illicit drugs such as heroin, cocaine (Cohen, 1994:1648) and
nitrites ('poppers'), aphrodisiacs used by gay men to facilitate anal intercourse
(Guiccione, 1993 :58): "There are ... numerous studies that show that as of early in the
century, a long term junkie had pneumonia, weight loss, dementia, diarrhoea, mouth
infections, fevers ... Drug addicts have always been described with the same diseases that
are called AIDS now" (Guccione, 1993:58). In Duesberg's opinion, AIDS was a drug, and
not a sexually transmitted disease. He assumed mv positive babies were only born to
drug-addicted mothers (Guiccione, 1993:59) and that 'foreign proteins' in blood
transfusions suppressed the immune systems of hemophiliacs, and not mv (Guccione,
1993: 13). When AZT, the first drug for the treatment of AIDS, was approved, Duesberg
started spreading the message that AIDS was "AZT by prescription" (Guiccione,
1993: 12), as the drug's side-effects included immunosuppressive symptoms: "It's AIDS
by design ... you get immune deficiency ... you literally get AIDS, you have nausea, all
the AIDS symptoms because it's severe cellular intoxication" (Guccione, 93: 12). The
'drug hypothesis' provoked heated disagreement, to the extent that Duesberg alleged that
the authors of a [1993] study in Nature showing that only mv-positive drug users
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developed AIDS had fabricated data (Cohen, 1994: 1648). Shortly thereafter, an
independent panel found the charge to be groundless.
Itwas true that some people's immune systems collapsed due to drug use: numerous
chemicals weakened the immune system; some were given to organ transplant patients
for that very purpose (Fumento, 1992). However, what Duesberg did not acknowledge
was that AIDS was characterized by a specific type of immune deficit - a progressive and
sustained loss of CD4+ T cells (The Evidence That HIV Causes AIDS, 2000) - that was
extremely rare in the absence ofHIY. One study for instance showed that the CD4 count
(the measurement of the subgroup of T-cells whose progressive decline is the hallmark
of AIDS) ofHIV-negative drug users were almost always within normal range (Cohen,
1994: 1648).
Although there was some legitimacy in arguing AZT was toxic and that, when used on its
own, not very effective (Cohen, 1994: 1649), there was no proof that the drug worsened
the condition of AIDS patients. In fact, with the development of new anti-aids drugs, it
soon emerged that drug combinations (often including AZT), "when used according to
established guidelines, ... [could] ... improve the length and quality of life ofHIV-
infected individuals" (The Evidence That HIV Causes AIDS, 2000). Anti-AIDS drugs
might have had high levels of toxicity, but their ability to prevent the virus from
replicating, far exceeded their side effects. Thirteen years later, with US government
records registering a dramatic fall in AIDS deaths since 1996 - the year in which three-
drug combination therapy became widely used - Duesberg still held on to his theory,
arguing that the given interpretations of statistics were misleading (Delaney, 2000).
The Californian's theories could also not account for the spread of AIDS in Africa, where
both AZT and recreational drugs were hardly in use (Fumento, 1992). Neither did it
resolve "why drug-free, non-promiscuous people who contracted HIV sickened and died
in the years before AZT was even available" (Fumento, 1992). But for these instances,
Duesberg had different explanations. What people perceived as AIDS in Africa, he
argued, was in fact long existing diseases of poverty suddenly being grouped together:
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
38
"AIDS is twenty-five old diseases under a new name in the presence ofHIY. These
diseases do occur with or without HIV" (Duesberg cited in Guiccione, 1993: 12).
Duesberg had it right that diseases that had come to be associated with AIDS in Africa,
such as wasting syndrome ("slim disease"), diarrheal diseases and TB, had long been
severe burdens on the continent. However, according to UNAIDS reports, "high rates of
mortality from these diseases, formerly confined to the elderly and malnourished, were
now common among HIV-infected young and middle-aged people, including well-
educated members of the middle class" (UNAIDS cited in The Evidence That HIV
Causes AIDS, 2000). Itwas clearly a different group of people who now suffered from
these diseases; even "successful [African] countries like Botswana, considered a World
Bank 'economic miracle' with phenomenal financial growth" (Garrett, 2000), experienced
a rapidly increasing epidemic.
But dilapidated health care systems favoured Duesberg's theories: official AIDS deaths
often did not correlate with the reality countries experienced (Whiteside, 1996: 1) as there
were few means of recording - or even diagnosing - them. In many African countries,
HIV-tests weren't available, which meant they had to rely on the World Health
Organization's 'Banqui Defintion' to make HIV-diagnosis. Banqui offered doctors a list of
symptoms, some combination that had to be present to diagnose AIDS (Garrett, 2000).
But even when these diagnoses were made successfully, stigma and the lack of proper
recording systems prevented health professionals from keeping accurate records. What
was however glaringly obvious was that most African countries experienced a
"significant increase in levels of illnesses and deaths" (Whiteside, 1996:2) at the time
when AIDS seemed to be on the increase.
But, even in first world countries where HIV-tests were readily available, Duesberg
foresaw problems with the outcomes. He reasoned that HIV-tests only tested for the
presence of antibodies and not the virus itself and could "be wrong over 50% of the time"
(Duesberg in Guccione, 1993: 12). Although the reliability of these tests had improved
since the late eighties, they even then exceeded the performance of most other infectious
disease tests in both sensitivity (the ability of the screening test to give a positive finding
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when the person tested truly has the disease) and specificity (the ability of the test to give
a negative finding when the subjects tested are free of the disease under study); (The
Evidence That HIV Causes AIDS, 2000). Already in the early nineties, HIV had a 98%
reliability level (WHO, 1998 cited in The Evidence That HIV Causes AIDS, 2000).
Diagnosis of infection using antibody testing was also a commonly established concept in
medicine: "these antibodies ... are specific to a given pathogen (an organism that
produces a disease), similar to a security lock and its key" (HIV, AIDS and the
reappearance of an old myth, UNAIDS). Examples included the diagnosis of viral
hepatitis, rubella (German measles) and many other infectious diseases. Antibody testing
for these illnesses had - strangely - never been questioned (HIV, AIDS and the
reappearance of an old myth, UNAIDS). The results of antibody HIV tests (Elisa or
Western Blot tests) also correlated with the eventual development of AIDS: people who
lacked positive results almost never experienced AIDS-like symptoms or a decline in
their CD4 counts (Delaney, 2000).
Duesberg was so convinced of his theories that he was willing to die for it: on more than
one occasion, he offered to inject himself publicly with a purified form ofHIV (Delaney,
2000). To many others, however, his message was the equivalent of telling a dieter that
cheesecake had no calories, the difference being "that cheesecake ... [could] ... not cause
a slow, agonizing death" (Fumento, 1992).
The eager "audience"
Duesberg's objections quickly became a public cause: they rapidly spread from beyond a
small company in the research community to a large part of the AIDS community itself.
What seemed to give it a lot if its force, and "peculiar twists and turns ... [was] the way
in which it ... enacted in very public arenas" (Epstein in Cohen, 1994: 1643). There were
political conservatives who disputed the notion that HIV was transmitted heterosexually,
gay radicals from San Francisco (Garret, 2000) who believed the anti-gay Reagan
administration slowed down AIDS-research processes, and those who believed the AIDS
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establishment consisted of money-grabbing "mythmakers" (Cohen, 1994:1643) eager to
misrepresent anyone who disagreed with them.
Moreover, Duesberg was "an excellent, persuasive public speaker ... [knowing] how to
sound reasonable, use humor, and include statements that '" [were] important and
meaningful to people" (James 1997). In a nutshell, Peter Duesberg offered an easy,
comforting approach to a broad range of people all sharing a common article of faith: that
HIV was harmless (Garrett, 2000).
Consolation
Itwasn't difficult to understand why people at high risk of AIDS were vulnerable to
Duesberg's views (Cohen, 1994:1643): there were uncertainties about the pathogenesis-
the precise way in which HIV caused disease and death - and also no available cure or
vaccine. Joseph Sodroski from the Dana Farber Cancer Institute in Boston remarked that
"the ways for dealing with the virus ... [hadn't] worked that well ... Affected people ...
[thought] maybe science, with all its powers, had not been able to solve it, because the
theory ... [was] wrong" (Sodroski cited in Cohen, 1994:1643). The Centre for Disease
Control's James Curran agreed: "To some extent, going back to the beginning and
looking for another cause ... [provided] ... hope for finding a cure and vaccine" (Curran
cited in Cohen, 1994: 1643).
When Duesberg attended an AIDS forum held in San Francisco's largely gay Castro
district in January 1988, he "received a hero's welcome" (San Francisco Sentinel, 1988,
cited in Cohen, 1994: 1643). For the gay community, Duesberg's theories provided
consolation - that AIDS wasn't caused by sexual intercourse; maybe it didn't even exist.
And although this "hero's welcome" quickly wore out when he began "espousing the
theory that AIDS was the result of lifestyle choices - in particular, illicit drug use -
implying that people with AIDS were in some sense responsible for their disease"
(Cohen, 1994:1643), Duesberg managed to maintain a substantial following in many gay
districts.
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Denialists and political conservatives
The Berkeley messages were also well received by HIV -positive mothers like Christine
Maggiore. In 1992, doctors told Maggiore she was HIV -positive. She had a second test
that was indeterminate, then a negative test, and finally another positive test (Yamey,
2000:772). This uncertainty led her to question the scientific knowledge about the virus
and the disease, and initiated Alive & Well AIDS Alternatives, a non-profit organization
"founded by HIV positives who have learnt to live in wellness without AIDS drugs and
without fear of AIDS" (Maggiore in Yamey, 2000:772). Maggiore consequently decided
their was no harm in breastfeeding her baby, and drawing from both Duesberg's and her
own experience, published a book on the subject: What if everything you know about
AIDS was wrong? (Maggiore & Mullis, 2000). She maintained that HIV tests were
unreliable, that pregnant women who tested HIV positive could not transmit the virus to
their babies, and that Africa's AIDS figures were "simply false" (Yamey, 2000:772).
To political conservatives with little sympathy for the gay movement, Duesberg's views
were of particular appeal (Epstein in Cohen, 1994:1643). And although this kind of
backing brought a prejudicial component - and not necessarily the type he was looking
for - to the 'Duesberg campaign', the Californian scientist was determined to continue
with his criticism: "The charge of a scientist is to find the truth, to find the scientific basis
of a problem. So you go for it irrespective of the political and moral and ethical
consequences ... A scientist is not a politically correct crowd pleaser ... Science is
amoral. Nature doesn't know morals" (Guccione, 1993 :72).
The" anti-establishment lobby"
Duesberg's biggest and most ardent audience was those experiencing a growing
disenchantment with the medical establishment (Cohen, 1994: 1643), and interpreted this
dispute as a forthright attack on the AIDS establishment. To 'the anti-establishment
lobby', his arguments quickly assumed "some sort of cult status" (Jaffe in Cohen,
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1994: 1643), as they confirmed their notion that the AIDS establishment was always
wrong (Fumento, 1992). There was anti-Nll-I playwright Larry Kramer, 1993 Nobel Prize
for Chemistry-winner Kary Mullis, Californian molecular pharmacologist David Rasnick
and the prominent Yale mathematician, Serge Lang, who wrote several articles and a
book on the Gallo debacle. Itwas a relatively small, but powerful movement; it quickly
learned to appeal to different agendas weaving "heavy doses of misinformation ... [with]
some accurate facts and emotional, social and political truths" (James, 2000). The lobby
had excellent public speakers and, during later years, developed top-notch websites
guiding webcrawlers every step of the way. ACT UP San Francisco, an anti-IDVactivist
group, eagerly took the anti-establishment's cause upon it, with slogans such as "Don't
buy the IDV Lie" (Yamey, 2000:772) and "IDV cannot possibly cause AIDS" (Yamey,
2000:772). More branches in Hollywood, Toronto and Atlanta sprang up, all ironically,
but cleverly, named after ACT UP New York, a pro-HfV group campaigning for access
to anti-AIDS drugs (Schusky, 2000).
Followers of the anti-establishment lobby did not only suggest that the AIDS
establishment was wrong about the cause of the disease; they also argued that mainstream
researchers have suppressed Duesberg's search for the truth. This contention of
censorship almost instantly ensured an even broader audience: "credibility by a half-
dozen prominent scientists" (Cohen, 1994: 1643) - many of whom disagreed with
Duesberg - but who were equally, if not more, concerned about the treatment of the
dissident at the hands of the AIDS establishment. A former Harvard biochemist, Charles
Thomas Jr., saw this in such a serious light, that he initiated a dissident support group The
Group for the Scientific Reappraisal of the HIV/AIDS hypothesis (Cohen, 1994: 1644), of
which most AIDS dissidents became members. Also unconvinced of Dues berg's ideas-
but persuaded that he should not be shut out of scientific resources - was Daniel
Koshland Jr., editor-in-chief of Science, who wrote letters to the National Institute on
Drug Abuse supporting Duesberg's grant proposals to test his "drug hypothesis" (Cohen,
1994: 1644).
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But most of the establishment persevered in resisting Duesberg. By doing so, it made one
of its biggest mistakes: by largely ignoring and censoring AIDS dissidents, it played right
into the hands of Dues berg supporters who were convinced that AIDS was just another
'hoax' created by the American government. Centre for Disease Control (CDC) AIDS
director Dr Helen Gayle denounced skeptics by saying there was no "merit in questioning
conventional wisdom" about HIVand a Berkeley AIDS expert described them as
"undermining" (Cohen, 1994: 1642).
In 1993, the NCI decided not to renew Duesberg's Outstanding Investigator Grant, an act
he claimed was politically motivated: "I am advancing my hypothesis very much at my
own expense. Since I challenged the virus-AIDS hypothesis, which is entirely
unproductive in terms of public health benefits, I have been excommunicated by the
retrovirus-AIDS community with noninvitations to meetings, noncitations in the literature
and nonrenewals of my research grants, which is the highest price an experimental
scientist can pay for his convictions" (Duesberg cited in Mann, 1993). AIDS dissidents
argued that Duesberg's grant was "ironically supposed to encourage 'innovative' thinking
... [and that the NCI's termination of it] suggested that it ... [was] simply a fantasy to
think that open criticism is welcomed within scientific inner circles" (Strohman cited in
Duesberg, 1995). This act appeared to be particularly suspicious in the light of an NIH
investigation clearing Robert Gallo - who by now compared Duesberg to "a little dog
that won't let go" (Gallo in Cohen, 1994: 1644) - of scientific misconduct (following his
appeal) and subsequent prosecution (Culliton, 1990; Lang, 1998). Gallo had no problems
with funding; in his case, money was abundant.
As in Montagnier's case, most mainstream medical journals refused to publish Duesberg's
articles. In 1989 and 1991 the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
subjected his AIDS papers to "unusual multilayered peer reviews" (Cohen, 1994:1644)
and Nature editor John Maddox - who published many of the dissident's award winning
cancer research in the past - now bluntly refused to carry his proposals: "Duesberg will
not be alone in protesting that this is merely a recipe for suppressing challenges to
received wisdom. So it can be. But Nature will not use it" (Maddox, 1993: 109). AIDS
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doctors and scientists viewed dissidents "as a lunatic fringe best ignored in hopes that it
would go away" (James, 2000). But many now agree that the establishment's refusal to
respond was a mistake: it fuelled dissident arguments - "AIDS professionals and activists
often forget that the world looks different to people who do not have the same access they
do ... Most people do not have the background or training to judge a technical scientific
argument themselves; instead, they look at how they are being treated. When one side
will not give them the time of day on the issue while the other is always available, they
may believe those they can talk to, without hearing any other view" (James, 2000).
But, with time, Duesberg repeated the AIDS establishment's mistakes - to his detriment:
many of his supporters became frustrated with his style, which was widely perceived as
inflexible of data not supporting his views (Cohen, 1994:1643). Even his 'enemies'
eventually used it against him when justifying why they refused to entertain his views:
"Part of the explanation is that Duesberg has not been asking questions, or raising
questions he believes should be answered, but has been making demands and implying
(but sometimes saying outright) to and right now: 'Unless you can answer this and right
now, your belief that HIV causes AIDS is wrong ... '. Unanswerable rhetorical questions
are the stock-in-trade of undergraduate debating societies' (Maddox, 1993: 109). In 1994-
after eight years of ardent support - many dissidents resigned from The Group for the
Scientific Reappraisal of the HIV/AIDS hypothesis, including Robert Root-Bernstein, a
physiologist at Michigan State University and New York Aids clinician Joseph
Sonnabend, who both criticized Duesberg for being too inflexible in his assertions
(Cohen, 1994: 1644). Support groups were increasingly left with dissidents consisting of
scientists outside of the AIDS field, not being able to test their hypotheses due to lack of
funding, and lawyers lacking the scientific background to do so (Goodman, 1995).
By the late nineties dissidents no longer spoke with one voice as many diverse opinions
had evolved: some believed HIV played a role in combination with other co-factors in
causing AIDS, some that the virus was completely harmless, and many others that HIV
did not exist at all. This left the AIDS dissidents a rather scattered group with 'loose'
voices facing the possibility of disappearing unless they found someone influential who
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could unite them and convey their messages efficiently; someone in the midst of the
AIDS crisis, who would desperately be seeking solutions; someone the world - including
Africa - would listen to: South Africa's president, Thabo Mbeki.
Conclusion
In the US, where AIDS treatments have been accessible to patients who needed them, the
dissident movement found only a tiny constituency of believers who would put their lives
at risk by rejecting all medical advice in favour ofa debate of rhetoric. But by 1999,
dissidents were to become revitalized by tapping into agendas in developing countries,
where people had been told they were going to die and had no chance of treatment
because drugs had been priced far beyond reach as a direct result of US and international
government policies protecting the interests of major corporations (James, 2000). In the
developing world, dissidents would find yet a new audience among leaders and the public
who were understandingly suspicious of a western-dominated, heavily corporate
mainstream which pursued its own profit above all else, and offered millions of people
around the world nothing but death.
Few African countries offered a better kick-off point than South Africa with its history of
oppression and subsequent skepticism of many Western interests. The country in which
the dissident debate "never really happened in the late eighties and early nineties"
(Karim, personal communication, May 28 200 1), was to become the first one in the world
where AIDS dissidents would be recognized by a head of state. Thabo Mbeki would
readily take up their cause and force the two sides - the dissidents and establishment - to
talk to each other. The African leader was to ensure that the role of heads of state in the
science of Hl V/AIDS did not stop after that first historical "discovery" settlement. Only
this time, it would not result in a settlement, but in major confusion on the continent
hardest hit by the epidemic.
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COVERING THE PLAGUE: THE AIDS ESTABLISHMENT'S DISSIDENTS
Introduction
New York Native editor Chuck Ortleb's obsession with alternative AIDS theories
strangely enough culminated in 1987 - the same year in which Peter Duesberg began
querying HIV as the cause of AIDS. With the American government's announcement that
the number of Americans infected with HIV had passed the 1 million mark (Kinsella,
1989:46), Ortleb's impatience with the 'AIDS establishment' reached breaking point. He
continued his search for new theories that would undermine the idea that Robert Gallo's
virus was the cause of AIDS. Following Ortleb's preoccupation with ASFV, the Native
seized upon a New York doctor's contention that many cases of AIDS were not caused by
the identified viral culprit, but by the 'great masquerader': syphilis (Kinsella, 1989:45-6).
Several other notions followed ... but none seemed to last long.
Peter Duesberg's theories were what Ortleb had really been waiting for: they were
objections raised by a prominent scientist, seemed to be long-running, and flew right in
the face of the 'AIDS establishment'. For the Californian himself, the timing ofOrtleb's
desperation could not have been better. The Native editor was so convinced of Duesberg's
arguments that he believed reporting them could raise his publication's profile from "just
a gay newspaper that had dutifully tracked the epidemic from the beginning" (Kinsella,
1989:47) to a media legend. In fact, Ortleb was so convinced of this as to submit the
Native's Duesberg coverage for a Pulitzer Prize award, print journalism's most
distinguished endowment.
Alternative publications - like pop music magazine Spin - also published interviews with
the Berkeley professor. The US mainstream media, on the other hand, was far less
receptive to giving space to alternative positions (Epstein, 1996: 174). This time around,
however, reporting was not limited to the US or France, but included prominent British
publications such as the London-based Sunday Times .,. mostly due to the personal
beliefs and affiliations of particular journalists and editors. Gallo was furious at media
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outlets printing his opponent's theories, accusing them of failing to recognize the
consequences of their arguments. But to many, his warnings were in vain, for they were
tainted with his reputation: "Gallo had come to be a symbol of expertise gone bad:
untrustworthy, patronizing, and resentful of challenges" (Epstein, 1996: 116).
Ortleb, the Duesberg champion
The New York Native promptly followed up on Duesberg's March 1987 Cancer Research
article with a cover story by John Lauritsen, a survey researcher and strong supporter of
AIDS dissident theories (Epstein, 1996:98; 103), in its June 1 1987 issue (Lauritsen, 1987
cited in Epstein, 1996: 109). "Unless HlV's champions can do some very fancy
explaining," Lauritsen wrote, "Duesberg's article has unambiguously relegated the 'AIDS
virus' etiology to medical history's trash heap of falsified hypotheses" (Lauritsen, 1987
cited in Epstein, 1996: 110). A month later, Lauritsen interviewed Duesberg during his
sabbatical at the NCI, running the interview, Which Man Is Right? on the Native's cover
along with pictures of Gallo and Duesberg (Epstein, 1996: 110). Furthermore, Ortleb took
it upon himself to organize a telethon to boost the publicity of his latest fixation
(Kinsella, 1989:46).
But it was only through an article by Katie Leishman in the magazine Atlantic Monthly
that Peter Duesberg began to hit the mainstream media (Epstein, 1996: 112). Leishman's
story in the September 1987 edition noted that Duesberg was so certain of his claim that
he had "offered to be inoculated with HfV'' (Leishman, 1987:71). Soon afterward, the
Berkeley professor made the first of what would prove to be several appearances in a
British television documentary series called Dispatches (Epstein, 1996: 112). But the
show never attracted much attention in the United States. Nonetheless, Harvey Bialy, the
editor of the scientific publication Bio/Technology, had become interested in Duesberg's
arguments, inviting him to submit a synopsis of his Cancer Research article. This
presented Duesberg with the opportunity to publicly complain that "the 'deadly AIDS
virus' ... [had] ... been sold to the public as the cause of AIDS with the confidence and
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authority that ... [was] ... usually derived from absolute scientific proof' (Duesberg,
1987b :1244).
In the wake of Leishman's piece and Duesberg's own article, the Californian began to be
recognized in "US media circles as a credible and 'quote-worthy' dissenter on the subject
of AIDS" (Epstein, 1996:112). So much so that, by the end of 1987, gay newspapers like
Gay Community News (GCN) and San Francisco's Bay Area Reporter were publishing
articles specifically about the failure of his colleagues in the 'AIDS establishment' to
respond to him. In one GCN report Duesberg was quoted as saying: "I've asked questions
they apparently can't answer" (Kenschaft, 1987 cited in Epstein, 1996: 112).
Duesberg soon had more than gay publications willing to print his views. In January
1988, Celia Farber, a journalist with Spin magazine and fierce critic of the 'AIDS
establishment', featured him in a lengthy interview in one of her AIDS columns.
Duesberg gained the support of many of Robert Gallo's doubters when he pointed out that
'establishment' researchers found themselves unable to retreat from their original claims
because the "stakes are too high now" (Farber, 1988:43): "Scientists researching AIDS
are much less inclined to ask scrutinizing questions about the etiology ... of AIDS when
they have invested huge sums of money in companies that make money on the hypothesis
that HIV is the cause of the AIDS virus ... Gallo stands to make a lot of money from
patent rights on the virus. His entire reputation depends on this virus. If HIV is not he
cause of AIDS, there's nothing left for Gallo. If it's not a retrovirus, Gallo would become
irrelevant" (Farber, 1988 :44).
Chuck Ortleb could not agree more. To him, Duesberg's theories provided explanations
for the 'AIDS establishment's' behaviour, and also clarified why people like Gallo
continued to have support. They also offered the Native's readers a comfortable denial of
the ever increasing, inexplicable deaths. By the "spring of 1988, the Native seasonably
pronounced: 'The AIDS crisis will be over in six months'" (Ortleb, 1988 cited in Kinsella,
1989:46). Ortleb had become a 'Duesberg champion': he had more ammunition than ever
against the AIDS establishment ... everything backed up by a world-renowned scientist.
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Mainstream dailies
Mainstream dailies approached Duesberg in different ways, with the more influential
publications being the most critical. While the New York Post and Los Angeles Times lent
credibility to Duesberg's views, The New York Times was far more cautious, with
headlines such as Solitary Dissenter Disputes Cause of AIDS (Boffey, 1988 cited in
Epstein, 1996:114). The New York Times' articles were also rarely sensationalist front
page news, but rather carefully placed on science pages, quoting government scientists
such as the NIH's Anthony Fauci arguing that "the evidence that HIV causes AIDS is so
overwhelming that it almost doesn't deserve discussion anymore" (Fauci, 1988 cited in
Boffey, 1988 in Epstein, 1996: 114). Reports often referred to Duesberg's arguments as
"provocative", pitting them against "virtually all of the leading scientists engaged in
AIDS work [who] believe that Dr Duesberg is wrong" (Boffey, 1988 cited in Epstein,
1996: 114). The New York Times also hinted that Duesberg's claims were repetitions of
old arguments and had "been considered at length within the scientific community"
(Boffey, 1988 cited in Epstein, 1996: 115). Lies of Our Times, an alternative magazine
dedicated to monitoring the writings of The New York Times, complained that the
newspaper had never mentioned Duesberg since Philip Boffey's 1988 article, and it
claimed "the silence of the Times kept Duesberg out of the major media for three years"
(Lehrman, 1991 cited in Epstein, 1996: 141).
But, that was not true of all the media. The New York Post and Los Angeles Times were
far more generous with accrediting Duesberg. The Post was the first daily newspaper to
print an article on the causation controversy on January 7 1988, called AIDS Experts on
Wrong Track: Top Doc (Nicholson, 1988 cited in Epstein, 1996: 114). Writer Joe
Nicholson, the publication's medicine and science editor, cited Duesberg's offer to have
himself injected with HIVand paid considerable attention to his credentials, noting that
this "top scientist" had been studying viruses for twenty years, and had spent the previous
year on a scholarship at the NIH, "the world centre of AIDS research (Nicholson, 1988
cited in Epstein, 1996: 114). In the process, however, Nicholson overlooked Duesberg's
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shortcomings. He failed to mention that the professor's work at the NIH was on cancer,
and not AIDS, puzzling many of his readers. Epstein (1996: 114) pointed out that
Nicholson could also not provide any justification for referring to Duesberg as an "AIDS
expert" in the heading of his article.
A two thousand-word article by Joel Shurkin appeared soon afterwards in the Los
Angeles Times and considered Duesberg's arguments as even weightier (Shurkin,
1988:114). Shurkin described the controversy as a debate between "two camps," the
"dissidents" and the "AIDS establishment", which "disagree not so much on the basic
facts as on their interpretations" (Shurkin, 1988:114).Epstein (1996:115) has noted that
this discussion "tended to convey a certain legitimacy upon Duesberg's arguments. For
example, one AIDS researcher 'who refused to be quoted by name'said that Duesberg
was factually incorrect in that the virus had indeed been found in all patients. But another
researcher 'said the truth is somewhere in between'. Such disagreement had the effect of
suggesting that there was a legitimate spectrum of opinion on these questions and that
Duesberg's views, however unpopular, were not beyond the reaches of plausible scientific
theorizing" (Epstein, 1996: 115). Between 1989 and 1991, the Los Angeles Times
continued to be sympathetic towards Duesberg, asking whether he was a "Hero or
Heretic" (Abrams, 1991 cited in Epstein, 1996:140). When Duesberg's Outstanding
Investigator's Grant was not renewed, the Los Angeles Times implied that it was a direct
punishment for heresy, with the phrase "non-scientific issues" serving as a euphemism
for Duesberg's campaign against the orthodox position on AIDS.
Anthony Fauci analyzed the media's role in the causation debate, pointing out that "the
media are great equalizers in science" and that any scientist quoted in the media becomes
an "expert" (Fauci, 1989 cited in Epstein, 1996: 175). Because some publications
presented Duesberg as credible, "many people became concerned that the HIV hypothesis
was a hoax", Fauci explained, adding that his own sister had called him repeatedly to ask:
'Are you sure he's wrong?'" (Fauci, 1989 cited in Epstein, 1996: 175). Fauci further noted
that journalistic norms of balance often compelled reporters to present the controversy as
having 'two sides', resulting in media consumers being unable to judge for themselves the
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relative solidity of consensus among AIDS researchers, assuming controversy was
rampant.
Duesberg's critics had complained vehemently about the amount of ink that newspapers
such as the New York Native, Los Angeles Times and New York Post had devoted to him,
arguing that it had profound implications for the social construction of belief of their
readers - for what they thought was true about 'preventative sexual behaviour' and the
safety and efficacy of anti-aids drugs" (Epstein, 1996: 178). Yet, the Berkeley professor's
perspective was completely the opposite: "I mean, measure it against the ... 1,000
[articles] on the virus hypothesis that The New York Times alone publishes a year ... You
will have a factor of like 1,000 ... to one ... in their favour" (Duesberg, 1994 cited in
Epstein, 1996: 175).
From everything to nothing in the gay community
With the Native's pro-Duesberg campaigns, and the Californian's convenient denial of the
epidemic, some of his most ardent support came from the gay media. But then Duesberg
started suggesting that "the trauma of anal intercourse" (Rapaport, 1988 cited in Epstein,
1996: 118) could be a factor in the spread of AIDS, and that the worst affected
populations, such as the gay community, "could have ... been too promiscuous"
(Rapaport, 1988 cited in Epstein, 1996: 118). Within a week of publication ofa Duesberg
comment in a Village Voice article that AIDS was "caused by a lifestyle that was criminal
twenty years ago" (Duesberg, 1988 cited Epstein, 1996: 117), the remark became the Gay
Community News's "Quote of the Week" (GCN, 1988 cited in Epstein, 1996: 118).
Duesberg's views were referred to as "a stunning regression to 1982, when everything
under the sun, and gay practices in particular, were being blamed for the outbreak of
disease" (Fettner, 1988 cited in Epstein, 1996: 118).
Chuck Ortleb, however, refused to halt his 'Duesberg coverage'. So much so that he asked
Duesberg to review Gallo's book Virus Hunting (Gallo, 1991) in 1991, which the
Berkeley professor dubbed an "expensive, scientific comedy" (Duesberg, 1991). Gallo
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repeatedly emphasized that Duesberg was unable to understand AIDS, being a molecular
virologist and chemist, and not a doctor. In his review, Duesberg responded: "I wonder
whether the M.D. Gallo might not have been better cast using his medical training to treat
AIDS patients than trying to resolve the 'molecular virology' ofHIV and the 'chemistry'
of AIDS" (Duesberg, 1991). Ortleb's reports had, however, lost their impact. With his
fixation on a scientist who was now being viewed as holding homosexual men
responsible for the spread of AIDS, the Native had lost its credibility with Ortleb
becoming as controversial as the man he was supporting. Fewer and fewer Native readers
took him seriously, by this time being left with many other publications also reporting on
the epidemic and providing the information they were looking for.
The right of reply
With the exception of Bio/Technology, Duesberg's Cancer Research article initially
received very little attention from the scientific media (Kinsella, 1989:46). According to
Anthony Fauci, many AIDS researchers refused to comment publicly out of fear that it
would legitimize dissident theories (Fauci, 1988 cited in Epstein, 1996: 119). Even
politicians were cautious, with the President's commission on the HIV epidemic blasting
Duesberg for "the sin of playing to a public audience" (Epstein, 1996: 119). This appeal to
the Berkeley professor to avoid publicizing his dissent, played right into the hands of
journalists critical of the US government's handling of the epidemic, such as Atlantic
Monthly's Katie Leishman. In a piece published in the Wall Street Journal, The AIDS
Debate That Isn't, Leishman rebuked the commission for its treatment of alternative
voices: "The suggestion that the public and patients must be protected from confusion is
not merely condescending but faintly sinister" (Leishman, 1988: 14).
Duesberg's supporters routinely insisted upon his "right to speak the truth" (Epstein,
1996: 176) with some newspapers such as the San Francisco Examiner acknowledging
this right, although not supporting dissident theories. In Spin, Celia Farber, who by now
was a strong alternative voice, accused the 'AIDS establishment' of assuming it had the
right to "govern all discourse on AIDS ... It feels no one has any business disrupting its
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conclusions and treatment strategies. But don't those AIDS posters remind us, 'AIDS is
everybody's disease'? Doesn't that include the people who question those who made the
posters? Isn't it everyone's debate, too?" (Farber, 1992 cited in Epstein, 1996: 176).
As a result of these pressures, along with considerable help from Bio/Technology editor
Harvey Bialy, the 'establishment' was eventually forced to debate Duesberg in the July 29
1988 issue of Science. Itwas the Californian (Duesberg, 1988) against three orthodox
scientists - including Robert Gallo (Blattner, Gallo and Temin, 1988). Each side stated its
views in a one-page report, along with the other party's response, as a Policy Forum.
Duesberg finally had his views published in one of the most authoritative science
magazines in the world, which compelled influential researchers to take note of them.
But, for the Californian, this also had a downside: the voices against him would become
stronger. John Maddox, the editor of the British science journal Nature, started referring
to his queries as "the stock-in-the-trade of undergraduate debating societies" (Maddox,
1993: 109), and pointed out that Duesberg considered "questions left unanswered for
more than about ten minutes" (Maddox, 1993: 109) as further proof that HIV was not the
cause of AIDS. In many editorials, Maddox openly stated that he would not allow
Duesberg the "right of reply", as it was in stark conflict with his journal's obligation to
provide its readers with trustworthy information. "Whatever Duesberg's friends say, the
right of reply must be modulated by its content" (Maddox, 1993: 109). In one of his 1995
editorials, Maddox responded to journalists like Celia Farber's criticism: "The sad truth
about debates on controversial issues in science is that there may come a point at which
dissenters forfeit the right to make claims on other people's time and trouble by the
poverty of their arguments and the exasperation they have caused. The world (to judge
from Nature's postbag) is full of people who believe that Einstein's relativity is a pack of
lies, but who cannot make the claim on other people's attention they would wish"
(Maddox, 1995: 1).
As it would later prove to be in the case of the British media, Maddox's criticism of
Duesberg and efforts to keep him out of the media would by no means end here. But
some publications would see them as reminiscent of the 'AIDS establishment's' perceived
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assumption that it had the right to "govern all discourse on AIDS" (Farber, 1992 cited in
Epstein, 1996: 176).
The British media
Causation debates in the British media started much later than in the US. While American
newspapers widely reported Peter Duesberg's theories by the late eighties, English
publications only took note of them in 1992. As in America, journalists' and editors'
personal 'AIDS beliefs' were instrumental in the type of coverage Duesberg received.
Where the States had Chuck Ortleb (New York Native), John Lauritsen (New York
Native), Katie Leishman (Atlantic Monthly) and Celia Farber (Spin) producing pro-
dissident reports in accordance with their own views, England had its own dissident
voices. Sunday Times science correspondent Neville Hodgkinson and his editor Andrew
Neil were so supportive of the Berkeley professor's theories that their coverage ended up
being analyzed on a weekly basis in Nature's editorial pages.
Duesberg's coverage in the United Kingdom was, however, preceded by another debate
that needs discussion to provide context with what followed. A peak of controversy came
in November 1989 "when Lord Kilbracken, a minority voice on the All Party
Parliamentary Group on AIDS, made his claim that only one proven case of AIDS
attributable to heterosexual transmission could be found in official figures" (Beharrell,
1998:215). Several newspapers gave this assertion prominent coverage. "The Daily Mail
front page declared it The Truth About AIDS (Daily Mail, 1989 cited in Beharrell,
1998:215) and the "Sun headlined its inside page report Straight Sex Cannot Give You
AIDS - Official" (BeharrelI, 1998:215). In this way the epidemiological argument, that
HIV caused AIDS, underpinning the British government's official health education
campaign, became highly politicized.
AIDS reports peaked during the time of the Kilbraeken controversy, with three daily
newspapers, the Sun, Daily Mail and Daily Express, standing out in their endorsement of
his claims. All three accepted 'the figures' without doubt or qualification (Beharrell,
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1998:217). The Sun's resident doctor, Vernon Coleman, alleged an even wider
conspiracy: "AIDS - the Hoax of the Century ... Why it paid prudes, gays and Business
to scare us all" (Coleman, 1989, cited in Beharrell, 1998:218). As some American
journalists had done before him, Coleman argued that "drug and medical companies and
the doctors who are linked to them had vested interests in the policy, and that moral
campaigners were interested in frightening young people into celibacy, while gay
activists were 'worried that once it was widely known that AIDS was NOT a major threat
to heterosexuals, then funds for AIDS research would fall'" (Coleman, 1989 cited in
Beharrell, 1988 :218). In the Daily Mail, the columnist Ann Leslie voiced a similar view:
"This newspaper is growing weary of pointing out the facts ... Everyone is NOT at risk
from AIDS: only those who belong to high-risk groups ... So why have we, the
taxpayers, been forced to waste money on this costly and farcical campaign? First of all,
because our government, like many others, fell for militant gay propaganda ... " (Leslie,
1989 cited in Beharrell, 1998 :218-9).
These publications consistently put forward the editorial view that the government's
message was a lie, supporting the notion that AIDS was an exclusively gay disease
(Beharrell, 1998:222). Having huge readerships, they played a significant role in
promoting strong skepticism about the cause of AIDS among political conservatives and
anti-gay groups. In some circles, the suspicion was so widespread that many disbelieved
a 1990 government announcement of increased heterosexual HIV infections (Beharrell,
1998:222). In many ways, this period laid an important and favourable foundation for
Peter Duesberg's theories that were to hit the British media two years later.
Between April 26 and May 31 1992, more than twenty articles or opinion pieces on the
causation controversy were published in the pages of the Times, the Sunday Times, the
Independent, the Daily Telegraph and Reuters (Epstein, 1996: 150). The Sunday Times,
one of the national Sunday newspapers with top readerships, spearheaded the furor.
When Neville Hodgkinson became the Sunday Times' science correspondent in 1991, the
publication had already serialised The Myth of Heterosexual AIDS, a book by an AIDS
dissident and Los Angeles Times journalist, Michael Fumento. The book echoed Lord
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Kilbracken's argument that AIDS was a gay disease, with heterosexuals only being at risk
if they were drug users or black (Alford, 1997). This decision, largely the doing of editor
Andrew Neil, provoked an outrage. American bookstores had boycotted Fumento's book,
Nature had published a scathing review, the Sunday Times' letters editor had been
inundated with complaints. Yet, Neil decided to publish it. The editor of the Sunday
Times was such a strong supporter of Fum ento's notions that he even allowed journalists
to interview him. In Continuum, a magazine for long-term survivors ofHIV and AIDS,
he spoke of how, at the end of the 1980s, he began to feel that "there was a kind of
conspiracy beginning to develop - almost an unholy alliance among the government,
militant gay lobby and a sort of Christian moral majority right" (Neil, 1989, cited in
Jacob, 1995: 14). Now Neil had fresh ammunition with which to defend his beliefs:
Duesberg's theories.
Neville Hodgkinson and his editor's convictions were virtually the same. In April 1992,
he wrote his first Duesberg article for the Sunday Times, headed a Startling Challenge to
AIDS Orthodoxy, mounted by "two of the world's experts on viruses" (Hodgkinson,
1992a). Hodgkinson was referring to an alternative AIDS conference that would be held
in Amsterdam and be attended by Peter Duesberg and Luc Montagnier. Both scientists,
he reported, "are to challenge the orthodox view that HIV is the exclusive cause of
AIDS" (Hodgkinson, 1992a). Montagnier had publicly admitted that the cause of AIDS
might be far more complex than originally thought and could possibly involve co-factors.
He, however, never agreed with Duesberg's theories. Yet, Hodgkinson's Sunday Times
article made it sound as if Montagnier and Duesberg were a solid team on its way to
convince delegates of a theory they had agreed on (Epstein, 1996: 150).
The Sunday Times was soon to be challenged on its claims by other publications. A few
days later, the Independent, a daily newspaper, weighed in with a report from Steve
Connor, a science correspondent who had co-authored a well-known book on AIDS.
Connor quoted Montagnier as commenting that Duesberg was wrong "because he doesn't
take all the data into account, whether deliberately or not" (Connor, 1992:25). In the same
article, Montagnier corrected Hodgkinson, pointing out that he would be attending the
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conference to publicly oppose Duesberg and not to support him (Connor, 1992:25).
Connor argued that the Sunday Times' misrepresentation ofMontagnier was typical of an
article that devoted two pages to Duesberg but largely ignored the wealth of evidence
against his claim (Conner, 1992:25). Many other media publications were soon to
challenge the Sunday Times as well. Malcolm Dean, writing in the News & Comment
Section of the British medical journal Lancet accused the Times of a "deep conservative
bias which the editor desperately tries to conceal by anti-establishment campaigns" (Dean
1992:1286). Dean argued "of course skeptics should be given space, but iconoclasts
should be pushed as hard as establishment figures to justify their assertions"(Dean,
1992:1286).
Meanwhile, Nature editor John Maddox had not forgotten about Peter Duesberg. His
journal being based in London, as the Sunday Times was, Maddox was outraged at the
Times' promotion of Dues berg, accusing it of concealing the facts and misleading its
readers about AIDS: "For more than two years the most profitable newspaper in Britain
has supported the view that HIV is irrelevant to the causation of AIDS. This opinion can
be traced to the journalistically proper reporting of Dr Peter Duesberg's well-known
dissent from the general opinion that AIDS follows HIV infection; but the Sunday Times
has since made the cause its own" (Maddox, 1993 cited in Jacob, 1995: 15). In Maddox's
opinion, the Times had an orchestrated and dangerous campaign against the AIDS
orthodoxy that no one had been able to stop: "The public interest requires that the Sunday
Times should not follow its perverse line of the causation of AIDS; but that would entail
censorship, for which there is no mechanism and which is a greater evil ... So how, in an
open society, is a newspaper to be discouraged from following a line that is seriously
mistaken and probably disastrous as well?" (Jacob, 1995: 15)
Maddox was so upset by the Times' coverage that he decided to take it upon himself to
change it. Each week, the Sunday Times' AIDS coverage was analyzed in Nature: it was
reported as if it was news, and in enough detail to let readers judge whether the
newspaper's line on HIVand AIDS showed signs of change. Referring to the Times'
'campaign' as the "Sunday Times aberrations" (Maddox, 1993 cited in Jacobs, 1995: 16) in
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an editorial Don't Read Sunday Times, Maddox charged the publication with not
considering the damage done by displaying "the discomforts of 'safe sex' to be tiresome
encumbrances" (Maddox, 1993 cited in Jacob, 1995: 16). Many doctors and researchers
actively participated in Nature's efforts by complaining of difficulties in getting their
refutations published as letters in the Sunday Times. The Sunday Times claimed it did not
print these letters because many were in an 'abusive tone' (Sunday Times, 1993 cited in
Jacob, 1995). In protest, Nature assured distressed Sunday Times readers that it would
weekly publish letters of complaint intended for the Sunday Times.
But the Sunday Times was ready for a media war, viewing Nature's campaign as an
arrogant attempt to claim the AIDS debate for itself. Reprinting Maddox's editorial on
December 12, 1993, the Times commented: "Despite distortions and inaccuracies, this
editorial deserves a wider audience than Nature's, both in the interest of open debate and
because of the insight it gives into the mind of the journal's editor. So we reprint in full
below, with Maddox permission, though he requested 200 pounds for the privilege"
(Sunday Times, 1993 cited in Jacobs, 1995: 16). Maddox's piece was accompanied by one
of Neville Hodgkinson's articles AIDS: Why We Won't be Silenced It argued that
Nature's summaries of Sunday Times reports at least gave Maddox's readers the
opportunity "to become exposed for the first time to facts and arguments which Nature
should long ago have reported and debated in detail" (Hodgkinson, 1993).
Itwas however, the Independent, and not Nature, that eventually put an "unceremonious
end" (Jacob, 1995: 17) to the Sunday Times' Duesberg campaign. Steven Connor tracked
down Angelo d'Agostino, a doctor working in Tanzania, who was quoted by the Sunday
Times as saying that AIDS was not nearly as bad in Africa as portrayed. Doubting
Hodgkinson's citations, Connor showed the article to d'Agostino who complained that his
comments were severely distorted in order to fit in with the Times' "myth theories"
(Jacob, 1995: 17). The Independent ran an entire article devoted to this situation,
contending that "one cannot help but wonder at the motivation for such irresponsible
journalism, and more so, decry the terrible effects on the unsuspecting public who are
given a false sense of security and run the very real risk of contracting an incurable
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disease as a consequence" (Connor, 1994 cited in Jacob, 1995). This caused a great
upheaval in the offices of Rupert Murdoch, the media magnate to which the Sunday
Times belonged, and resulted in the resignations of both Neil and Hodgkinson in May
1994.
Jacob (1995: 17) has argued that the Sunday Times' campaign had a visible effect on the
voluntary sector in Britain, with funders reading the newspaper developing doubts about
the cause of AIDS. In Jacob's opinion, this resulted in a significant decrease in funding
for 1994, leaving many volunteer organizations without enough money to continue with
their AIDS work. The same author has put forward that the reports created "an air of
complacency" (Jacob, 1995: 17) in the general public. Many started believing that they
were immune to AIDS, asking: "Where is the epidemic you have predicted? We are still
immune to AIDS and we engage in unprotected sex."
Books
By the end of 1994, media reports on AIDS dissident theories had virtually disappeared.
Dissidents no longer came up with new theories and for most publications, the subject
had simply lost its news value. Individual journalists supporting dissident theories,
however, did not disappear. With news publications' lack of interest in their stories, many
started publishing books, either at their own cost or backed by alternative publishing
companies. However, these books received mostly scathing reviews ... if reviewed at all
in mainstream publications.
Towards the end of 1993, John Lauritsen (New York Native) published The AIDS War:
Propaganda, Profiteering and Genocide from the Medical-Industrial Complex
(Lauritsen, 1994), presenting his previously published AIDS reports in chronological
order with a few new chapters interspersed. In highly technical language, he argued that
AIDS did not exist. Mike Chapelle criticized the publication in The Bloomsbury Review
as reinforcing "the notion that issues of medical science are inaccessible technical matters
best left to the elite scientific community" (Chapelle, 1994).
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Two years after his resignation, Neville Hodgkinson published AIDS: The Failure of
Contemporary Science (Hodgkinson, 1996), restating the opinion that HIV was not the
cause of AIDS. In a mocking book review in The Guardian, John Maddox described the
book as "an heroic account of a prejudice that went sour - mercifully quickly in this case"
(Maddox, 1996). In the same year, Peter Duesberg also published a book Inventing the
AIDS Virus (Duesberg, 1996), with the New York Times dubbing it "destructive of
personal morale, prevention efforts and public understanding of both HIV/AIDS and of
biomedical science in general" (Osborn, 1996). The Washington Times (Goode, 1996)
was more sympathetic, noting "the controversy has left Duesberg a scientific persona non
grata with few graduate students, all of whom are about to finish their work with him
with no funding" (Goode, 1996).
One of the only books not taking sides in the debate, but analyzing both mainstream and
dissenting views in the same way, was also published that year. Steven Epstein's Impure
Science: AIDS, Activism and the Politics of Knowledge (Epstein, 1996) "differed from the
usual approach which tends to accept a mainstream world view as true, and then tries to
'explain' other opinions as various kinds of errors" (James, 1996), leaving readers with
the task of coming to their own conclusions.
Conclusion
In explaining why most publications eventually accepted the orthodox position and not
his, Duesberg told the California Monthly: "Science is really now a popularity contest
made by newspapers. You hype something in the press, and people take it from there"
(Duesberg, 1990 cited in Epstein, 1996: 176). Duesberg was being critical but he had
obviously played the same game in order to advance his claims in the causation
controversy.
Some publications fell prey to this, publishing and often advancing his views. Yet, most
of these reports were published as a result of a journalists' or editors' personal view. They
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were, in effect, dissidents themselves who happened to be working in the media, with all
having different reasons for supporting Duesberg's theories. Some did so out of
frustration with the US government and scientists like Robert Gallo; others because they
believed Duesberg had the right to be heard. In some cases, Duesberg-stories simply
provided a fresh angle on which to report on AIDS, with editors often complaining that
reports on the epidemic repeated the same 'death angle' over and over again. Reporting on
Duesberg's arguments was, however, dangerous, as they had the potential to create the
impression among readers, viewers and listeners that it was safe to engage in unsafe sex
or that AIDS medicines were ineffective. Many publications, such as The New York
Times, were cautious of this and downplayed Duesberg's reports by placing him on 'less
read' pages of the newspaper.
In both the US and Britain, reports on the Berkeley professor could be controlled to at
least some extent, resulting in only temporary damage. For one, the 'Duesberg-period'
passed after eight years in the US and half that time in England. Also, only a few
mainstream publications approached his stories uncritically, with alternative publications,
read by only small parts of the population, being more sympathetic. But in South Africa,
the situation would prove to be entirely different: here, people would not be asked to
support a Californian scientist, but the country's President. Thabo Mbeki's dissident views
would be reported in every single newspaper, on every radio and television station. With
the country's literacy levels far below that of the developed world, people would be
significantly more vulnerable to accepting their President's views as the truth than
Americans were in Peter Duesberg's case. Another major difference would be that the
entire country's AIDS policies would be influenced by Mbeki's views - something that
was never on the cards in either the US or Britain. What was to come would result in
permanent damage.
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CHAPTER THREE
I AM NOT ARGUING WITH YOU, I'M TELLING YOU
Conflicts, like living organisms, had a natural lifespan. The trick was to know when to let
them die.
Ian McEwan, 1948.
(Cited in: Ratcliff and Rappaport, 2001: 17)
Introduction
By the mid-nineties, by which time AIDS dissidents in the first world had lost their
voices, AIDS had reached epidemic proportions in South Africa. By the turn of the
century, the epidemic "increased 30-fold since 1990" (Abdool-Karim cited in Nicodemus,
1999a), and by the year 2000, UNAIDS officially dubbed South Africa as the country
with the fastest growing epidemic in the world (Report on the global mVI AIDS
epidemic, 2000).
With a former apartheid government giving little attention to mvIAIDS, 'the ANC
government elected in 1994 appeared to have taken the issue seriously: even prior to it
coming into power, ANC doctors, health and social workers had meeting after meeting
under the banner of the National AIDS Convention of South Africa (NACOSA), with
gatherings often addressed by officials raking as high as Nelson Mandela. The result was
the new cabinet's adoption of a national AIDS plan within six months after being elected
- a plan "which stressed the need to formulate a strong, shared vision of mobilisation to
focus all of the country's resources on fighting the disease" (Nicodemus, 1999a).
AIDS activists, non-governmental organisations and people living with AIDS had high
hopes that South Africa would show the rest of the continent how to combat the disease
effectively. But instead, the country's AIDS vision became rapidly clouded by infighting,
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to the point that many perceived the government's response to the epidemic as a "dismal
failure ... its organization disjointed and its policies largely ineffective" (Nicodemus,
1999a). It was framed as such by one of South Africa's leading AIDS physicians, Dr
Ashraf Grimwood: we "shot our allies, knifed our neighbours and instead of attacking the
enemy, attacked each other" (Grimwood cited in Bisseker, 1999). This situation,
combined with the country's Deputy President at the time (and President to be), Thabo
Mbeki's receptiveness to HIV/AIDS views other than those coming from a first world
establishment he was often suspicious of, made South Africa a fertile ground for AIDS
dissident views.
Disasters setting the context
Thabo Mbeki's support for discredited HIV/AIDS theories started long before he was
elected President in 1999. In 1997, he unleashed a political storm when he appeared to
have played a prominent role in attempts to fast track the registration of a widely
condemned "cure for AIDS" - Virodene POS8. Virodene contained a highly toxic
industrial solvent called diethylformamide (Sidley, 1997), that a team of Pretoria
University researchers claimed could kill HIV viruses (Sidley, 1998a). Their research
was brought to the public eye when they presented preliminary data in parliament in an
effort to secure government funding, and in the process "bypassed all the conventional
funding and controlling bodies who would normally be expected to use a high level of
scientific scrutiny to judge applications for financial support" (Huismans cited in Sidley,
1997). While a highly sceptical medical and scientific community looked on, the team
received a standing ovation and promises of research funding from cabinet (Sidley,
1998a). It soon emerged that the person behind the researchers' government support was
the then minister of health, Dr Nkosazana Zuma, "who had represented the now discredit
results to the cabinet" (Sidley, 1997), and convinced it to consider funding the Virodene
proposals. Developments thereafter would point to Zuma receiving extraordinarily strong
backing from Deputy President Thabo Mbeki.
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Following extensive media reports, the team's findings were subjected to scientific
scrutiny, with a committee of inquiry pronouncing that "preclinical trial research and
experiments were so 'sloppy' that the results of the clinical trials could not be determined
with any degree of certainty" (Sidley, 1997). Sidley (1997) remarked that the researchers
also proceeded with clinical trials without the required permission of the Medicines
Control Councilor Ethics Research Protocol Committee of the University of Pretoria.
Other matters for concern included the "lack of a proper control group, the way patients
were selected for the trial, and the secretive, non-transparent nature of the investigation"
(Sidley, 1997).
Notwithstanding this, both Mbeki and Zuma took up a high profile stance in favour of
placing Virodene on the market as quickly as possible. Mbeki backed Zuma in making a
controversial change to the law to control the functioning of South Africa's Medicines
Control Council (MCC), after several attempts to register the drug in question had failed
(Sidley, 1998a). The law allowed her to "overrule decisions taken by the council" (Sidley,
1998b), and as a result, the Virodene team would be permitted to set up new protocols to
re-apply to the MCC for registration.
However, the researchers fell out with one another and a court battle ensued. Sidley
(1998a) noted that court documents pointed to Thabo Mbeki's personal involvement in
ensuring the drug's continued development by having several pre-breakfast meetings with
the warring factions in order to settle the issue. Added tot that, an opposition party
alleged that it had found evidence in court documents indicating that Zuma and Mbeki
were to gain financially from Virodene's development (Sidley, 1998a). After the MeC
had rejected several new protocols from the Pretoria research team, arguing that there
was "disturbing evidence that Virodene may in fact exaggerate the effects of AIDS
instead of diminishing them" (Sidley, 1998a), Mbeki was quoted in newspapers as saying
that the MCC "has some other agenda for holding up the development ofVirodene"
(Sidley, 1998a).
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Soon thereafter, a review team appointed by the Health Minister to investigate the
"breakdown in communication" (Sidley, 1998b) between the MCC and herself concluded
that the "best solution was to close the Medicines Control Council and start again"
(Sidley, 1998b). The MCC was disbanded shortly after the report and replaced by a new
council with members seemingly "less aggressive on issues such as AIDS treatments"
(Sidley, 1998c) than their predecessors. Zuma's national AIDS advisory council, which
openly voiced its opposition to Virodene, was equally quickly dismissed (Nicodemus,
1999) and replaced by a National AIDS Council with limited powers. Many interpreted
these moves as Mbeki and Zuma politicising "a stale scientific debate" (Bisseker, 1999):
"The medicines regulatory authority in any country should be fiercely independent.
Mbeki has crossed that line ... He did it by supporting Virodene and accusing former
MCC chairman Professor Peter Folb, who refused to bow to political pressure to license
the industrial solvent, of professional dishonesty. Former Health minister Nkosazana
Zuma forever blurred the line when she pioneered legislation restructuring the MCC and
replacing certain members with her own officials" (Bisseker, 1999).
Ironically, the new MCC never approved Virodene for testing on humans, stating - like
its predecessor - that protocols were inadequate and the substance too toxic to be tested
on people. But the government's ardent support for Virodene seemed to continue long
thereafter: in September 2001, the health department confirmed a visit by Zuma's
successor, Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, to a Virodene research clinic in Tanzania. The
Pretoria team was reported to be "secretly testing ... [the] discredited anti-AIDS drug on
human guinea pigs" (Arenstein & John, 2002: 19), thus being on the verge of deportation.
The Health Department, however, insisted "that the visit was part of an official tour of
Tanzania and the link with Virodene purely coincidental" (Arenstein & John, 2002:19).
Sarafina IT
The Virodene debacle was preceded by a scandal of equally disastrous proportions -
Sarafina II. Zuma's department spent R14 million on an AIDS musical, that "threw the
national AIDS directorate into disarray" (Adler cited in Nicodemus, 1999a) by using
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European Union funding set aside for AIDS prevention - without the EU having
authorized it (Powell, 1996). Moreover, the contract for the play was given to a well-
known playwright "without consultation or proper tendering" (Makanya, 1996), with
many being of the opinion that the show contained almost no relevant AIDS prevention
messages (Ramklown, 1996:3).
Although Mbeki did not seem to be directly involved, Sarafina II was a major contributor
to the erosion of the credibility of his government's AIDS directorate. By 1999, the
directorate had its third director in three years (Nicodemus, 1999a), and according to
many AIDS authorities, a "demise of shared vision for AIDS" (Adler cited in Nicodemus,
1999). The state's reaction to Zuma's critics drastically fuelled these perceptions, with it
either refusing to respond, or branding criticism as 'racist' or 'unpatriotic' (Lengane,
1996). Gary Adler, executive director of South Africa's AIDS Foundation, was convinced
that a radical cut in government funding for AIDS NGOs from R19 million in 1996 to R2
million in 1998, was a "punishment for those who dared to demand accountability of the
department" (Adler cited in Nicodemus, 1999a).
Zuma andAZT
In late 1998, Zuma announced that she was to cancel all projects providing the anti-aids
drug AZT to Hl V-positive women pregnant women. She insisted that the government
could not afford to finance programmes (Lurie et aI., 1999) and that the efficacy of the
drug had not been proved (Nicodemus, 1999a). Her decision made South Africa "the
target of international criticism, both in academic journals and the popular press" (Lurie
et aI., 1999), as there was unequivocal evidence that AZT reduced the "risk ofa mother
passing Hl'V to her infant child by between 35% and 50%" (Thom, 1999). The World
Health Organization regarded the drug as so effective, that "it added AZT for the
prevention of vertical transmission to its Essential Drugs List" (UNAIDS Prevention of
HIV transmission from mother-to-child, 1998 cited in Lurie et al., 1999). Itwas also
well-established that the cost of treating HIV-positive children far exceeded that of the
dosages of AZT that could prevent them from coming HIV-positive (MPs break ranks to
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protest against Zuma's decision on AZT, 1999). At least thirty five thousand mv-
positive babies were born in South Africa every year (Lurie et aI., 1999), with many
estimated the number to be double that (Capraro, 1999: Il).
A factor that worsened matters was Zuma's blunt dismissal of the results of a study - to
which South Africa was a key contributor - that demonstrated that short (and invariably
cheaper) courses of various anti-aids drugs, including AZT, were viable options for the
reduction of mother- to-child-transmission (MTCT) of HfV in Africa: at the 6th
Conference of Retroviruses and Opportunistic Infections in Chicago in February 1999,
the PETRA trial, "to which South Africa contributed ... 52% of the patients, showed that
various shorter anti-retroviral regimens reduce ... [mother-to-child-transmission] ... by
37-50% compared with a placebo" (Saba, 1999 cited in Lurie et aI., 1999). Prompted on
whether the Health Minister would reconsider the suspension of MTCT projects in the
light of the PETRA study results, as well as a "75% price cut for 5 years" from drug
manufacturer Glaxo Well come (Lurie et aI., 1999), a health department spokesperson
responded: "Our position has not changed. It has not been influenced by the research
findings coming from Chicago or anywhere else" (Eveleth cited in Lurie et al., 1999).
Mbeki's announcement
On October 28 1999 - a year after Zuma shelved the country's AZT projects - President
Thabo Mbeki addressed parliament's second chamber, the National Council of Provinces,
and made a statement precariously close to Peter Duesberg's views on AZT: "there exists
a large volume of scientific literature alleging that, among other things, the toxicity of
this drug is such that it is in fact a danger to health ... these are matters of great concern
to the government as it would be irresponsible for us not to heed the dire warnings which
medical researchers have been making" (Swarns, 1999).Mbeki told the council that he
had asked the (new) Health Minister, Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, to "look into the
claim in certain scientific literature that AZT [which had been registered for the
prevention of mother -to-child transmission in South Africa for 10 years (Nicodemus,
1999b)] is dangerous" (Bisseker, 1999).
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The president's comments did not only have a far greater impact than those of his former
Health Minister; they took the debate an unsound step further, implying that AZT was
dangerous. As with Duesberg's statements, there was the risk that AIDS patients using the
drug could stop with a potentially lifesaving treatment. This evidently happened, given
Mbeki's influence, with obviously far more disastrous consequences than in Duesberg's
case. One of the country's biggest AIDS benefit programmes, Aid for AIDS, was
suddenly being "inundated with calls from fearful patients who ... [thought] ... new
evidence must have emerged about the drug's toxicity" (Bisseker, 1999). Aid For AIDS
supported 3000 HIV-positive members of whom more than halfwas taking AZT - now
fearful of their medication. In Cape Town, many patients stopped taking AZT, with
drastic increases in their viral loads. Yet, they maintained they no longer had the disease
(Bisseker, 1999).
Mbeki's speech caused a furor among doctors and researchers working with AIDS,
especially when Tshabalala-Msimang echoed Mbeki and Zuma's views, announcing that
there was no substantial data that AZT stopped the transmission ofHIV from mother to
child. She argued that conflicting data prevented her from changing Zuma's policies, and
that, until she was" convinced that the drug AZT ... [was] ... safe" (Nicodemus, 1999b),
she would not move in that direction. South African doctors were outraged, categorizing
the President and his Health Minister's remarks as people "believing the earth was flat"
(Nicodemus, 1999b). Many, such as the head of Groote Schuur Hospital's HIV/AIDS
Unit, Prof. Gary Maartens, argued that AZT was being singled out from the class of anti-
aids drugs to which it belonged, "because the government ... [was] ... trying to defend its
decision not to provide it for mother-to-child transmission" (Maartens, 1999 cited in
Bisseker, 1999).
Dissident connections
Many loudly wondered where Mbeki was getting his information. Responding to the
queries from a Sunday newspaper, his media liaison officer, Tasneem Carrim, explained:
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"Mbeki has a 'thick set of documents' about the dangers of AZT from Internet ... the
president goes into the Net all the time" (Carrim, 1999 cited in South Africa president got
information on AZT dangers from Internet, 1999). But some scientists, such as
University of Natal and MRC AIDS researcher professor Salim Abdool-Karim, knew
better: Mbeki had already had a range of meetings with two South African AIDS
dissidents, Anita Allen and Anthony Brink (Abdool-Karim, personal communication, 28
May,2001).
Brink was a Pietermaritzburg-based attorney who had written a "two volume report on
the dangers of AZT" (Abdool-Karim, personal communication, 28 May, 2001) and
doubtful links between HIVand AIDS that had been submitted to the President.
According to Abdool-Karim (2001), Mbeki was "somehow convinced by these
arguments" and handed Brink's documents to a group of scientists to review. The
President refuted the review committee's response that disagreed with Brink's, countering
it with his own arguments. A month later, he announced that AZT was a toxic drug.
Before doing media work for AIDS dissident groups, Anita Allen was a Johannesburg
journalist working for The Star newspaper. Itwas known that she was well connected to
the Presidency, and was to all likelihood "the person through which Brink submitted his
volumes to the President" (Abdool-Karim, 1999). To many scientists, it had become
glaringly obvious that Thabo Mbeki had well-oiled links with dissidents, and in
particular, with a close ally of Peter Duesberg, David Rasnick. Those who remained
unconvinced were to be persuaded by the events of the months to follow.
Mbeki's AIDS panel
In February 2000, the Health Minister announced one ofMbeki's most controversial
decisions up to date: to convene an international AIDS panel that was to "reappraise the
scientific evidence that HIV caused AIDS" (Expert panel will look at AIDS with fresh
eyes, 2000). The world was stunned - never before had a state leader taken it upon
himself to "reinvent the wheel" (Moore, 2000 cited in Sulcas, 2000) by wanting to
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
70
globally re-debate scientific matters that were "non-issues for all practical purposes"
(Moore, 2000 cited in Sulcas, 2000). Dr John Moore of the Aaron Diamond AIDS
research centre in New York, phrased it pertinently: "Everybody in AIDS research who
ever logs onto e-mail ... [was] ... talking about this ... and [we were] deeply concerned".
Concern was appropriate: this time around Mbeki did not only question the safety of anti-
aids drugs - he questioned whether the epidemic in fact existed. Dr Mamphele Ramphele,
at the time a medical doctor and former University of Cape Town vice chancellor,
warned that "if the government gives credence to this voodoo science, there's a real
danger that people might say 'I don't have to worry about condoms' " (Ramphele, 2000
cited in Susman, 2000). Dr Ashraf Grimwood, chairperson of the National AIDS
Convention of South Africa (NACO SA), considered it "the most retrograde step anybody
could make" (Move to reinvestigate mv link with AIDS shocks doctors, 2000) and
Leslie London, associate professor at the University of Cape Town's Department of
Public Health, "a travesty that the public money will be spent reinvestigating that issue"
(Move to reinvestigate mv link with AIDS shocks doctors, 2000).
Shortly after Mbeki's announcement, David Rasnick published a full transcript of
questions on the Internet that he claimed Mbeki's office had faxed him in January, as well
as details ofa phone call the President allegedly made to him on January 21 2000. The
questions referred to the validity of'HfV tests, definitions of AIDS, AIDS treatments and
AIDS statistics. In his response, Rasnick advised Mbeki that most of these issues were
not to be taken seriously at all: that "mVantibody tests do not measure at all", that
diseases that Africans had been suffering from for decades had "arbitrarily ... [been]
redefined as AIDS" and that "the only blessing of poverty was that is may protect poor
Africans from the highly toxic mv drugs that have already killed thousands, perhaps tens
of thousands of Americans" (Rasnick, 2000). Rasnick also claimed that he and fellow
dissident Dr Charles Geshekter from the California State University in Chico had met
with Tshabalala-Msimang and MCC registrar Precious Matsoso in December 1999 in a
"frank, open and very cordial" (Rasnick, 2000) meeting: "the minister herself suggested
that it seemed time to assemble a distinguished group of South African and international
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experts from the fields of medicine, virology, biology, chemistry, epidemiology and
public health to engage in a formal, face-to-face exchange of opinion and viewpoints
about all aspects ofHIV, AIDS, AZT and related topics".
Prof Malegapuru Makgoba, the MRC Chair and close friend ofMbeki's, described it as a
national scandal, calling the President's questions "trivial" and "mind-blowing" and
"political rather than scientific" (Makgoba, 2000 cited in Sulcas, 2000): "if politicians are
seeking consensus among scientists, that's the wrong approach" (Makgoba, 2000 cited in
Sulcas, 2000).
Mbeki's office refused to confirm or deny Rasnick's claims but were nonetheless outraged
by the criticism he received. His spokesperson, Parks Mankahlana, released a statement
in which he accused the "powerful and the rich" of expropriating knowledge, "issue[ing]
patents to themselves and mak[ing] laws and regulations to protect and defend their
interests (Mankahlana, 2000a). "Many philosophers and historians have gone as far as
questioning the existence of God and the legacy of Jesus Christ", he said. "Then why
should questions that are asked by the South African government about HIV/AIDS
reverse the gains that have been made over the past thirteen years?" (Mankahlana,
2000a).
Letter to World Leaders
Thabo Mbeki was not deterred; through his actions he appeared to be more convinced
than ever: he sent a five page hand-addressed letter to several First World state leaders,
including the then President Bill Clinton, describing the AIDS epidemic as a "uniquely
African catastrophe" (Fox, 2000). Asserting the South African government's right to
doubt whether HIV caused AIDS and to question whether AZT is unfit for human
consumption or not, he stated that he resisted the "superimposition of Western experience
on African reality" (Fox, 2000): "we will not ourselves, condemn our own people to
death by giving up the search for specific and targeted responses to the specifically
African incidence ofHIV-AIDS (Mbeki, 2000a). He characterized "some elements of
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this orchestrated campaign of condemnation" (Mbeki 2000a) as worrying him "very
deeply" (Mbeki 2000a), as the world suggested, in his opinion, "that there are some
scientists who are 'dangerous and discredited' with whom nobody, including ourselves,
should communicate or interact" (Mbeki 2000a). Mbeki saw these actions as similar as
the former regime's treatment of anti-apartheid activists: "not so long ago, in our own
country, people were killed, tortured, imprisoned and prohibited from being quoted in
private and public because the established authority believed that their views were
dangerous and discredited. We are now being asked to do precisely the same thing that
the racist apartheid tyranny we opposed did, because, it is said, there exists a scientific
view that is supported by the majority against which dissent is prohibited" (Mbeki,
2000a).
Composition of the panel
Questioned on whether dissidents would be included on Mbeki's panel, Tshabalala-
Msimang said: "my personal view is that those with more extreme views are unlikely to
participate, because we are looking for a consensus view" (Tshabalala-Msimang, 2000).
But she was soon to be overruled by her president - to such an extent that her personal
advisor, Dr Ian Roberts, resigned, stating that "he feit he was not being effective in the
ministry in the battle against HIV/AIDS in Africa" (James, 2000b). Shortly after Roberts'
departure, the panel was changed to include" AIDS dissidents without clear qualifications
in therapeutics" (James, 2000b). It comprised of33 scientists from 14 countries,
containing dissidents such as Peter Duesberg and David Rasnick of the United States and
South African professor Sam Mhlango" (Mbeki opens controversial AIDS panel, 2000)
of the Medical University of South Africa, MEDUNSA. Orthodox scientists included
HIV co-discoverer Luc Montagnier and Helen Gayle from the Centres for Disease
Control (CDC) in the USA and MRC president Malegapuru Makgoba. The composition
was considered "skewed" by many, such as AIDS researcher Dr John Moore of Weill
Cornell Medical College in New York City, considering that most scientists held an
orthodox view: "the panel has pretty well everyone on it who believes that HIV is not the
cause of AIDS, and about 0.0001 per cent of those who hold an opposite view" (Moore,
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2000 cited in Cherry, 2000). "It gives them a platform to espouse theories that are
absolutely unsupportable," said Thomas Coates, director of the AIDS Research Institute
at the University of California in San Francisco, "and they don't get many platforms,
because they are considered to be on the lunatic fringe" (Coates, 2000 cited in Freedberg,
2000).
There were also obvious omissions on the orthodox side, with several prominent South
African AIDS researchers, all who had been outspoken in their criticism of the dissident
movement, not included. Profs. Hoosen Coovadia of Natal University, James McIntyre
and Glenda Gray of the University of Witwatersrand, immunologist Johnny Sachs, Gary
Maartens of the University of Cape Town and epidemiologist Bryan Williams of the
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, were all considered to be trouble makers
(Cherry, 2000). Jerry Coovadia stated: "our data is published in the best international
medical journals and we compete for research funding with the world leaders in science.
The government's approach to us is baffiing" (Coovadia, 2000, cited in Munusamy,
2000a).
As a result, leading international scientists threatened to boycott a bi-annual international
AIDS conference that was to take place in July 2000 in Durban, in protest at South
Africa's contacts with renegade "experts" (Conner, 2000). It was the first time that the
conference was to take place on African soil, but many authorities believed South Africa
had become an unsuitable host for an international AIDS conference. Moreover,
conference organisers and key delegates became concerned that "Mbeki's flirtation with
unorthodox views could cast a shadow over the proceedings" (Thurman, 2000 cited in
Freedberg,2000).
Denial
Responding to criticism of the President spreading confusion about AIDS among South
Africans, Mbeki's office denied that he had ever questioned the link between HIVand
AIDS: "neither his private correspondence nor a reconstruction of all the discussions with
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either his minister or any other authority on the question ofHIV and AIDS could produce
any evidence of this. So the president has never said that HIV does not cause AIDS"
(Mankahlana, 2000b).
Opening of the panel/first meeting
On May 6 2000, Thabo Mbeki opened his AIDS panel's first meeting in Pretoria,
declaring that the search for solutions could not be based on what some considered to be
"biblical absolute truth(s)" (Mbeki opens controversial AIDS panel, 2000). He
maintained that he had been surprised by the uproar about his quest to have the causes of
AIDS reviewed, adding that criticism by renowned scientists had at times made it
difficult for him to think he was not a fool: "but I'm not longer so sure about that, given
that so many eminent people responded to the invitation of a fool to come to the
important meeting" (Mbeki, 2000b).
The "important meeting" was to cost the Arts, Culture, Science and Technology
Department R2 million in hotel and travel costs (More about South African AIDS panel,
2000), a questionable sum of money with the Health Department claiming it could not
afford anti-AIDS drugs for HIV-positive women. The panel met for two days that
weekend in Pretoria, and conversed in a "closed internet debate" (More about South
African AIDS panel, 2000) on AIDS before returning to South Africa in early July for a
final four-day discussion.
However, after its first meeting, Mbeki's international AIDS experts remained deeply
divided about the cause of AIDS: chief facilitator Stephen Owen remarked that "it would
be overstating the situation grossly to say there were major areas of difference that have
been significantly narrowed" (Owen cited in AIDS experts remain divided but agree to
experiment, 2000).
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Durban Declaration
A week before the opening of the Durban AIDS conference, more than 5 000 leading
scientists, doctors and medical experts released a document, called the Durban
Declaration, to "set the record straight on the cause of the disease" (Munusamy, 2000b).
The scientific journal Nature published the declaration on July 6, stating that "the
evidence that AIDS is caused by HIV-Ior HIV-2 is clear-cut, exhaustive and
unambiguous" (Reany, 2000) and that it was "unfortunate that a few vocal people
continue to deny the evidence" (Reany, 2000). The South African government slammed
the Durban Declaration as intolerant and "smacking of elitism" (Tshabalala-Msimang
2000, cited in Sithole, 2000), with Mankahlana warning that "the debate appeared to be
descending into Mbeki bashing" (Mankahlana, 2000 cited in Sithole, 2000), and that it
"should be consigned to the dustbin" (Presidency disowns 'dustbin' comment, 2000).
Second meeting
By the second meeting on July 4, the panel's composition had received so much criticism
that the government decided to include some of the orthodox scientists omitted originally,
increasing the number of panel members to 44 (Sithole, 2000b). Well-known South
African researchers such as Glenda Gray and James McIntyre now took part in
discussions (Presidential AIDS advisory panel meetings participants and programme,
2000). The meeting agreed to carry out further studies on, among others, "the reliability
of the globally-used ELISA HIV test" (Sithole, 2000b).
However, National Research Foundation president, Khotso Mokhele, "hyped the planned
studies, which he said he expected to be completed by the end of the year, as so rigorous
a test of the hypothesis that HIV causes AIDS that afterwards one side might 'shut up
once and for all' " (Shoofs, 2000). It soon emerged that Mokhele - the person assigned to
communicate proceedings to the media - had a complete misunderstanding of the studies
to be done, a pertinent indication of how confusing and inconclusive the conference
turned out to be. None of the experiments were ever done - the only tangible piece of
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information was a 134 page interim report released in March 2001. But even that did not
contain any conclusions: each chapter merely summarised the unchanged, incompatible
viewpoints of the two respective groups (Interim AIDS panel report, 2000).
Durban AIDS conference
In what many would label Mbeki's most important speech - his opening address at the
13thInternational AIDS Conference in Durban - in the years to come, the President
pointed to poverty, and not HIV, as the "root cause of the growing AIDS epidemic in
sub-Saharan Africa" (Collins, 2000): "the world's biggest killer and the greatest cause of
ill health and suffering across the globe, including South Africa, is extreme poverty ... as
I listened and heard the whole story about our own country, it seemed to me we could not
blame everything on a single virus" (Mbeki, 2000 cited in Collins, 2000). As Mbeki
spoke, hundreds of delegates walked out, dismayed at his remarks (Collins, 2000). Many
thought he would use the opportunity to "end a damaging debate over the causes of the
disease" (Mbeki courts more AIDS controversy, 2000) and "quell some of the disquiet
around government's position on HIV-AIDS" (Coovadia, 2000 cited in Mbeki courts
more AIDS controversy, 2000).
In response, Judge Edwin Cameron, one of South Africa's most respected AIDS activists
and an acting judge in the Constitutional Court at the time, accused the state of
mismanaging the epidemic "almost at every conceivable turn" (Cameron, 2000 cited in
A1tenroxel, 2000) and declared his disappointment in Mbeki's opening speech during a
keynote lecture at the conference: "the speech, in which Mbeki insisted that his
government was committed to the fight against HIV, did not do enough to counter
government blunders" (Cameron, 2000 cited in A1tenroxel, 2000). Dr Helen Gayle, head
ofHIV programmes at the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and
one ofMbeki's orthodox panel members, knew Mbeki well by this time: "he is not going
to come out and say, 'I was wrong'," she told Reuters (Gayle, 2000 cited in Mbeki courts
more AIDS controversy, 2000).
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Nevirapine
At the same conference, groundbreaking results on Nevirapine, a drug which combats
mother-to-child transmission at a much cheaper rate than AZT, were announced: for R25
per baby, more than half born to HIV -positive mothers could be saved, by preventing
them from contracting the virus from their mothers at birth (Ray of hope for AIDS
sufferers, 2000). Even more encouraging was that most of the study was done by South
African researchers at the Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital in Soweto. But, once again,
findings flew in the face of the government statements expressing concern that anti-Aids
drugs such as Nevirapine could be toxic, and unaffordable: "to think we can just wake up
in the morning and give Nevirapine is just not possible" (Ntsaluba, 2000 cited Cullinan,
2000). Nevirapine manufacturer, Boehringer Ingelheim, offered the South African
government a free, five-year supply of Nevi rapine for all HIV-positive pregnant women
who could not afford it. But, yet again, the South African government rejected an offer
that would reduce the price of a lifesaving anti-aids drug.
The state's refusal to accept free Nevirapine was followed by presidential spokesperson
Parks Mankahlana being quoted in the American journal Science on the reasons "why the
government was dragging its feet in giving pregnant women HIV medication ... that
mother is going to die and that HIV-negative child will be an orphan. That child must be
brought up. Who's going to bring the child up? It's the state. That's resources, you see"
(Mankahlana, 2000 cited in a quote from Science cited in Parks v Science: It's all on tape,
2000). The statement caused an obvious uproar among conference delegates, with
Mankahlana denying that he had ever spoken so Science. Science correspondent, Jon
Cohen, however, had the interview on tape, and offered to play it "to any journalist who
wants to hear it, or Parks himself' (Cohen, 2000 cited in Parks v Science: It's all on tape,
2000).
The AIDS conference closed with a significant statement from former South African
President Nelson Mandela, the aim of which appeared to be to put pressure on Thabo
Mbeki: "the dispute about the primacy of politics or science. .. [must be] ... put on the
backburner and ... [we must] ... proceed to address the concerns of those suffering and
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dying" (James, 2000c). While paying tribute to Mbeki as "a very intelligent man and a
man of science" (Mandela, 2000 cited in Matisonn and SAPA, 2000), Mandela called - in
direct contrast with Mbeki - for greater access to treatment and testing, particularly
treatment for mother-to-child transmission. The next day, he repeated his plea at the
ANC's national general council meeting in Port Elizabeth, which Mbeki attended
(Matisonn and SAPA, 2000). For many, this was confirmation of a split between the two
leaders on the issue ofHIV/AIDS: Mbeki, the dissident, and Mandela, the advocate for
treatment.
On the Sunday following the conference, July 16, the government published an edited
version ofMbeki's opening speech in Sunday newspapers, ending with a comment from
Manto Tshabalala-Msimang: "we have in addition to all the transformational work that
we have been doing, been working extremely hard to make the epidemic in every way we
can, carefully following WHO and UNAIDS guidelines. We are proud of what we have
achieved so far and we are fully committed to continue the struggle in every way that we
can. This I can promise you" (Tshabalala-Msimang, 2000, cited in Message of South
Africa, 2000).
llIuminati document
But, in stark contract with her published statement, Tshabalala-Msimang continued to
refuse HIV -positive pregnant women and their unborn babies treatment, and instead
started distributing discredited AIDS materials to her provincial health ministers: in early
September 2000, she circulated a chapter from an AIDS conspiracy book, Beyond the
pale horse by William Cooper, that claimed AIDS was a conspiracy designed to wipe out
Africa (Transcript of John Robbie interview, 2000). The document was leaked to the
media by one of her ministers, resulting in a radio interview between the minister and 702
presenter John Robbie. When Robbie asked whether she believed HIV caused AIDS and
whether she considered it to be responsible to circulate "loony tune" documents, the
Minister furiously responded that she had "absolute confidence in the MEC's ... [to] ...
decipher nonsense from the truth" (Transcript of John Robbie interview, 2000), and
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warned Robbie "not to put words into my mouth" (John Robbie interview, 2000). She
eventually slammed the phone down halfway through the interview.
Parks Mankahlana's death
Denying the AIDS epidemic did not take its consequences away. In late October 2000,
Mbeki's presidential spokesperson, Parks Mankahlana, died at the age of36. Several
sources close to him said the cause of death was an AIDS related disease, but his widow
angrily denied it, claiming that he had died of heart failure following anemia. The media,
however, were full of reports that he'd succumbed to AIDS - given Mankahlana's
controversial pronouncements on the epidemic. The government passed it off as "in
shockingly bad taste" and in "total disrespect for the deceased and his family" (Pahad,
2000).
Mbeki doubts an MRC report
But not even the death of his spokesperson, it seemed, could sway Thabo Mbeki from his
beliefs. In early September 2001, he dismissed the results of a MRC report that found
mV/AIDS to be the single biggest cause of death in South Africa (Fine, 2001), as "not
credible" (ANC Trashes AIDS deaths report, 2001). The report followed Mbeki's asking
Tshabalala-Msimang to re-examine the government's policy based on outdated 1995
World Health Organisation statistics that listed AIDS as the twelfth most common cause
of death in the country (ANC Trashes AIDS deaths report, 2001). In a letter dated August
6, Mbeki instructed the Health Minister to present the data to cabinet ministers, and to
determine whether the allocation of resources in the health department correlated with his
profile of the incidence of death. Fine (2001) remarked that Mbeki's letter was sent days
after he "made the point in a BBC television interview with Tim Sebastian that AIDS was
not the primary cause of death in South Africa".
Questioning the scientific methodology and demographic modeling of the report, and
responding to allegations that it tried to delay its release, Mbeki's office insisted that "the
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MRC report is not a government report" and that it could not "release a report that it does
not own" (Statement on mortality statistics, 2001). On October 16, Tshabalala-Msimang
told the parliamentary health committee that, although it was difficult to obtain results on
AIDS deaths, she was convinced that South Africa's AIDS pandemic was stabilizing due
to remarkable progress with government prevention strategies (Lackay, 2001).
The findings of the MRC report correlated with those of other international studies such
as the joint United Nation's Programme on AIDS, UNAIDS's annual report and AIDS
research models of the USA's census bureau (Lackey, 2001). MRC president Malegapuru
Makgoba contended that his institution's research "could be pivotal in lifting the country
out of its 'state of denial' on HIV/AIDS" (Makgoba, 2001 cited in Sidley, 2001), if
translated into "major commitment to policy and action" (Makgoba, 2001, cited in Sidley,
2001). But instead, the reality was, once again, contradicted by the president: "my own
analysis after having been back in this country for the past six years," Makgoba said, "is
that the country is in complete denial. We need to lift the veil of denial" (Makgoba, 2001
cited in Sidley, 2001).
Nevirapine court cases
In December 2001, AIDS activists' frustration with the government's response to the
epidemic translated into court action. The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), the
country's strongest AIDS lobby group, asked the Pretoria High Court to "force the
government to make Nevirapine available to HIV-positive pregnant women where
medically indicated" and also to compel it to "implement an effective national
programme to reduce transmission ofHIV from mother to child" (Beresford, 2001: 11).
The state argued that it already had 18 pilot sites and that a lack of resources meant the
programme could not be expanded. It also - once again - questioned the efficacy and
safety of Nevi rapine.
The court ruled in favour of the TAC, ordering government to make Nevirapine available
to all HIV-positive pregnant women at public health facilities and to have a proper
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programme in place by March the following year (James, 2001). After several appeals by
the State, the case eventually ended up in the Constitutional Court which had to rule
whether the judiciary had the right to determine the contents of government policy. The
court case played out at a time when KwaZulu-Natal, the province with the highest
incidence of AIDS, was threatening to distribute Nevirapine against national policy. The
national government opposed this move strongly, pressuring the ANC-affiliated health
MEC, Dr Zweli Mkhize, to oppose his IFP premier, Lionel Mtshali, in his plan to roll-out
the drug (Liebenberg, 2002:2). Clear tensions within the ANC itself also emerged with
Gauteng premier Mbhazima Shilowa (ANC) announcing that he would ensure that all
hospitals in the province would provide the drug (Grobler, 2002).
Shilowa later retracted his promise, but apprehensiveness within the party continued:
Nelson Mandela and former Cape Town archbishop Desmond Tutu openly contradicted
Mbeki on more than one occasion. Tutu publicly dubbed the State AIDS policy as
"preposterous without direction" (Lackay & Brummer, 2002) and called on government
"to stop plodding around" (Lackey & Brummer, 2002:1). At the ANC's 90th birthday in
January 2002, Nelson Mandela asked Mbeki to "take note and give consideration to ...
points of criticism as they are raised in the national interest and deserve to be taken
seriously" (Mamaila: 1, 2002). A month later he repeated himself at the Nelson Mandela
Award for Health and Human Rights in Cape Town: "some fundamental debates around
IDV/AIDS continue to rage in a manner that detracts attention from what should be core
concerns about the biggest threat facing our future ... I think the government ...
understands that this is a real war because it is killing more people than those killed in all
the past wars ... " (Mamaila, 2002: 1).
On July 5 2002, the Constitutional Court ordered the state to make Nevirapine available
at state facilities with immediate effect (Plaatjies, 2002). The ruling was made exactly
two years after the Durban AIDS conference, during the 14thInternational AIDS
Conference in Barcelona. Asked by Newsday health correspondent Laurie Garrett for her
opinion on the ruling, Tshabalala-Msimang said: "the High Court has decided the
constitution says I must give my people a drug that isn't approved by the FDA (Food and
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Drug Administration in the United States). I must poison my people" (Garrett, 2002).
Two months thereafter, the TAC expressed "deep concern about the inaction by
provinces in implementing programmes" (Deane, 2002:3).
At the same conference, the Health Minister refused to allow KwaZulu-Natal province to
accept a $72 million grant from the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria to enable it to
distribute anti-AIDS drugs (Controversial KZN AIDS Fund, 2002).
Conclusion
When a state leader supports an idea, no matter how irrational, its impact is far-reaching.
In the case ofHIV/AIDS, the consequences for South Africa have been disastrous, with
thousands of babies contracting HIV from their mothers while drugs weren't available. It
took legal action to push the South African government that far, and it will take more
court cases to get it further.
Many have argued that Thabo Mbeki should have refrained from taking part in the AIDS
debate and left it to scientists. But Mbeki finds this argument absurd, asking why state
leaders aren't asked to do the same when it comes to the economy and education
(Shenton, 2000). One of his closest friends, but also one of his fiercest critics in the world
of science, MRC president Malegapuru Makgoba, has come to the conclusion that Mbeki
is not playing a political game, but is genuinely confused about the link between HIVand
AIDS (All the president's scientists: Diary of a round-earther, 2000). Being science, it's
almost impossible for a layman to understand all the details of such an explanation,
which makes people without scientific qualifications particularly vulnerable to well-
organised dissidents trying to disprove well-established AIDS theories.
Mbeki may have been a victim of that, but his Health Ministers - qualified medical
doctors - surely weren't. Prior to Mbeki's dissident beliefs, Tshabalala-Msimang and
Zuma were the two main protagonists behind NACOSA, pushing the government to take
a stronger stand on AIDS. What has thrown many scientists, is that "they could sit in
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cabinet meetings and allow the president to saymv does not cause AIDS and not say
anything about it" (Abdool-Karim, personal discussion, May 28th, 2001). "That that
happened in cabinet," University of Natal's AIDS researcher Prof. Salim Abdool-Karim
says, "is something very striking - why didn't they stand up and say something?"
(Abdool-Karim, personal discussion, May 28th, 2001). Politics have clearly played a role:
with Zuma being one of the most senior ranking wamen within the ANC, and Tshabalala-
Msimang being married to the party's treasurer-general, Mendi Msimang, pressure to
agree with whatever the President says is surely at a premium.
By the time the dissident debate reached South Africa, the AIDS world was already
highly politicized - also in South Africa. AIDS figures among Africans were far higher
than those among other race groups, but most AIDS organizations were headed by white
people. To the government, it was important to find an African solution to the country's
AIDS pandemic, and that solution did not necessarily lie with wealthy drug companies
pricing their drugs in such a way as to be out of reach for the poor. Given the political
history of the pandemic, there was plenty of room for speculation about the motives of
these companies and the way they treated the poor ... leaving ample opportunity for
dissidents to step in with conspiracy theories.
In Mbeki's case there was even more at stake: for him, the dissident debate seems to be-
at least partly - about freedom of speech, something he'd fought for most of his life. With
a former apartheid government suppressing the voices of people like himself, he seems to
have become obsessed with making the voiceless heard. Sadly, the president's own
journey has translated into the loss oflives of many of his people - in his country and on
his continent.
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COVERING THE PLAGUE: THABO MBEKI'S DISSIDENCE
Introduction
Prior to 1994, most AIDS stories in the South African media were confined to fringe
reports referring to "a gay plague ... black deaths and malicious infectors" (Gevisser,
1995 :7). And the few reports that were indeed published were highly politicized. Among
the largely white-owned media, AIDS was seen as a gay, but increasingly black disease.
Conservative political magazines, such as the Patriot, warned of the spread ofHIV
through racial integration, recklessly claiming that the AIDS virus "retains full infectivity
in water for a week" (Patriot, 1990 cited in Van Niftrik, 1990-91) and that white areas
could be kept free of AIDS if integration was avoided. The black press, on the other
hand, alleged that AIDS had been developed specifically to wipe out black people.
Referring to the matter in its February 1991 edition, Drum magazine reasoned: "All of a
sudden, here comes this raging virus that seems to have a propensity for black people ...
at the very least, you have to be suspicious" (Drum [name of article not stated], 1991,
cited in Crewe, 1995).
But overall, mainstream media reports rarely did more than to document press releases,
or to focus on the deaths of international celebrities that had died or suffered of AIDS,
such as actor Rock Hudson, American basketball star Magic Johnson and pop star
Freddie Mercury. The AIDS deaths of two gay South African celebrities - film director
William Faure and Afrikaans author Koos Prinsloo - were reported as well ... but the
local media was far more cautious in writing about the causes of their deaths than it had
been in reporting the deaths of their international counterparts. And the AIDS dissident
debate that was widely published in the American and British media eluded the South
African press. AIDS was simply not considered a big enough issue, let alone the merits of
debating its science. Besides, the South African media had virtually no science reporters.
There were a few health reporters, but they were concerned with public health matters
considered more pressing, not the latest Nature or Science editorials debating the cause of
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illV/AIDS. AIDS stories were therefore mostly written by general, often 'cub', reporters,
or they were simply taken from international wire services.
Itwas only in the mid-nineties, with breaking news about debacles such as Sarafina II
and Virodene, that the AIDS epidemic became a widely publicized issue in South Africa.
Reporting, however, focused on the accountability of government officials, the
squandering of public money (Bulger, 1996) and misappropriation of research protocols,
rarely touching on scientific matters. By 1999, the South African National Editors Forum
declared HlV/AIDS as "one of the most serious issues facing this country" (Journalists
think HIV-AIDS is one of the most serious issues, 1999) ... yet not a single editor had
suggested AIDS science as a subject in which journalists required urgent training
(Mazibuko, personal communication, 10 December 2002). Thus, when Thabo Mbeki
announced his controversial AIDS panel in February 2000, most South African
journalists had never heard of AIDS dissidents; some had not even heard of the ill-virus.
The science ofillV/AIDS was completely unknown territory.
Setting the context - reporting on Sarafin a IT and Virodene
Fomenting the already racially divided perception ofillV/ AIDS in South Africa, the
government labeled critical media reports on Sarafina II and Virodene as racist or
unpatriotic. With stories from the largely white-owned media, it was easy to blame
matters on race, and Zuma's spokesperson, Vincent Hlongwane, commented that "the
uproar over the show's [Sarafina II's] funding stems from the fact that [the playwright
Mbongeni] Ngema is black" (Hlongwane, 1996 cited in Lengane, 1996). Hlongwane
claimed that ifNgema had been white, there would have been no opposition. In the case
of black newspapers, however, the situation was slightly more complex. Sarafina II hit
the media less than two years after the ANC government had come to power. Many black
journalists had fought in the anti-apartheid struggle along with now high ranking
government officials, including Dr Zuma and Thabo Mbeki. Public criticism from their
'former comrades' was considered absolutely disloyal. When the black newspaper City
Press enquired as to the whereabouts of Sarafina II's "missing money" (Lengane, 1996),
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Hlongwane said that it was "a pity that mainstream black newspapers are climbing on the
white media bandwagon to criticise the project" (Hlongwane, 1996 cited in Lengane,
1996).
With Virodene, matters were no different. Media organizations - as well as doctors and
scientists - denouncing the health minister's and president's support for the unauthorized
drug, were passed off as anti-government and prejudiced against an indigenous cure for
AIDS. In an open letter to the South African media, Mbeki wrote "an indignant defense"
(Epstein, 2001 :202): "How alien these goings-on seem to be to the noble pursuits of
medical research! In our strange world, those who seek the good for all humanity have
become the villains of our time" (Mbeki, 1998 cited in Epstein, 2001 :202). The
influential daily newspaper Business Day referred to the Virodene issue as "Parafina 2",
hinting that the matter had drawn "fire from the media" (Sidley, 1997). What barned
many was that almost all Virodene's researchers were white and were associated with a
traditionally Afrikaans university.
Reporting on Virodene, however, demanded a skill the Sarafina II issue didn't necessarily
require: a basic understanding of the science ofHIV/AIDS. Without that, there was a
danger that journalists could report on Virodene as a potential cure for AIDS. With
virtually no reporters having scientific backgrounds, many initially became victim to this
trap. The Star reporter Lynne Altenroxel, today an authoritative AIDS reporter, but at the
time overwhelmed by the 'science' of AIDS, has recalled it as a "complete fiasco"
(Altenroxel, personal communication, 5 December 2002): "Journalists actually believed
the Virodene researchers could have a cure for AIDS. And that was so appalling. If! look
at it now, and at how many AIDS cures daily come to my desk, and how I tell people
sending me these to go to hell, then you start to see just how bad you were with the
Virodene thing. I was a 'cub' reporter when the Virodene saga started, and had never
reported on medical stuff in my life before. "
In many respects, the racially divided milieu that reporting on Sarafina II and Virodene
fostered, as well as the government's reaction to it, set the context for reporting on
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Mbeki's dissident debate. The government would regard critical reports as 'anti-African',
intolerant of dialogue, and as a "vile and vicious campaign against the head of state"
(Kelly & Parker, 2001).
Initial reporting on the dissident debate
When Thabo Mbeki made his October 28, 1999 announcement in parliament - that AZT
was a dangerous drug - it was amidst already critical media reports on the government's
refusal to provide the drug to reduce mother-to-child-transmission ofHIV and to prevent
rape survivors from contracting the virus from their potentially HIV-positive attackers.
The president's speech was widely quoted in newspapers for the following week, with
AZT manufacturer Glaxo Wellcome referring to him as being "gravely misinformed"
(Taitz, 1999) and local scientists condemning Mbeki's statement (Mbeki stokes row over
anti-AIDS drug, 1999). The AIDS directorate refused to comment, with its head, Dr
Nono Simelela, claiming that the health department had not been briefed on the issue by
the president's office (Taitz, 1999).
Two journalists, Business Day health and welfare editor Pat Sidley and freelaneer
Charlene Smith, had good reason to expect Mbeki's announcement. Sidley became aware
of his doubts in April that year, when her news editor asked her to follow-up on a wire
report stating the president's intention to call a conference (the conference eventually
ended up to be Mbeki's AIDS panel) to resolve the issue of the cause of AIDS. Sidley
was a well-established journalist who had fought in the anti-apartheid struggle along with
many senior health department officials; many therefore trusted her with off the record
statements. When she received a phone call from a health department lawyer asking her
"how to go about literally smashing AZT" (Sidley, personal communication, 12
December 2002) and a few officials confirmed the president's intentions, she realised the
report was true. Sidley filed a short report on the president's plans, without mentioning
her 'off the record' phone call.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
88
In the same month that Sidley succeeded in getting Mbeki's objectives confirmed, Smith
was raped at her Greenside home in Johannesburg on April I 1999. Being a regular
contributor to the Mail & Guardian, she published an account of her ordeal in the
following week's edition (Smith, 1999: 16). Among other things, she focused on the
difficulties she encountered to access antiretroviral drugs, including AZT. Describing the
district surgeon's office she had to report to, Smith wrote: "There is no AZT there, how
could I forget, Minister Nkosazana Zuma, a woman too, won't allow the government to
give AZT to rape victims and pregnant women to reduce transmission of the disease to
their babies. The rapist bestows a death sentence and the state, by refusing to give cheap
medication that could save many women, becomes executioner. I thought the death
sentence was outlawed?" (Smith, 1999:24-25). Soon thereafter, Dr Zuma issued a press
release accusing Smith of "being paid by pharmaceutical companies to go on about post
exposure prophylaxis" (Smith, personal communication, 5 December 2002). The
journalist promptly issued a counter press release stating that "not only was I not being
paid, but I had battled to afford these drugs, and several leading people had helped me
pay for them" (Smith, personal communication, 5 December 2002).
Experiences like those of Sidley and Smith were, however, not common. Most journalists
- even those who had been reporting on AIDS for a few months - were baffled. Star
reporter Lynne Altenroxel has recalled: "I had never heard of dissidents in my life before
- I never thought that anyone could ever question that HIV caused AIDS, or simply pass
a widely used and internationally acceptable drug off as useless. When Mbeki started
questioning it, it sounded absolutely absurd" (Altenroxel, personal communication, 5
December 2002). Even Sidley has recollected how scientifically unprepared she feit with
"the whole thing coming down on me so suddenly. I had no scientific basis other than
Matric science" (Sidley, personal communication, 12 December 2002). Many political
journalists reporting on Mbeki's announcement from parliament had never heard of AZT.
AIDS dissidents did not allow grass to grow under their feet; they soon started to respond
to articles condemning Mbeki's assertions. In the November 26 1999 edition of South
Africa's Financial Mail, Anita Allen, the former journalist who allegedly introduced
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Mbeki to dissident arguments, responded to a FM article by Claire Bisseker, which
highlighted the confusion that the president's announcement had resulted in: "Your cover
story on AIDS and AZT (Current Affairs, November 19) ... should include the reference
of its statement 'AIDS-related deaths halved in the US from 1996 to 1997 because of the
use of antiretroviral therapies', as well as the studies providing 'beneficial combination
therapies' referred to ... " (Allen, 1999: 11) implying that there was no conclusive proof
that AZT worked. On the letter's page of an influential magazine such comments could
have potentially dangerous consequences if read by people who were not familiar with
the science of antiretroviral drugs. Allen also took Bisseker on for referring to Peter
Duesberg as a discredited scientist: "Actually he is a standing member of the US National
Academy of Science. Or did the FM mean to 'discredit' that too?" (Allen, 1999: 11).
Bisseker's FM story was preceded by an 'invitation' article by the managing editor of the
current affairs magazine Noseweek, Marten du Plessis. In the November 10 issue of
Financial Mail, he argued that Mbeki was correct, as "AZT is a highly toxic
chemotherapy drug that lays waste to the immune system and produces the symptoms of
AIDS" (Du Plessis, 1999). Du Plessis extensively referred to the Gallo-Montagnier
debacle, pointing to Gallo's misappropriation ofHIV, the 1990 US federal investigation
which found him guilty of "fostering conditions that gave rise to ... falsified reports" (Du
Plessis, 1999) and the US government's arrogance at the time: "So what's that got to do
with today? Well, say the critics, Gallo's dodgy science remains the basis on which
billion of dollars have been spent on HIV research" (Du Plessis, 1999). Although Du
Plessis' article was clearly written from a dissident point of view, it was hard not to see
some truth in his referrals to the AIDS establishment's treatment of alternative views
(given how Montagnier was treated): "The AIDS establishment is outraged by any
suggestion of debate. The current tactic is to compare those who question the HIV
hypothesis to those who deny there was a holocaust" (Du Plessis, 1990). The article was
followed up by a four part series in Noseweek, documenting AIDS dissident views in
detail.
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Another media outlet that gave space to dissident views was the pay channel M-Net's
current affairs slot, Carte Blanche. On November 7 (The AZT Debate: Peter Duesberg
interview, 1999) it broadcast a programme examining AZT's efficacy and safety,
including an interview with professor Peter Duesberg in which he claimed that AZT did
not reduce the chances of HIV positive mothers of transmitting the virus to their babies.
The programme also featured an interview with David Patient, an HIV -positive South
African who believed AZT had almost killed him. Although the insert also incorporated
the views of Charlene Smith, it upset many AIDS researchers such as the University of
KwaZulu-Natal's professor Salim Abdool-Karim, who believed it could discourage
people with AIDS from seeking treatment: "I think it becomes destructive when they start
undermining public health messages ... I don't mind when they keep it as an academic
debate and they stick to facts. But the Carte Blanche programme has bordered on not
being the case" (Abdool-Karim, personal communication, 28 May, 2001). Following the
Carte Blanche programme was an article in the African current affairs magazine, New
Africa, which quoted one of British AIDS dissident journalist Neville Hodgkinson's
books that referred to a widely contested trial in which AIDS patients had died from AZT
(Banda, 1999).
The difficulty with journalists without specialized backgrounds reporting on dissident
views was that "dissident arguments are quite convincing ... until you really go into them
... only when you understand the science of AIDS can you really start asking questions
and would you be able to understand just exactly how wrong they are" (Altenroxel,
personal communication, 5 December 2002). Journalists such as Pat Sidley, Charlene
Smith, Claire Bisseker, Lynne Altenroxel and one or two Cape Town based reporters, in
their own respective ways, became fairly familiar with the science of the epidemic. In
fact, many were to become some ofMbeki's and his AIDS dissidents' fiercest critics. But
in the next few years they were to face sustained pressure; either directly from
government, or from government-aligned editors. They would also have little control
over the letters pages of their newspapers, which would be inundated with responses from
AIDS dissidents.
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Reporting on Mbeki's AIDS panel
By the time that Mbeki's AIDS panel convened for its first meeting in May 2000, the
international and local media was full of reports condemning the idea. The Sunday Times
in South Africa pointed out that "this would not have been so contentious a statement [the
health minister's announcement of the AIDS panel in February 2000] had it not followed
the October pronouncement by President Thabo Mbeki that the drug AZT is toxic, and
that it would be irresponsible of the government to use it for the prevention of mother- to-
child transmission of the virus" (Taitz, 2000). The New York based newspaper, Village
Voice, remarked that "South Africa's President may become the first world leader to
believe that HIV is not the cause of AIDS" (Village Voice, 2000 [title of article not
stated] cited in Taitz, 2000), and several American newspapers began to wonder whether
the President and his health minister had taken leave of their senses (Epstein, 2001: 189).
Mbeki's April 3 letter to president Bill Clinton made world headlines and was republished
in several local newspapers, with the Mail & Guardian referring to it as "deeply
disturbing" and demonstrative of "a capacity for justifying the most unreasonable of
positions by a brew of implausible appeals to populist sentiments and prejudices"
(Berger, 2000:32). Nature considered the matter serious enough to publish an open letter
to Mbeki in its April 27 edition, justifying why dissidents could not be taken seriously
(An open letter to the president of South Africa, 2000).
Such reports were promptly followed up by government reaction in the form of letters to
newspapers, opinion pieces or press releases. In an op-ed piece in the March 28 issue of
The Citizen, presidential spokesperson Parks Mankahlana denied that the president had
ever said that HIV didn't cause AIDS, and accused the media of intolerance to different
viewpoints as well as of siding with the drug companies: "He [the president] will
intensify the fight to end discrimination against and exploitation of people with
HIV/AIDS, including by medical schemes and pharmaceutical giants who are the
beneficiaries in the defense of AZT by the media. They buy advertising space and are a
strong ally of publishing and broadcasting houses, to the detriment of the millions that
live with HIV/AIDS" (Mankahlana, 2000a). A shortened version of the piece was
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repeated in the April 3 Internet edition of the Daily Mail & Guardian (Mankahlana,
2000c).
After having refused several requests for interviews from local media organizations on
the HIVIAIDS controversy, Mbeki granted an interview to a well-known British AIDS
dissident journalist, Joan Shenton, in April 2000. Shenton worked for a London-based
company, Meditel, that had sold the interview to M-Net's Carte Blanche. The programme
was broadcast on April 16, with Mbeki labeling orthodox AIDS scientists as narrow-
minded: "I'm not surprised at all to find among the overwhelming majority of scientists,
are people who would hold one particular view [that HIV causes AIDS] because that's all
they've been exposed to. This other point of view [that AIDS is not caused by HIV],
which is quite frightening, this alternative view in a sense has been blacked out" (Mbeki,
2000 cited in Shenton, 2000). He added that he wanted to raise the matter with political
leaders around the world to "at least get them to understand the truth about this issue [the
cause of AIDS], not what they might see on television or read in newspapers" (Mbeki,
2000 cited in Shenton, 2000).
Concerned about what it regarded as 'misinformation' by the president and his allies, the
country's biggest AIDS lobby group, Treatment Action Campaign, launched a media
campaign to supply it "with accurate information" (Heywood, personal communication,
13 December 2002). TAC general secretary, Mark Heywood, has explained: "Our
strategy was that when the president of a country with an exceptionally high HIV
prevalence is in denial of that epidemic, and starts publicly questioning whether HIV
causes AIDS, it is bound to cause a lot of confusion and do a lot of damage. Therefore
our approach was to use the media as widely as possible to communicate the fact that this
was wrong and irresponsible, because the media was as much a potential victim of the
confusion as anybody else" (Heywood, personal communication, 13 December 2002).
Every time that a government official, including the president, made a perplexing
statement, the TAC publicly countered it with press conferences or protest marches.
According to Heywood that meant "obviously corning into conflict with the presidency -
most people were scared to openly oppose Mbeki - but it's put us at the forefront in the
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media of opposing the kind of stuff that was going on" (Heywood, personal
communication, 13 December 2002). The TAC's protest marches provided media outlets
with 'instant' stories, often making front page headlines with pictures of placard slogans
such as "One dissident, one bullet" (Altenroxel, Ngubane & Leeman, 2000).
By this time, journalists such as Lynne Altenroxel (The Star), Pat Sidley (Business Day)
and Charlene Smith had developed their own opinions about AIDS dissidents, which
strongly influenced their reporting on Mbeki's statements. Altenroxel (2002) has
remarked that she came to the conclusion "that you had to take sides. There was no way
that you could ethically report on the HIV epidemic and not take sides in this debate,
specifically because the government's policies on mother-to-child transmission bordered
on genocide. And you've got to take sides in a genocide" (Altenroxel, personal
communication, 5 December 2002). At the end of the AIDS panel's rounds of meetings,
Altenroxel wrote: "After spending R2 million to organise two meetings between AIDS
dissident scientists and orthodoxy, only one conclusion has been reached - to spend more
money. And the South Africa taxpayers are likely to foot the bill, Health Minister Manto
Tshabalala-Msimang confirmed yesterday" (Altenroxel, 2000b:2). She was referring to
the panel's decision to research the accuracy of the Elisa test, used in South Africa to
diagnose HIV infection.
Sidley viewed the debate as political, rather than scientific, in "which the president was
ill-informed ... I never gave the dissidents any credibility by lending weight to what they
said - I rather reported their statements in the context of the fact that it was developing
into a political row". In one of many reports, Sidley quoted an opposition party member
as saying that "Mbeki seemed to be so 'defensive of the subject of AIDS that he is placing
at risk sound judgment and rational thinking ... the consequences for our international
reputation can only be negative'" (Ellis, 2000 cited in Hartley & Sidley, 2000). Along the
same line of thinking, Sidley also filed news reports for the British Medical Journal,
which the president must have read: Essop Pahad, the minister in the president's office
made several crude statements at press conferences specifically aimed at Sidley, and the
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
94
president started consistently using Sidley's term for describing his statements in the
BMJ, namely "eccentric views" (Sidley, personal communication, 12 December 2002).
Smith, again, saw her role as one of advocacy - to campaign for access to AZT. Several
journalists supported her; a reporter interviewed for a report of the Centre for AIDS
Development, Research and Evaluation (CADRE), What's news: Perspectives on
HIV/AIDS in the South African Media, argued: "We are the fourth estate. Without a
doubt, government is sensitive to pressure. So it will respond. I mean, if something is in
the press then action on that will be taken much quicker than anything else" (CADRE,
2002:9). Having done that, Smith was bombarded with emails from dissidents like
Charles Geshekter and David Rasnick, resulting in her having to "put a block on their
email addresses on my computer" (Smith, personal communication, 5 December 2002).
This, however, was only the beginning of personal attacks on her; at the International
AIDS Conference that was to be held in Durban in July, she would be publicly criticised
by the president himself.
The country's largest, and overwhelmingly black, daily newspaper, the Sowetan, on the
other hand, had a completely different approach. The Sowetan formed an in-house
journalist committee to establish whether Mbeki had indeed said that HIV did not cause
AIDS. The panel could not find any such statements in the president's speeches,
concluding that "the president's speeches had been deliberately misinterpreted"
(Mazibuko, personal communication, 10 December 2002). Lucky Mazibuko, an HIV-
positive journalist who writes weekly AIDS columns for the Sowetan as well as the
Sowetan Sunday World, has pointed out that there was "a visible racial divide in terms of
support for the president: If your were listening to a 702 talk show on the subject, where
the majority of callers were white, you would find people slating the president, whereas
an Ukhozi FM talk show, with mostly black callers, would have a completely different
take on the debate" (Mazibuko, personal communication, 10 December 2002). In his
widely read columns (Sowetan's Lucky is a positive influence, 2000:38), Mazibuko
defended the president's panel: "I am mindful that government enters the debate as the
underdog, having unforgivably blundered in the Virodene saga and the Sarafina II
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debacle. But on this one I think the president has hit the nail on the head ... he has a
constitutional right to highlight discrepancies in science that affect my health and
treatment, not least because the scientists themselves can't agree" (Mazibuko, 2000:22).
While newspapers such as Business Day slammed Mbeki's panel for "disproportionate
representation" (A way out on AIDS, 2000) [Mbeki suggested that the panel should
consist of an equal number of the dissidents and orthodox scientists, while in the broader
scientific context orthodox scientists outnumbered dissidents by far], Mazibuko believed
that "the fact that the dissidents are a minority does not in itself suggest that the majority
is right" (Mazibuko, 2000:22). Referring to the Durban declaration, announced shortly
after the panel's last meeting, a Sowetan editorial suggested that it was worrying "that the
scientists have gone to such great lengths ... only to silence someone asking a few
questions" (Where is the cure, 2000).
Being an HIV-positive journalist, the international media often interviewed Mazibuko on
the issue, with him arguing for the president's right "to put things in the open" (Plagued
By Doubt, 2000). Mazibuko has claimed that his opinions were often treated with
impatience: "I found a great intolerance for an opposing opinion from the general one
that the president was wrong and was wasting time. I remember doing an interview with a
British radio station, when, as soon as I had said the president never said that HIV did not
cause AIDS, I was cut off" (Mazibuko, personal communication, 10 December 2002).
But, in time, even Mazibuko doubted the president's motives: "I believed that the
president had the right to raise his doubts, but when he refused to make anti-AIDS drugs
available to HIV -positive mothers and their unborn babies, it seemed as if he was actually
using the fact of poverty as an excuse not to provide treatment. In my mind there was a
problem with him pushing ahead with poverty alleviation, but not providing treatment. I
believed the two had to be done simultaneously" (Mazibuko, personal communication, 10
December 2000).
Another journalist who had clearly developed his own views on the debate, was The
Citizen's executive editor, Martin Williams. In his weekly columns he addressed the
dissident issue consistently, proudly declaring that his newspaper's pages had "been
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devoted to Anthony Brink's [the Pietermaritzburg lawyer whose writings had introduced
Mbeki to the toxicity of AZT) opus on the topic [AZT]" (Williams, 2000a), as well as to
several essays from AIDS dissident Charles Geshekter. In one column, he cynically
commented on a widely acclaimed AIDS book by Alan Whiteside and Clem Sunter,
AIDS: The challenge for South Africa (Whiteside & Sunter, 2000), and UNAIDS's new
statistics, both published in that year: "I gave my copy to one ofMbeki's panelists,
Professor Charles Geshekter from California, who spent a few days in our home [during
the meetings of the AIDS panel]. Even as an interested expert, he struggled to cope with
all the cliches ... But for unintelligible statistics, it's hard to beat the UNAIDS report.
These figures are bandied about as facts when they are obviously flawed" (Williams,
2000b).
A day after the panel's second and last meeting, on July 5, award-winning Village Voice
journalist, Mark Shoofs, filed a report Inside the South African Government's
Controversial AIDS Panel (Shoofs, 2000). Shoofs was the only reporter allowed to sit in
on the panel; no local journalists had access, resulting in few being able to report on more
than mere press conferences. From his report it was clear that the panel's discussions had
been brutish, achieving little more than a loose exchange of opinions. Shoofs described a
fight between Peter Duesberg, Harvard Bialy (the former editor of Bio/Technology that
invited Duesberg in 1987 to submit a summary of his Cancer Research article) and Dr
Helen Gayle, head of the CDC's AIDS research Unit, over a study on Hl'V-positive
babies at Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital in Soweto: "And so, holding the CDC data in
his hand, Duesberg asked Gayle whether the babies with mv had received AZT. Gayle
started to answer, but Bialy cut in, saying yes, the babies had received the drug. Duesberg
then shouted that AZT was what probably killed the babies, and, as Gayle kept trying to
answer his original question, Duesberg stormed out of the room ... Eventually, Gayle
explained that some of the babies had received the drug while others hadn't, and that the
CDC was preparing a breakdown for the dissidents to analyze" (Shoofs, 2000). Shoofs
ended his report by speculating what Mbeki would be saying in his opening address at the
Durban AIDS conference, that was to commence that Sunday: "What will he say? Will he
endorse the recommendations of those who deny that an epidemic even exists? Almost
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certainly not. But will he throw his full weight behind what the overwhelming body of
scientific evidence shows? Will he face reality?" (Shoofs, 2000).
Later that year, on September 8, the Mail & Guardian published a diary kept by an
orthodox member of the advisory AIDS panel, All the president's scientists: Diary of a
round-earther (All the president's scientist's: Diary of a round-earther, 2000), quoting
David Rasnick as saying that "AIDS would disappear in South Africa if we outlawed
tests ofHIV" (Rasnick, 2000 in All the president's scientists: Diary of a round earther).
Upon the insistence of Anita Allen, the "Appeal Panel of South Africa" (Allen, 2000)
later found the report to be in breach of its code of conduct, noting that "material
omissions are evident in the account" (Allen, 2000: 12), after the press ombudsman had
earlier exonerated the M & G from any wrongdoing. In the same month, the New African
published an account of dissidents' experiences during panel meetings (Christie, 2000).
Mbeki's attack on Charlene Smith
On Sunday July 9, the day on which the Durban AIDS Conference opened, the Sunday
Times (South Africa) carried a front page story consisting of correspondence on
HIV/AIDS between Thabo Mbeki and opposition party leader Tony Leon. Mbeki was
outraged about a Washington Post article by South African journalist Charlene Smith on
June 4, in which she conceded that culture and religion played major roles in the
incidence of rape and AIDS in South Africa. The president was particularly upset about
the following quote: "Here [in South Africa], it [HIV] is spread primarily by heterosexual
sex - spurred by men's attitudes toward women. We won't end this epidemic until we
understand the role of tradition and religion - and of a culture in which rape is endemic
and has become a prime means of transmitting the disease, to young women as well as
children" (Smith, 2000c). Mbeki accused Smith of being either "sufficiently brave, or
blinded by racist rage, to publicly make the deeply offensive statement that rape is an
endemic feature of African society" (Mbeki, 2000 cited in Mbeki versus Leon, 2000). He
added that he considered it "contemptuous of our people [South Africans], our country
and its laws that, as you [Tony Leon] and Charlene Smith say, Glaxo Wellcome should
promote the sales of AZT by selling 'cut price' AZT in our country for use by rape
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victims, knowing very well that this is in violation of the law and that no scientific
evidence exists proving the efficacy of this drug in cases of rape" (Mbeki, 2000 cited in
Mbeki versus Leon, 2000).
Accusing Smith of racism did not go down well with either Smith or Leon; Smith had a
long history in the anti-apartheid struggle, knowing Mbeki personally after having spent
a few years with him in Lusaka during the late eighties. She responded publicly in The
Citizen and Mail & Guardian later that week, maintaining that Mbeki's denial of the
AIDS epidemic "smacks of genocidal arrogance" (Smith, 2000a: 12), that he was involved
in "a massive and inexplicable attempt to distract himself and others from the devastation
ofHIV/AIDS in South Africa" (Smith, 2000b:30) and, consequently, that his problems
were far more "serious than the criticisms of one small blonde [referring to herselfJ"
(Smith, 2000b:30). Leon himself accused Mbeki of being obsessed with conspiracy
theories: "You seem to believe that the request by my Party, Charlene Smith and others
for the government to provide AZT to rape victims, and the offer by Glaxo Well come to
provide it at greatly reduced prices, is all part of a giant conspiracy. You imply that this
conspiracy is the result of some unholy alliance between a civil society motivated by
racism and an international pharmaceutical industry driven by greed ... To top off this
giant-racial-capitalist-conspiracy, you accuse Charlene Smith and I of being 'marketing
agents' of the pharmaceutical companies" (Leon, 2000 cited in Mbeki versus Leon, 2000).
The personal accusations that Mbeki had made in his by now widely published letter,
along with the controversy surrounding his presidential AIDS panel and the contents of
his opening speech that night, set the tone for media coverage of the Durban conference
to become - in the government's own words - a "Mbeki-bashing bazaar" (Mbeki's man in
AIDS plea, 2000: 1), instead ofa documentation of the latest advances in HIV/AIDS
research.
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Reporting on the Durban AIDS Conference
With the already loaded atmosphere that Sunday, and many journalists confused about
what exactly Thabo Mbeki's views on HIV/AIDS were, the media anxiously awaited the
president's opening address. Many delegates, particularly the South African conference
organisers, had hoped that the president would clear up the perplexities and state that he
believed that HIV was the cause of AIDS. But, to the disappointment of "many of the
world's scientists" (Collins, 2000), the president pointed to poverty, and not HIV, as
being the root cause of AIDS in Africa. As a result, news reports about the South African
president's views "cloud[ing] the international gathering of scientists" (Vergani, 2000)
quickly spread. The Sunday Times in London called it an "increasingly embarrassing
public dispute" (Beeston, 2000); locally, its South African equivalent noted how the
president had "disappointed many of those gathered in Durban by ... [not] focusing his
speech on ... practical ways of engaging and combating the spread of the virus (AIDS:
The way forward, 2000:20). Two days into the conference, a Sowetan editorial remarked:
"The 13th International AIDS Conference in Durban is at serious risk. lts critical first two
days have been dominated by a useless obsession with scoring political points. Much of
the discourse so far has focused rather unproductively on disagreements and apparent
differences, which in reality may not even exist" (AIDS summit kicks off at a tangent,
2000).
Almost every plenary speaker either attacked Mbeki, or begged him to change his mind.
One of the most frequently reported opinions was that of South African HIV-positive
judge Edwin Cameron accusing the state of doing nothing to curb the epidemic. In
response, the Health Minister, Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, charged Cameron with
failing to "acknowledge that the apartheid government had put few structures in place to
fight AIDS and the ANC had to establish such infrastructure from scratch" (Miffed
Manto hits back, 2000). Referring to Mbeki's speech she remarked: "The president of the
country has never denied either the existence of AIDS, nor this causal connection
between HIVand AIDS. Why should he deny something he has not said? The media
should turn around and report it correctly ... It is precisely those who had decided to
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make this allegation and then cynically expect the president to respond to distortions of
their own making who should reflect on their consciences" (Tshabalala-Msimang, 2000
cited inmv can't be seen as only cause of scourge & Miffed Manto hits back, 2000).
Tshabalala-Msimang's response was not received well, particularly not when it emerged
that the president had walked out while a famous mv -positive South African boy, Nkosi
Johnson, publicly asked the government to make anti-AIDS drugs available for mv-
positive pregnant women and their unborn babies. Johnson addressed the AIDS
conference directly after Mbeki's opening speech. The president's address also followed
dangerously close on the heels of the cancellation of a press conference on the Durban
Declaration, the document that 5 000 scientists had signed to declare that they believed
mv was the cause of AIDS. No official reason was given for the "last-minute
cancellation, which happened 10 minutes before the conference was to begin, but
rumours ... [were] ... rife that government pressure was behind the ... drama"
(Altenroxel, Ngubane & Leeman, 2000).
Mankahlana's comments in Science on July 14 that the state could not provide treatment
to infected pregnant women because of the resources it would take to raise the surviving
AIDS orphans, made the situation even worse. Mankahlana's view quickly reached the
front pages of almost all South African newspapers. He himself branded the article "a
complete fabrication" (Mankahlana, 2000 cited in Parks v Science: It's all on tape,
2000: 1), but did not come across as very convincing when Science's news editor, Colin
Norman, told the media that the interview was conducted on March 24 in Mankahlana's
office and offered to play the tape-recorded version to journalists. Mankahlana threatened
the South African newspaper that broke the story, The Citizen, with legal action, accusing
its editor, Tim du Plessis, of not making "an effort to develop ... objectivity and
accuracy" (Mankahlana, 2000 cited in Parks v Science: It's all on tape, 2000). Du Plessis
responded decisively, pronouncing "that the paper stood by its original story" (Du Plessis,
2000 cited in Parks v Science: It's all on tape, 2000: 1).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
101
When Nelson Mandela closed the Durban conference asking for drugs to be made
available to prevent mother-to-child transmission, a Sunday Times leader cynically
proclaimed: "To suggest, as is the fashion when anyone argues for medical intervention,
that Mandela is somehow in cahoots with pharmaceutical monopolies, is laughable.
Thankfully, no such suggestion has yet been made, and Mandela's message may well
finally change the way government is seeing this solution. Above all, the conference
needs to produce among all South Africans a sense of urgency about the country's largest
social crisis" (AIDS: The way forward, 2000). Itwas a crisis that would tragically end the
life of the president's own spokesperson.
Reporting on Parks Mankahlana's death
On October 26, the presidency announced the death of Parks Mankahlana (Barrell,
2000:3). Mankahlana had been sick for months, even at the time of his controversial
announcements at the Durban AIDS conference, and all indications were that he had died
of AIDS. The cause of his death was stated as "heart failure brought on by chronic
anaemia" (Hills, 2000: 1); anaemia being a well-known AIDS-related illness (Sefiel, 2000
cited in Hills, 2000: 1). In political circles it was considered common knowledge that
Parks Mankahlana had been HIV -positive. Mankahlana was also "no saint" (Jones, 2000
cited in Kelly & Parker, 2001), and known to be promiscuous, having had two child
maintenance cases for illegitimate children filed against him (Parks en vigs, 2000: 12). He
died at the early age of 36, characteristic of an AIDS death.
On the Friday following the announcement, the Mail & Guardian published an obituary
for the former presidential spokesperson, including a statement from an anonymous
senior ANC official that confirmed that "Mankahlana had indeed died of an illness
induced by HIV/AIDS" (Barrell, 2000:3). Barrell (2000:3) argued that the public had the
right to know whether Mankahlana had died of AIDS, as "the involvement of [him] ...
and President Thabo Mbeki in polemics over HIV/AIDS has made the cause of [his]
death a public domain issue". The presidency was outraged and refused to confirm the M
& G's allegations, stating that "the question of his illness is something that the family
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should deal with" (Presidential spokesperson, 2000 cited in Barrell, 2000:3). In the
following week's M & G, Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, Aziz Pahad, launched a
scathing attack on Barrell, accusing him of stirring rumours and violating others' right to
privacy (Pahad, 2000:32). Pahad compared Barrell to the likes of Hitler and Goebbels
that "believe[d] that if you manufacture stories and repeat them ad nauseam, they
somehow become the truth" (Pahad, 2000:32). M &G editor, Philip van Niekerk, replied
directly beneath the letter: "It is a well-accepted principle in the media and in the law that
an individual's involvement in public life and public debates curtails, in relevant areas,
his or her rights to privacy ... Finally we would ask the deputy minister ... how much
witblits do you need to consume before you can compare Howard Barrell to Hitler or
Groebels (sic)?" (Van Niekerk, 2000 cited in Pahad, 2000:32). Along with other
incidents, the M & G's biting response opened up a lengthy debate on how Mankahlana's
death should have been covered.
The media differed on how to treat the issue, yet most outlets had linked Mankahlana's
death to AIDS in one way or another. Several newspapers used it to call for more
openness on the topic. In a front page editorial, the Sunday Independent noted that
regardless of whether Mankahlana's death was related to AIDS, he was a victim of it:
"We all have a choice in how we remember Mankahlana. We have the choice of using his
memory to break the chains of silence and end the cycle of denial" (Sunday Independent
[name of article not stated], 2000 cited in Sidley, 2000). The Sunday Times (South
Africa) carried a column by a well known gay writer, which said: "However Mankahlana
died, all of us who knew him or worked with him, or perhaps just glimpsed him on TV,
owe it to his legacy, to his democratic vision of a new South Africa, to stop the deadly
cycle of silence, denial and stigma that accompanies AIDS" (Sunday Times [name of
article not stated], 2000 cited in Sidley, 2000). In a leader titled Parks and AIDS (2000),
the Johannesburg daily Beeld took the debate a step further, arguing that Parks' death had
"in all probability confirmed the link between HIVand AIDS". The state-owned South
African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), however, known for its close relationship to
the President, toed the line, whereas the independent television channel, e.tv, reported the
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AIDS rumours; an ironic move, as Mankahlana's widow, e.tv journalist Ntabiseng
Mankahlana, had strongly denied the speculation.
An editorial in theM &G argued finally: "The death of Parks Mankahlana is central to
the mV/AIDS controversy, because it brings home not only the human side of the
tragedy but, we would suggest, the character of the betrayal. It is the nature of the post of
the spokesman to the president that the incumbent is intensely loyal to the head of state,
which raises the obvious question whether Parks had the benefit of anti-retrovirals, or
died out of loyalty to his master's recent and controversial views" (A prayer for the living,
2000:30). A knowing member of the public, quoted in Barrell's (Barrel, 2000:3) article,
furthered this view by conceding that Mankahlana's death was "so sad, because he was
made to play the clown for the king" (Member of the public, 2000 cited in Barrell,
2000:3). In Business Day and British Medical Journal journalist Pat Sidley wrote: "The
real tragedy was that the President had killed Parks, and no one said it" (Sidley, personal
communication, 12 December 2002).
These speculations elicited harsh criticism from various sectors. At Mankahlana's
memorial service, the media were accused of wanting to belittle him and by implication
criticise the presidency (Mokaba, 2000 cited in Lackay, 2000:4). ANC Youth League
president, Malusi Gigaba, appealed to the press to "mimic humanity" (Gigaba, 2000 cited
in Radebe, 2000:5) by showing compassion to Mankahlana's wife and family: "There are
times where even an insensitive, inhuman and incompassionate media must try to regain
its humanity or at least try to ape humans" (Gigaba, 2000 cited in Radebe, 2000:5). Also
at the service was The Star deputy editor and South African National Editor's Forum
(SANEF) chair, Mathatha Tsedu, who expressed dismay at the media's reporting on the
issue, maintaining that he was embarrassed to be part of "an institution that showed
vulturous tendencies and no respect for the living or dead" (Tsedu, 2000 cited in Lackay,
2000:4).
The debate caused tension in a "number of newsrooms, sometimes along racial lines with
some white journalists arguing for the rumours to be published in the public interest
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while some black journalists argued that this was disrespectful to the dead" (Kelly &
Parker, 2001). The Gauteng branch of SANEF and the Freedom of Expression Institute
felt the need to convene a meeting on ethical issues raised by Mankahlana's death on
November 9 (Kelly & Parker, 1991). The Star's Lizeka Mda, a panelist, "appealed for
journalists to respect the dead, and chastised them for not asking Mankahlana about his
HIV status while alive" (Mda, 2000 stated in Kelly & Parker, 2001). Business Day editor,
Jim Jones, however, said he believed Mankahlana had died of AIDS and that it should be
reported: "The man died of AIDS-related causes - he was not a saint, he was not an icon,
and he was promiscuous" (Jones, 2000 cited in Kelly & Parker, 2001). This discussion
had raised a number of issues, as stated in Kelly & Parker (2001):
• Attitudes towards death: Is the African approach to death different from that of
other cultures? If so, do cultural concerns make it inappropriate to speculate over such
cases?
• Public interest: Does the fact that Mankahlana spoke out in the HIV/AIDS
controversy mean that his cause of death is relevant?
• Racism in the media: Why haven't the deaths of prominent whites been probed in
the same intensive way? Do we polarise opinion along racial lines by writing too
simplistically?
• Stigma: Are we taking a judgmental stance (i.e. he was promiscuous) to justify our
stories about him? Are the media contributing to stigmatising HIV/AIDS or reflecting
society's views?
Shortly after its broadcast, e.tv's report was taken to the Broadcasting Complaints
Commission of South Africa (BCCSA). The complaint was lodged by a member of the
public, who was also a senior government official (Kelly & Parker, 2001), and alleged
that Mankahlana's right to privacy had been violated. However, the BCCSA dismissed
the complaint, ruling that a "dead person had no legal right to privacy or dignity ... and
that while many might find the broadcast 'in questionable taste', Mankahlana's
involvement in the AIDS debate as a public official justified the report" (Kelly & Parker,
2001).
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Regardless of the BCCSA ruling, journalists attending the SANEF meeting concluded
that there were no clear answers to the issues raised; almost everyone attending had
different opinions. What the meeting did however succeed in doing was driving home the
idea that reporting on mV/AIDS was complicated and often controversial. The Star's
Lynne Altenroxel has framed it succinctly: "I've reported on almost every conceivable
subject - taxi violence, murders, you name it - but I've never experienced such ethical
dilemmas as I've had on mV/AIDs. Never." (Altenroxel, personal communication, 5
December 2002).
Pressure mounts on journalists
For a short while, Parks Mankahlana's death interrupted the president's debate about the
cause of AIDS, that had climaxed during the AIDS conference. For the media, however,
it was far from over. The press wanted answers and clarity. Besides, the government's
responses increasingly complemented critical stories about the state's lack of good AIDS
policies. A journalist interviewed for CADRE's report, What's News - Perspectives on
HIV/AIDS in the South African Media, described it as follows: "You know ... [that] ... if
you ask the minister of health or the President, 'Does mv cause AIDS?' [that] they are
going to fall over their tongues. So it's become a game" (CADRE, 2001: 14). The game
was certainly on when, on September 52000, 702 presenter John Robbie interviewed the
Health Minister and repeatedly asked her whether mv caused AIDS. She refused to
answer him (Transcript of John Robbie interview, 2000). A frustrated Robbie told her "to
go away ... I can't take this rubbish any longer" (Robbie, 2000 cited in Transcript of John
Robbie interview, 2000), with an outraged Tshabalala-Msimang slamming down the
phone halfway through the interview.
The ruling ANC party did not take kindly to this, and at once intervened by demanding a
public apology from Robbie and his station, as well as his resignation. In a press release,
the ANC's spokesperson, Smuts Ngonyama, explained that his party was of the opinion
that "as soon as journalists used their positions to rudely belittle others, they lose the right
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to be reporters and are obliged to resign immediately" (Ngonyama, 2000 cited in John
Robbie weier om te bedank na relletjie met minister, 2000:2). If702 refused to comply,
no government minister or senior ANC official would grant an interview to the station
again (Ngonyama, 2000 cited in Eybers, 2000:5). The ANC was strongly criticised for
this threat and although Robbie and 702 initially refused to adhere to the ANC's requests,
the pressure became too much: On September 13, Primedia, 702's owner, issued a written
apology to Tshabalala-Msimang (I'm sorry for my rudeness, 2000: 1). Robbie publicly
apologised for his "rudeness" (Robbie, 2000 cited in I'm sorry for my rudeness, 2000: 1)
at the beginning of his popular drive-time show; only then did the ANC withdraw its
threats. This incident, however, was certainly not the only one illustrative of the kind of
pressure and censorship the government was prepared to exercise to get the kind of
publicity it thought it deserved.
On November 8 2001, Charlene Smith wrote an article for You magazine (Smith,
2001 :22), claiming that at least 20% of parliamentarians were Hl V-positive and that
many were seeking the 'toxic' treatment their president did not want to make available.
She quoted Anglican Archbishop Njongonkulu Ndungane, who described Mbeki as an
insecure and dominating man with "those ... hav[ing] to implement Mbeki's policies
often find[ing] themselves in tricky situations" (Ndugane, 2000 cited in Smith, 2001 :23).
Smith also referred to Mbeki's dismissal of the MRC report that found AIDS to be the
single biggest cause of mortality in South Africa, stating that "the government has also
threatened three times to withdraw the MRC's funding if it doesn't toe the ANC line on
AIDS" (Smith, 2001 :24). The article caused an uproar in the president's office; shortly
after its publication, a frantic Ndungane called Smith saying that he had been requested to
issue a press release denying that she had ever interviewed him (Smith, personal
communication, 5 December 2002). On the same day, MRC president Malegapuru
Makgoba phoned to say that he had received a similar request: to deny that the
government had threatened to withdraw MRC funding (Smith, personal communication,
5 December 2002). In a two week period following the publication of the article, Smith
has claimed unknown parties broke into her house on four occasions and vehicles tried to
force her off the road during three separate incidents: "In none of the burglaries were
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valuable articles taken, and one of the cars trying to force me off the road were off duty
police officers. I got the feeling someone was telling me: 'don't mess with us' ... It might
have been co-incidental, but I don't think so" (Smith, personal communication, 5
December 2002).
Where Smith's experiences have been open to speculation, The Star's Lynne Altenroxel
has been the subject of direct government attacks. In March 2002 she filed a story
Witchhuntfor AIDS whistleblower (Altenroxel, 2002b: 1) on the same MRC report Smith
referred to in her You magazine article. Altenroxel had a letter that Tshabalala-Msimang
had written to the MRC in her possession, in which the minister demanded that the "anti-
dissident" (Tshabalala-Msimang, 2000 cited in Altenroxel, personal conversation, 5
December 2002) that had leaked the report to the media be found and dealt with (the
government had put a hold on the report's release date because it doubted its findings, but
someone leaked it to the media, raising the health minister's and president's fury and
resulting in their denial of the results). Altenroxel wrote that "since mid-February, an
investigator has been tracking down, interrogating - and even suggesting lie-detector
tests on - a host of people who might have had access to the controversial document"
(Altenroxel, 2000b: 1).
The afternoon before the article was to be published, she contacted Tshabalala-
Msimang's spokesperson, Sibani Mngadi, for comment but refused to reveal her sources
or the contents of the letter. Mngadi claimed that it was impossible to get hold of the
minister in time for Altenroxel's deadline, and was so outraged by Altenroxel's report
appearing on The Star's front page the next day that he launched a scathing attack on her
in a letter published in the newspaper on March 26. Mngadi asserted that Altenroxel was
racist and that her report implied that a black minister could not be competent: "It was all
said and done. How can an African woman hold such a tough portfolio without resorting
to some irregular tactics to remain in charge of the health sector?" (Mngadi, 2002: 15).
The day after Altenroxel's report was published, the health department scheduled a press
conference to deny the allegations made in her article. Altenroxel was told that she wasn't
welcome at the press conference, with Mngadi sending her an SMS reading: "Hope you
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have the courtesy to apologise about the MRC report" (Mngadi, 2002 cited in,
Altenroxel, personal communication, 5 December 2002). Essop Pahad, the minister in the
president's office, has openly attacked The Star for Altenroxel's reporting during
meetings between editors and the government, and many of Altenroxel's reports critical
of government have remained unpublished.
Whilst still working for Business Day, Pat Sidley had to cope with blatant censorship
from her editor, Peter Bruce: "I never had to face the kind of editorial censorship I was
facing with Peter before. He was openly susceptible to dissident views, and very vocal
about the fact that the president had phoned him personally several times to discuss
Business Day's AIDS coverage. Until Peter arrived (he replaced Jim Jones as editor at the
beginning of2001), I was writing most of Business Day's AIDS stories, as well as almost
all the leaders on the subject. But with Peter, I was often taken off stories, with him
arguing that the political staff had to cover AIDS stories with a political angle, which
were of course most of the stories. He also stopped me from attending morning
conference meetings to give my input to coverage ... During a significant evening at the
Nelson Mandela Health Award in Cape Town, I decided to finally quit my job because of
the situation. Peter asked me silly questions such as 'did I know that they've never
photographed the AIDS virus' and why I had not reported on the fact that one could only
be certain that a baby is HIV -positive at 18 months'. He ended our conversation by telling
me that I should be listening more to what the president had to say on AIDS and reflect it
in my reporting" (Sidley, personal communication, 12 December 2002). Sidley resigned
in mid-2002, and is now working in the medical schemes industry: "I would still have
liked to write on AIDS, but could not do it under the circumstances at Business Day any
longer. Even the current AIDS reporter faces difficulties, having been told she was not
allowed to file any critical AIDS stories in the two months preceding the ANC's national
conference [in December]" (Sidley, personal communication, 12 December 2002).
Another development in The Star, Business Day and The Citizen was the contradiction of
viewpoints in reports published in the same newspaper, most likely brought on by editors
and reporters holding diverse opinions. While Altenroxel, Sidley and Citizen editor Tim
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du Plessis were filing 'anti-dissident' reports, the letters and op-ed pages, as well as
various columns in their newspapers, were often filled with directly opposing views. The
Citizen's editorials criticized Mbeki, while executive editor Martin William's columns -
often in the same edition as critical leaders - supported dissident views. In Williams's
July 11 column, Mbeki was praised for doing more than "anyone to promote open,
informed debate on AIDS" (Williams, 2000c); an editorial in the same issue accused him
of miring South Africa's fight against AIDS in controversy (Still mired in controversy,
2000). Op-ed pieces by AIDS dissident Anita Allen were repeatedly published, in many
months at least once a week. Referring to Mankahlana's 'dustbin statement', The Star's
leader of July 10 described the president's office as being "more interested in saving face
than in saving lives" (Saving face or lives?, 2000). Four days later an opinion piece by
Star journalist Jovial Rantao however, asked whether "some AIDS activists who have
mounted sustained pressure on the government to do more to combat the AIDS pandemic
have other motives" (Rantao, 2000). Both The Star and Business Day gave promiment
space to the letters of dissidents such as David Rasnick (eg. Rasnick, 2001 a & b), Val
Turner (eg. Turner, 2002) and Anita Allen (eg. Allen, 200la & b). This resulted in harsh
criticism from AIDS activists, such as the AIDS lobby group, Treatment Action
Campaign's Mark Heywood: "You can have responsible news stories, but when you
continue to give space to other forms of reporting supporting dissident views, the damage
prevails. And that points to the fact that the media, overall, has not really reflected on
what it's responsibility is" (Heywood, personal communication, 13 December 2002).
Conclusion
Some believe that the South African media, in the long term, has benefited from Thabo
Mbeki's statements: the situation has forced journalists to study the science of AIDS,
something that was seriously lacking prior to the dissident debate (Kelly & Parker, 2001).
It has also significantly increased the frequency and prominence of AIDS reports, with a
far broader range of journalists and health correspondents reporting on it today. But many
are of the opinion that it has been a totally negative experience, such as the Treatment
Action Campaign's Mark Heywood: "I don't think there was anything positive in the
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dissident episode at all; it cost a lot oflives and wasted a lot oftime. We're still living
with the consequences of it, and we're still not convinced that there are not people who
still harbour these views at high levels within government" (Heywood, personal
communication, 13 December 2002). Heywood has however admitted that the media's
reporting on AIDS improved during the dissident period, and that it prepared the press to
play some kind of public health role during the Nevirapine court cases: "The media
played an important part in this series of court cases, in the sense that it made the
prevention of mother-to-child transmission at the time a national issue in that it reported
extensively on the court proceedings. In that sense the press communicated information
to people on their rights to access to medicine that could reduce their unborn children's
risk of contracting HIV. I can see the proof of the media's effect in the high percentage-
eighty percent - ofHIV positive mothers who accept Nevirapine treatment at pilot sites.
If your compare it to a country like Botswana, where there's a very low take-up, because
there is widespread misunderstanding about the drug and almost no constructive media
coverage on the subject, I think you can tell what the value of South Africa's reporting on
the subject has been" (Heywood, personal communication, 13 December 2002).
Where England (Sunday Times) and the US (New York Native) had newspapers that
exclusively published dissident views, it was not the case in South Africa. Dissident
views were mostly reported in columns, letters and op-ed pages, with news reports often
contradicting them. Even in the Sowetan, which was far more lenient towards the
president, news reports never supported dissident standpoints, they merely backed
Mbeki's right to ask questions. Itwas therefore not necessary for scientific publications to
intervene, like Nature had done in the case of the Sunday Times. Activist groups such as
the Treatment Action Campaign, however, seemed to have an important influence on the
kind of reporting that was done: every time the president made a 'dissident' statement, it
countered it, ensuring that orthodox viewpoints received consistent coverage.
Although significantly decreased in prominence and frequency, dissident views continue to be published in
the mainstream media: Martin Williams still writes about them in his weekly columns and he makes sure
that other columns in his newspaper don't often counter him: after Tim du Plessis left The Citizen as editor
in mid-200I, Williams informed Charlene Smith that her "services were no longer needed" (Smith,
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personal communication, 5 December 2002) for a weekly column in which she often addressed AIDS
issues. According to Pat Sidley, critical reports about Mbeki's opinions on mV/AIDS continue to be
suppressed in Business Day (Sidley, personal communication, 12 December 2002), and The Star still
frequently publishes dissident letters. But, over all, most news reports have continued to be critical of the
government's AIDS policies, pressurising it to change. InCharlene Smith's words: "I think, for the moment,
we've conquered the dissidents. But journalists' role now is to go and check up on whether the state has
implemented the Constitutional Court rulings: are hospitals handing out Nevirapine for Hlv-positive
pregnant women, and do rape survivors really have access to anti-retroviral drugs? And I'm not yet seeing
that happen often enough" (Smith, personal communication, 5 December 2002).
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